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Abstract 
[Excerpt] By 2002, the decline of organizing in the U.S. manufacturing sector has reached crisis 
proportions. In the 1930s it was industrial organizing that built the labor movement and brought a decent 
standard of living to millions of industrial workers, their families, and communities across the country. 
Absent intensive efforts to organize the nation's most mobile industries, U.S. workers will lose their only 
hedge against the worst effects of the global economy, and American manufacturing employers will lead 
the race to the bottom in workplace democracy, wages, working conditions, and living standards. The 
American labor movement needs its industrial base in order to regain both union density and the political 
and economic power that goes with it. The question is not whether manufacturing will disappear in the 
U.S., for there will always be goods produced in this country; the question is what kinds of manufacturing 
jobs those will be and whether they will be unionized. 
It is because of this crisis that the AFL-CIO asked us to research the current state of organizing in 
manufacturing and make recommendations for strategies that would be effective at taking on and 
winning against the large multinational corporations that dominate the manufacturing sector. This report 
summarizes the findings from our research. The first section, Part I, examines changes that have 
occurred in manufacturing industries over the last five years in employment, union membership, union 
density, workforce demographics, and trade and investment relative to changes in other sectors and 
industries. Part II presents summary data for all NLRB elections in the last five years, comparing changes 
in certification election activity and outcomes in manufacturing industries relative to changes in other 
sectors and industries. In this section we also analyze NLRB election activity in the context of the 
changes in employment, union density, workforce demographics, and trade and investment summarized 
in Part I. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the last six years the AFL-CIO has put forth an enormous effort to facilitate, 
support, and encourage organizing initiatives by all affiliates. Although, to date, progress 
has been much slower than the leadership of the labor movement had hoped, more 
recently there have been some signs that those efforts are beginning to bear fruit. A 
growing number of unions are putting more resources into organizing, recruiting and 
training more organizers, ninning more organizing campaigns, winning more elections 
and voluntary recognitions, and winning them in larger units. 
Increasingly, however, these gains have been concentrated in industries such as 
healthcare, hospitality, telecommunication, and building services, while organizing 
efforts and success in manufacturing continue to decline. By January of 2001, only 21 
percent of all NLRB certification election activity occurred in manufacturing, compared 
to 35 percent in service sector industries such as health care, social services, education, 
business services, and hospitality. Overall, NLRB certification-election win rates in 
manufacturing averaged only 39 percent compared to 62 percent in the service sector 
(BLS 2002). The number of eligible voters who participated in NLRB elections from 
January 1997 to December 2001 totals over 414,000 for manufacturing and over 400,000 
for service sector elections. However, only 29 percent (120,291) of eligible voters in 
manufacturing units won representation during this period compared to 55 percent 
(222,391) in service sector units (BNA Plus 2002). 
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For more than a decade the Office of Labor Education Research at Cornell 
University,1 under the direction of Kate Bronfenbrenner, has conducted a series of studies 
to analyze factors contributing to union success in both private and public sector 
organizing campaigns. This research points to many possible explanations for the decline 
in organizing activity and win rates in the U.S. manufacturing sector. First and foremost, 
workers and businesses in the manufacturing sector are those that have been hit hardest 
by globalization and technological change. In particular, manufacturing employers have 
used capital mobility and the threat of capital mobility to intimidate unorganized workers 
from organizing into a union. In fact, our most recent research found that more than 70 
percent of manufacturing employers threaten to close all or part of their facility during 
NLRB organizing campaigns and another 22 percent continue those threats during the 
first contract campaign after the election is won (Bronfenbrenner 2000; 2001). These 
threats, and the other aggressive employer anti-union tactics that go with them, have had 
a devastating effect on organizing efforts in the manufacturing sector. Not only are 
election win rates rapidly declining in manufacturing industries, but industrial unions are 
also increasingly turning away from organizing targets in more mobile manufacturing 
industries and are looking instead to health care, public sector, food services, and other 
less mobile industries. 
By 2002, the decline of organizing in the U.S. manufacturing sector has reached 
crisis proportions. In the 1930s it was industrial organizing that built the labor movement 
and brought a decent standard of living to millions of industrial workers, their families, 
and communities across the country. Absent intensive efforts to organize the nation's 
This project was partially funded by the AFL-CIO. The authors would like to thank Robert Glase, 
Christina Ingoglia, Julie Sadler, and Anne Sieverding for the research assistance they provided for this 
report. In addition, we would like to acknowledge Beth Berry for her editorial assistance. 
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most mobile industries, U.S. workers will lose their only hedge against the worst effects 
of the global economy, and American manufacturing employers will lead the race to the 
bottom in workplace democracy, wages, working conditions, and living standards. The 
American labor movement needs its industrial base in order to regain both union density 
and the political and economic power that goes with it. The question is not whether 
manufacturing will disappear in the U.S., for there will always be goods produced in this 
country; the question is what kinds of manufacturing jobs those will be and whether they 
will be unionized. 
It is because of this crisis that the AFL-CIO asked us to research the current state 
of organizing in manufacturing and make recommendations for strategies that would be 
effective at taking on and winning against the large multinational corporations that 
dominate the manufacturing sector. This report summarizes the findings from our 
research. The first section, Part I, examines changes that have occurred in manufacturing 
industries over the last five years in employment, union membership, union density, 
workforce demographics, and trade and investment relative to changes in other sectors 
and industries. Part II presents summary data for all NLRB elections in the last five 
years, comparing changes in certification election activity and outcomes in 
manufacturing industries relative to changes in other sectors and industries. In this 
section we also analyze NLRB election activity in the context of the changes in 
employment, union density, workforce demographics, and trade and investment 
summarized in Part L 
In Part HI of the report, we present more of a micro analysis, using survey data to 
analyze the nature and process of organizing activity in the manufacturing sector relative 
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to other industries and sectors, including data on company characteristics, election 
background, bargaining unit demographics, organizer background, and employer and 
union tactics. These data will also be used to gain greater insight into why organizing 
success has become so elusive for unions organizing in the manufacturing sector. Part IV 
of the report presents our conclusions and recommendations about the most effective 
strategies for overcoming the challenges of organizing in the manufacturing sector. 
Method 
We used multiple data sources for this project. The industry employment, union 
membership, and union density data, summarized in Part I, were compiled from the 1998-
2002 editions of the Union Membership and Earnings Data Book published annually by 
the Bureau of National Affairs (BNA) (Hirsch and Macpherson 1998-2002), while the 
sector employment, union membership, and union density data, and the sector and 
industry workforce demographic data were compiled from Bureau of Labor Statistics 
data from 1997-2001 (BLS 2002) 2 BNA utilizes information from the Current 
Population Survey (CPS) to estimate statistics on employment, union membership, and 
2
 For the industry data we used BNA data rather than Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) data because BLS 
does not provide the detailed industry breakdown that we needed for this study. However, for our broader 
sector breakdowns we used BLS data because BNA does not separate out public sector employment, 
membership, or density figures. 
The CPS is a monthly survey conducted by the Bureau of Census of wage and salary workers in more 
than 50,000 households. The survey collects data on employment, occupation, race, gender, income, union 
membership, and union coverage for, on average, two wage and salary workers in each of the households in 
the survey sample. Because of sampling bias and sample size issues, the CPS is less reliable for industries 
with either low levels of employment or low levels of union density, or for industries where changes in 
employment or density are highly concentrated in certain regions or metropolitan areas. For example in the 
aftermath of September 11, 2001, there were dramatic job losses among unionized hotel employees in New 
York City and Los Angeles, but the sample for the CPS monthly survey for October, November, and 
December 2001 only included eleven hotel/motel employees in Los Angeles, only one of them a union 
member, and fourteen hotel employees in New York, including nine union members. Clearly, sample sizes 
this small are not useful for capturing regionally-based employment and union membership trends in these 
industries. In addition, because the CPS sample is based on a phone survey and therefore is less likely to 
include workers who are more marginal in the labor market (such as undocumented workers, homeless 
workers, and contingent workers), it is likely to underestimate the amount of both union and non-union job 
loss (Luce 2002). 
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union density for industries and sectors broken down by three digit Standard Industrial 
Codes (SIC). Our analysis includes both the baseline data reported by BNA as well as our 
calculations for average yearly percentage changes and aggregate percentage changes in 
employment, union, and demographic data from 1997-2001. These data allow us to 
examine differences in recent changes in employment and unionization both across the 
major economic sectors and more specifically across manufacUiring industries. 
In Part I we also use U.S. Department of Commerce data on U.S. trade and 
investment inflows and outflows from 1997-2001 (2002a; 2002b), along with data 
compiled on trade, foreign direct investment, and employment as part of the July 2001 
study commissioned by the U.S.-China Security Review Commission (Bronfenbrenner 
and Burke, et al. 2001).4 These data allow us to examine possible linkages between 
changes in employment, union membership, and union density in manufacturing 
industries and changes in investment and trade for those industries. 
The NLRB statistics included in Part II are compiled from a specialized database 
prepared by BNA Plus5 covering all NLRB certification elections (RC elections) that 
took place from January 1997 through December 2001. The database included election 
information on company name, petitioning union, number of eligible voters, unit type, 
election type, SIC, vote count, outcome, and certification date.6 By using the same 
industry breakdowns as we used in Part I, the data in Part II allow us to look at NLRB 
For a copy of the report summarizing the findings from this study, "The Impact of U.S. China Trade 
Relations on Workers, Wages, and Employment" (Bronfenbrenner and Burke, et al. 2002), please see 
http://www usee, gov/bron.pdf. 
- • - The NLRB data used in Part II was provided by BNA PLUS, the research division of The Bureau of 
National Affairs, Inc., 1231 25th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20037; 800-452-7773; bna@bnaplus.com. 
^ _ _ j°NA PLUS maintains a database of NLRB elections, which begins in 1985 and is updated quarterly. 
The NLRB database included both multi-union and single union elections. For the elections in the 
, ,. database where there was more than one union on the ballot, we recorded whichever union won the election 
•t?J'.r-. - w*ns ^ d , for losses, whichever union garnered the most votes. For multi-union elections where the 
'ig'hi* election was lost, but no vote count was reported, we recorded the original petitioning union. 
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activity and success relative to the our findings on employment, union density, and 
wages. 
Part IE is based on data collected as part of a larger study commissioned in May 
2000 by the United States Trade Deficit Review Commission to update Bronfenbrenner's 
previous research on the impact of plant closings and threats of plant closings on union 
organizing and first contract campaigns in the U.S. private sector (Bronfenbrenner 1997; 
2000; 2001).7 Through the use of surveys, personal interviews, documentary evidence, 
and electronic databases, this study compiled detailed data on election background, 
organizing environment, bargaining unit demographics, company characteristics and 
tactics, labor board charges and determinations, union characteristics and tactics, and 
election and first contract outcomes for 412 NLRB certification election campaigns that 
took place between January 1, 1998, and December 31, 1999. 
Our original random sample of 600 elections was derived from data compiled by 
the BNA of all NLRB single-union certification election campaigns in units with fifty or 
more eligible voters that took place in 1998-1999 (BNA PLUS 2000).8 For each case in 
the sample we conducted in-depth surveys of the lead organizer for the campaign by mail 
and phone. We also conducted computerized corporate, media, legal, and union database 
searches, and reviewed Securities and Exchange Commission filings, IRS 990 forms, and 
NLRB documents to collect data on company ownership, structure, operations, 
For a copy of the report summarizing the findings from this study, 'TJneasy Terrain: The Impact of 
Capital Mobility on Workers, Wages, and Union Organizing" (Bronfenbrenner 2000) go to the U.S. Trade 
Deficit Review Commission website at http://www.ustdrc.gov/research/bronfenbrenner.pdf. 
The study focuses on units with fifty or more eligible voters because data on bargaining unit 
demographics, company and union characteristics, and union and employer tactics are much more difficult 
to reliably analyze in units with only a small number of voters. The sample is representative of the 
population of NLRB elections in units with 50 or more eligible voters. 
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employment, financial condition, unionization, and employer characteristics and 
practices. 
We were able to complete surveys for 412 of the 600 cases in our random sample, 
for a response rate of 68 percent. Further, we were able to collect corporate ownership, 
structure, and financial information for 99 percent of the cases in our sample. NLRB data 
were compiled from the FAST database for 65 percent of the 136 cases where NLRB 
charges were filed, while NLRB documents were collected for 46 percent. When broken 
down by industry and sector, findings from these data allow us to examine differences 
and similarities between company characteristics, bargaining unit demographics, and 
union and employer behavior for NLRB elections in manufacturing units and units in 
other sectors of the economy. In addition, these findings provide important insights into 
which union strategies are most effective in assisting manufacturing unions in improving 
their organizing success. 
Throughout the paper we have divided industries into three main sectors: 
manufacturing, services, and other industries. Manufacturing includes all industries 
producing durable and non-durable goods, as well as mining, quarrying, and oil and gas 
extraction and processing. The service sector grouping includes health care, social 
services, education, entertainment, hospitality, building services, business services, and 
personal services. The "other sector" category includes retail, wholesale, utilities, 





 delude employment, union membership, and union density data for the public 
sector, but we do not have current certification election or survey data on public sector 
-il \ organizing. 
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PART I: EMPLOYMENT, UNION MEMBERSHIP, AND UNION DENSITY 
BY INDUSTRY AND SECTOR, 1997-2001 
Although the latter part of the 1990s has been generally hailed as a period of 
robust economic expansion and extensive job growth, the expansion was much less 
universal and the job growth much more limited than has been claimed. Instead, by the 
end of the decade there was a well-established pattern in the U.S. economy of slow job 
growth, declining employment in manufacturing, and expanding employment in the 
service sector, public sector, and most other sectors such as communications, 
construction, retail, wholesale, and transportation. For most sectors of the economy, 
changes in union membership paralleled employment trends for each sector, declining in 
manufacturing and generally increasing in the service and public sectors. However, 
membership changes were much more mixed in other sectors, with union membership 
increasing in communications, construction, warehousing, and sanitation, but declining in 
transportation, utilities, and retail, wholesale, and warehouse distribution. 
While overall union membership levels increased from 1997 to 2001, membership 
growth failed to keep up with employment growth, resulting in a continuation of the 
steady decline in union density levels that began a half a century ago. These overall 
employment, union membership, and union density trends also mask significant variation 
in the patterns within sectors. A few manufacturing industries experienced real gains in 
union membership and density levels in the period from 1997 to 2001, at the same time 
that several industries in both the service sector and other sectors experienced union 
density declines (Tables 1-1 and 1-2). Although many unionized companies, particularly 
-**__ io.manufacturing and retail, experienced devastating losses during this period, the labor 
movement could take some comfort in the fact that the overall rate of density decline had 
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slowed by the end of the 1990s, refuting pundits such as Leo Troy who had prematurely 
declared the near extinction of unions in the U.S. private sector by the year 2000 (Troy 
1994). 
Our analysis of these important trends in employment, union membership, and 
union density highlight both the challenges that have made organizing in the 
manufacturing sector more difficult and the continuing importance of manufacturing 
industries to the U.S. economy and organized labor. Similarly, the trade and investment 
data examined in this report show that trade agreements, such as the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) or the Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) with 
China, have led to declining trade balances for all major commodity groups tracked by 
the U.S. Department of Commerce. Certain industries, such as auto and auto parts, 
electronics and electrical equipment, and apparel and textiles, and certain unions, such as 
the UAW, CWA/IUE, USWA, and UNITE, have been particularly hard hit by these 
negative trends in international trade. 
During this same period, the rate of foreign direct investment in U.S. 
manufacturing industries has outpaced the flow of U.S. capital investments abroad. 
Although manufacturing industries will not disappear from the U.S. economy, for the 
majority of U.S. manufacturing firms, corporate ownership and structure are increasingly 
tied to the uncertain world of international capital markets. As our findings show, these 
trade and investment data reveal both the significant obstacles facing unions that organize 
in mobile manufacturing industries and the continuing importance of those industries to 
unions and the economy (Scott, Salas, and Campbell, 2001; Bronfenbrenner and Burke, 
et al. 2001; Bronfenbrenner 2000). 
Overcoming the Challenges to Organizing in Manufacturing - page 10 
Differences in employment trends between and within economic sectors 
Despite the economic boom in the late 1990s, the U.S. displayed only modest job 
growth during those years. Between 1997 and 2001 total nonagricultural employment 
grew by 6.2 million workers, or approximately 1 percent per year. 
Figure 1-1: Employment levels and change in employment levels by sector, 1997-2001 
« J I v""iV,"Wi" 
Manufacturing Service sector Other sectors Public sector 
Current employment level 18,680 41,909 39,348 19,155 
Change in employment -1,888 4,135 2,985 1,008 
As we see in Figures 1-1 and 1-2, the manufacturing sector lost nearly 1.9 million 
jobs during those five years, resulting in a 9 percent contraction in the total number of 
jobs in manufacturing industries. Service sector industries displayed the strongest job 
growth, increasing by 4.1 million workers (11 percent). Employment levels in other 
sectors grew at a slightly slower pace, adding nearly 3 million jobs for a growth rate of 8 
percent. Government employment increased by a more modest 6 percent, adding just 
over one million public sector jobs to the economy between 1997 and 2001. 
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Manufacturing Service sector Other sectors Public sector 
After years of steady job losses, by 2001 the manufacturing sector represented 
just 16 percent of total non-farm employment (Figure 1-3). The public sector represented 
another 16 percent while, together, the service sector (35 percent) and other sectors such 
as transportation, communications, construction, and retail (33 percent) accounted for the 
remaining two thirds of total employment. 
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Tabic 1-1: Summary statistics for employment and 
Manufacturing 
Aerospace 
Apparel, textiles, and 
leather 
Auto and auto parts 
Building materials 
Chemicals and petroleum 
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Industry employment trends 
As described in Table 1-1, while employment losses were universal among 
manufacturing industries, all industries in the service and other sectors showed some job 
growth between 1997-2001 with the exception of utilities (-95,000 jobs). Most job 
growth was concentrated within a limited number of industries including business 
services (1.5 million jobs), educational services (1.2 milhon jobs), retail (1.2 million 
jobs), construction (1.1 milhon jobs), finance, insurance, and real estate (541,000 jobs), 
social services (424,200 jobs), and health care (414,000 jobs). 
Figure 1-4: Current employment and changes in employment by manufacturing industries, 1997-
2001 
(Thousands) 
H Change in employment, 1997 - 2001 • Employment 2001 
Although every manufacturing industry experienced some job losses during this 
period, certain manufacturing industries suffered a disproportionate share of the jobs lost. 
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As we see in Figure 1-4, the most significant job losses occurred in apparel, textiles and 
leather, where in just five years the industry lost 537,000 jobs. Other industries that 
experienced heavy losses include industrial equipment and machinery (187,000 jobs), 
chemicals and petroleum (143,200 jobs), electronics and electrical products (133,000 
jobs), wood products (117,000 jobs), and autos and auto parts (112,600 jobs). In contrast, 
some manufacturing industries suffered much smaller net job losses such as rubber 
(11,600 jobs), metal production (23,000 jobs), and aerospace (30,900 jobs). 
Figure 1-5: Percent change in manufacturing industry employment, 1997-2001 
The variation across manufacturing industries becomes even more apparent when 
put in the context of the percent change in total employment for each manufacturing 
industry from 1997-2001 (Figure 1-5). By far the most devastating job losses occurred in 
apparel, textiles, and leather, which lost fully a third of its employment base in five years. 
-Several other industries also experienced major losses representing more than 10 percent 
of 1997 employment in the industry, such as wood products (-16 percent), paper products 
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(-13 percent), mining quarrying, and extraction (-13 percent), and household and 
recreational products (-12 percent). 
Figure 1-6: Manufacturing industries as a proportion of sector employment and industry 
employment loss as a proportion of total sector employment loss 
1.00 
• Aerospace 
• Apparel, textiles, and leather 
• Auto and auto parts 
H Building materials 
• Chemicals and petroleum 
H Electronics 
• Food processing 
• Household products 
B Industrial equipment 
H Metal fabrication 
B Metal production 
B Mining, quarrying, and extraction 
• Paper products 
B Plastics 
• Printing and publishing 
B Rubber products 
HWood products 
• Other manufacturing 
!'*/ As described in Figure 1-6, the variation in employment levels across 
. „ , ,<_ manufacturing industries is important when assessing the true impact of job losses in 
fegSfl^-ffiSfa industry. For example, industrial equipment had the second highest number of jobs 
V / ° S t (~-^7,000), yet its share of manufacturing sector job loss (10 percent) was relatively 
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equivalent to its share of manufacturing employment (12 percent) because with 2.2 
million workers, industrial equipment employed more workers than any other 
manufacturing industry. While comprising only 6 percent of total manufacturing sector 
employment, apparel, textile, and leather accounted for 28 percent of job loss in the 
manufacturing sector during this period. Similarly, the share of total employment loss in 
mining, quarrying, and extraction (4 percent), paper products (5 percent), and wood 
products (6 percent) was nearly twice the size of each industries' share of employment in 
the sector (all 3 percent). In contrast, the share of total employment losses for metal 
fabrication (2 percent), metal production (1 percent), and food processing (2 percent) was 
one quarter of their share of manufactoing employment (7 percent, 4 percent, and 8 
percent respectively), while printing and publishing's share of employment losses (4 
percent) was less than half of its share of employment (9 percent). 
Demographic characteristics of sector and industry workforce 
In the last decade unions have not only confronted a changing industrial 
landscape, they have experienced a changing workforce as well, particularly in the 
manufacturing sector. Slowly but surely trie face of the American manufacturing worker 
has changed, and it is no longer possible to characterize a significant proportion of the 
manufacturing workforce as belonging to any specific race, gender, or ethnic group. This 
remains true even in a time of recession, where the "last hired," often women and 
workers of color, are all too often the "first fired." 
Table 1-2 and Figure 1-7 present summary statistics for differences in the 
proportion of women, African-American, and Hispanic workers in sectors and industries. 
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Overall women accounted for 48 percent of the total workforce, while African-American 
and Hispanic workers both accounted for 12 percent.' 
Table 1-2: Workforce demographic 
Manufacturing 
Aerospace 
Apparel, textiles, and leather 
Auto and auto parts 
Building materials 







Mining, quarrying, and extraction 
Paper products 
Plastics 
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Because the Bureau of Labor Statistics only provided demographic data broken down by industry on 
"African-American and Hispanic workers, we do not report current industry data on other racial and ethnic 
groups such as Asians, Pacific Islanders, Native Americans, and non-Hispanic Black workers from Africa 
and the Caribbean. We can assume, as with Hispanic workers, there has been an increased presence of new 
unmigrant workers, particularly from Southeast Asia, across all sectors. 
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As would be expected, the highest concentration of women workers was in the 
service sector, where they made up 62 percent of the workforce compared to 45 percent 
in the public sector, 39 percent in other sectors, and just under a third in manufacturing 
(31 percent). Women were especially concentrated in social services (82 percent), health 
care (75 percent), and education (70 percent), and represented the majority of the 
workforce in finance, insurance, and real estate (58 percent), laundries (57 percent), 
hotels (56 percent), apparel, textiles and leather (55 percent), and (retail 51 percent). The 
industries where women were least represented include construction (10 percent), mining, 
quarrying, and extraction (15 percent), wood products (16 percent), and metal production 
(18 percent). 


























African-American workers were most concentrated in service sector industries 
such as social services (21 percent), health care (16 percent), and hotels (15 percent) as 
well as transportation (16 percent), auto and auto parts and rubber products (both 15 
percent), and food processing and apparel, textile, and leather (both 14 percent). As with 
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women workers, the smallest proportion of African-American workers was found in 
construction (6 percent) and mining, quarrying, and extraction (4 percent). 
A slightly different trend was found among Hispanic workers, who were primarily 
concentrated in food processing (25 percent), apparel, textile, and leather (23 percent), 
laundries (23 percent), and hotels (20 percent). Hispanics were least represented in auto 
and auto parts and rubber products (both 6 percent), and education, health care, finance, 
insurance and real estate, and wholesale (all 7 percent). 
Table 1-3: Change in workforce demographics by manufacturing industry, 
All manufacturing 
Aerospace 
Apparel, textiles, and leather 
Auto and auto parts 
Building materials 
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Women workers in manufacturing 
As described in Table 1-3 and Figure 1-8, the proportion of women in the 
^ ^ f ^ t u r i n g workforce varied significantly across individual manufacturing industries. 
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Figure I-$: Gender breakdown of manufacturing workforce by industry, 2001 
Overall, women represented 31 percent of the manufacturing workforce in 2001. 
The one manufacturing industry where women represented the majority (55 percent) of 
the workforce in 2001 was apparel, textiles, and leather, as they have for nearly a century. 
Women also represented a significant proportion of the printing and publishing 
industry in 2001 (43 percent). This reflects, in part, the shift in the printing industry from 
more of a traditional industrial production model to a more high-tech production process 
requiring increasing numbers of clerical and other white collar workers. Other 
manufacturing industries where women represented at least a quarter of the workforce 
include auto and auto parts (25 percent), chemicals and petroleum (32 percent), 
electronics and electrical equipment (38 percent), food processing (35 percent), 
household products (33 percent), paper products (26 percent), and plastics (37 percent). 
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Overall, women represented at least 20 percent of the workforce in all but three 
manufacturing industries (wood products, metal production, and mining, quarrying, and 
extraction). 
These data confirm that while women continue to be concentrated in the service, 
finance, and retail sectors of the economy, they represent a significant proportion of the 
industrial workforce as well. As described in Figure 1-9, in the last five years women's 
representation across sectors has also remained remarkably stable, holding steady at 62 
percent in the service sector and 45 percent in the public sector and changing by -3 
percent (one percentage point) in manufacturing (32 percent to 31 percent), other sectors 
(40 to 39 percent), and increasing by only 2 percent in all sectors combined (47 percent to 
48 percent). 












P jblic sector All sectors 
45% I 47% 
45% J 48% 
However, a very different picture emerges when we examine changes in the 
proportion of women within individual manufacturing industries. As described in Table 
^J^jmd Figure I-10, while gender composition in industrial sectors such as auto and auto 
parts and printing and pubhshing has remained quite stable, most industries faced fairly 
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significant shifts in the proportion of women employed in the industry between 1997 and 
2001. 
The most dramatic percentage decreases in the proportion of women in the 
industry were found in building materials (-15 percent) and metal fabrication (-8 percent). 
Other industries which experienced significant decreases in the proportion of women in 
the workforce include wood products and chemicals and petroleum (both -6 percent), and 
apparel, textiles, and leather (-7 percent). 
Figure I-10: Change in the proportion of women in manufacturing industries, 1997-2001 
15% 1 gfMMaw.ii', r.aw I'lTO'i.'iwmmjruiwmaaHa 
During this same period, the proportion of women in the industry increased 
substantially in metal production (13 percent), aerospace (9 percent), mining quarrying 
^ d extraction (7 percent), household and recreational products and food processing (both 
6 percent). However, because of the great differences in employment numbers across 
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manufacturing industries, we can best see the actual demographic shifts of men to women 
workers by looking at the number of jobs involved, rather then the percentage change. 
Thus, we find that the greatest demographic shift towards woman occurred in food 
processing, where a 6 percent increase translated into approximately 32,000 more jobs 
held by women. Similarly, in industrial equipment and machinery, a 4 percent gain by 
women reflected a demographic shift involving approximately 24,000 jobs. This 
contrasts with metal production, where in 1997 women represented only 16 percent of the 
workforce, so a 13 percent increase in the proportion of women in the workforce 
translated into an increase of only around 15,0.00 jobs held by women. 
A similar pattern was found in those industries where the percentage of women 
dropped from 1997 to 2001. For example, because of the large percentage of women 
employed in the apparel, textile, and leather industry in 1997 (59 percent), a 7 percent 
drop in the proportion of women in the industry translates into 65,000 fewer women 
working in the industry, while, because women only represent 24 percent of the 
workforce in the rubber industry, an 8 percent drop in the proportion of women in the 
industry translates into a decline of 26,000 women in the industry. 
In combination these data tell us that the gender composition of the workforce is 
going through fairly significant shifts in several manufacturing industries, with the 
proportion of women in the industry declining in industries such as apparel, textile, and 
leather; building materials; metal fabrication; rubber products; chemicals and petroleum; 
and household and recreational products; while the proportion of women is increasing in 
industries such as food processing, metal production, aerospace, and mining, quarrying, 
and extraction. These data also suggest that in some of the economic sectors hardest hit 
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bv the current recession, such as apparel, textiles, and leather, building materials, and 
wood products, women have suffered job losses at a rate disproportionate to their 
employment density in those industries. 
African-American and Hispanic workers in manufacturing 
By 2001, African-American and Hispanic workers accounted for more than 20 
percent of the manufacturing workforce. As with women, we find great variation in the 
extent to which African-American and Hispanic workers were represented in individual 
manufacturing industries. 
Figure 1-11: Proportion of African-American and Hispanic workers in manufacturing industries 
H Percent African-American • Percent Hispanic 
In 2001 the highest concentration of African-American workers (between 13 and 
15 percent) could be found in apparel, garment, and textiles, auto and auto parts, 
chemicals and petroleum, food processing, paper products, and rubber products (Figure I-
11). Hispanic workers had their highest concentration in food processing (25 percent), 
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apparel, textiles, and leather (23 percent), and household and recreational products (18 
percent). Both groups were underrepresented in printing and publishing, aerospace, 
industrial equipment and machinery, and mining, quarrying and excavation (all between 
7 and 10 percent). Hispanic workers also had very low concentrations in rubber products 
and auto and auto parts (both 6 percent), both industries where there were relatively high 
concentrations of African-American workers (both 15 percent). 




As described in Figures 1-12 and 1-13, during the last five years, the overall 
proportion of African-American workers in the manufacturing sector remained constant, 
holding at 10 percent from 1997-2001. At the same time, African-American workers 
increased their representation in the workforce in the service sector by 8 percent and in 
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ther sectors by 10 percent. In contrast, Hispanic workers increased their representation 
in the manufacturing sector by 9 percent and in other sectors by 20 percent, but their 
representation in the service sector remained constant at 9 percent for the five-year 
period. In the public sector the proportion of African-American workers declined 6 
percent while the proportion of Hispanic workers increased 9 percent. What these trends 
capture is that, while the proportion of workers of color in the workforce continues to 
increase overall, an increasing number of Hispanic workers were moving into 
manufacturing industries, both in the South and Midwest, which, in previous years were 
more dominated by African-American and white workers. 
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Figure 1-13 provides more detailed data on just where the shifts in manufacturing 
employment for both African-American and Hispanic workers were concentrated. As 
with women workers, the biggest shifts in real numbers of jobs occurred in apparel, 
textiles and leather and food processing. Between 1997 and 2001 the proportion of 
African-American workers in apparel, textiles, and leather dropped 18 percent (-31,000 
workers) while the proportion of Hispanic workers increased by 16 percent (27,000 
workers), suggesting an almost direct shift from African-American to Hispanic workers 
in the industry. Similar divergent trends occurred in food processing, where in 1997 the 
proportion of the workforce represented by African-American and Hispanic workers was 
relatively equal (15 percent and 18 percent respectively), by the end of the decade the 
proportion of African-Americans in the industry had dropped by 7 percent (114,000 
workers) to 14 percent, while the proportion of Hispanic workers had increased by 39 
percent (637,000 workers) to 25 percent. 
Overall, Hispanic workers only decreased their representation in three 
manufacturing industries between 1997 and 2001 — plastics, where their representation 
in the industry dropped from 15 percent to 14 percent (7 percent decrease); mining, 
quarrying, and extraction, where they decreased from 9 percent to 8 percent (15 percent 
decrease); and rubber products, where they dropped from 10 percent to 6 percent of the 
industry (40 percent decrease). Their representation remained unchanged in aerospace, 
chemicals and petroleum, electronics, industrial equipment, and other manufacturing, 
while it increased at least 20 percent in auto and auto parts, household products and 
recreational equipment, metal production, and paper products. Overall the proportion of 
panic workers had a net gain of 9 percent in all manufacturing industries combined. 
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African-American workers, in contrast, suffered losses in electronics (-11 
percent), plastics (-22 percent), and wood products (-17 percent), and experienced gains 
of at least 10 percent in aerospace, building materials, chemicals and petroleum, metal 
production, paper products, and rubber products, overall remaining constant at 10 percent 
of the manufacturing workforce. 
Differences in union membership trends between and within sectors 
Between 1997 and 2001, the total number of union members in the U.S. increased 
slightly, by just 177,000 (1 percent), from 16.07 million hi 1997 to 16.25 million union 
members in 2001.10 As described in Tables 1-1 and 1-4 and Figure 1-14, the overall 
stability in total union membership masks the significant differences in overall 
membership levels and changes in membership levels between and within economic 
sectors during that period. For example, between 1997 and 2001 union membership in 
the manufacturing sector declined by 615,000, dropping from 3.3 million members (21 
percent of organized workers) in 1997 to 2.7 niillion (17 percent of organized workers) in 
2001. 
TTable 1-4: Number of union members and percent of union members by sector and year, 1997-2001 
1997 1998 199!) 2000 2001 1997-2001 
Number Number Number Number Number Change Average 
of Percent of Percent of Percent of Percent of Percent of percent 
members of all members of all members of all members of all members of all members of all 
(OOP's) members (OOP's) members (OOP's) members (OOP's) members (000's) members (OOP's) members 
Manufacturing sector 3,337 21% 3,199 20% 3,081 19% 2,886 18% 2,722 17% -615 19% 
Service sector 1,802 11% 1,900 12% 1,965 12% 2,005 12% 2,184 13% 382 12% 
Othersectors 4,187 26% 4,182 26% 4,330 26% 4,219 26% 4,182 26% -5 26% 
Public sector 6,747 42% 6,905 43% 7,058 43% 7,110 44% 7,162 44% 415 43% 
M sectors 16,073 100% 16,186 100% 16,434 100% 16,220 100% 16,250 100% 177 100% 
The published figures from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) and the Bureau of National Affairs 
(BNA) differ slightly due to different sampling methods. In this report, we use BLS data for sector level 
analysis and BNA data for industry level analysis. 
Overcoming the Challenges to Organizing in Manufacturing -page 29 
Figure 1-14: Current numbers of union members and change by sector, 1997-2001 
Union membership 2001 














In contrast, the public sector gained 415,000 new members during the same 
period, increasing from 42 percent of organized workers (6.7 milhon members) in 1997 
to 44 percent of organized workers (7.2 milhon members) in 2001. While the service 
sector also showed significant growth (382,000 new members), because it started from a 
base level of only 11 percent of all organized workers (1.8 milhon members) in 1997, by 
2001 this increase brought the total number of organized workers in the service sector up 
to only 2.2 milhon members, or 13 percent of all organized workers. 
Overall, membership levels in other sectors showed a net loss of only 5,000 
members, holding steady at around 4.2 million (26 percent of all organized workers) for 
g i ^ . , . the entire five-year period. However, this overall stability masked significant differences 
MthJQtheother sector grouping, ranging from a loss of 134,000 members in retail to an 
increase of 198,000 members in construction during this same period. 
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It is also important to put membership changes in the context of the overall 
employment changes that occurred during this period. As shown in figure 1-15, the 
615,000 union members lost in manufacturing from 1997 to 2001 accounted for 
approximately a third of the total manufacturing employment losses. In other sectors, the 
drop in five thousand union members from 1997 to 2001 seems insignificant relative to 
the more than 2.9 million new jobs gained in other sectors during this period. 
Similarly, the 382,000 members gained in the service sector represents less than 
10 percent of the total service sector employment gains during that period (4.1 million), 
while the 415,000 increase in union members in the public sector is less than half of the 
]{^3}ii n e t £a*n °f o n e million new workers in the public sector in just the last five years. 
^Nevertheless, the growth in public and service sector union membership was able to 
jkvJi: * . 
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rtially compensate for the union membership losses in manufacturing, resulting in a net 
in of 177,000 new members between 1997 and 2001. 
FVure 1-16: Employment and membership levels by sector, 1997-2001 
45,000 
5^, ' Figure 1-16 shows the sector level trends in employment and union membership 
%••-?• * by year. From 1997 to 2001, declines in union membership in the manufacturing sector 
%t*f ' paralleled declines in manufacturing employment during the same period. Service sector 
g|j|jgy» •^Pyioyment grew rapidly while union membership in the service sector, although it 
pa- mcreased, grew much more slowly than employment in the service sector. In the public 1 
JP-
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sector, there was slow yearly employment growth from 1997 to 2001, mirrored by slow 
but steady membership increases. The most noticeably divergent trends occurred in other 
sectors, where union membership was relatively flat, while sector employment expanded 
steadily. 
When we compare the relative changes in employment and union membership, 
we find significant variation across sectors. As shown in Figure 1-17, the rate of 
employment loss in unionized manufacturing jobs (-18 percent) was more than twice that 
of employment loss in non-union jobs (-7 percent) and approximately twice the overall 
employment loss in the manufacturing sector (-9 percent). In other sectors, where union 
membership remained flat, non-union employment increased by 9 percent, while overall 
employment increased by 8 percent. In the public sector, the growth rates for union 
workers (6 percent), non-union workers (5 percent), and overall employment (6 percent) 
were relatively equal. These findings suggest that in the last five years public sector 
union job losses resulting from privatization, contracting out, and cutbacks in social 
services were more than made up for by public sector organizing gains, along with 
employment expansion in unionized federal, state, and local public sector agencies, 
particularly in education. 
In the service sector, the unionized workforce increased at a rate of 21 percent, 
twice the rate of increase in the non-union service sector workforce (10 percent) and the 
rate of increase in overall employment (11 percent). Once again, this reflects the 
combination of significant employment expansion in already organized service sector 
industries, coupled with organizing gains in health care, business services, hotels, 
laundries, and education (see Part H). 
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Fiffure 1-17: Percent change in union members compared to percent change in non-union 
employment by sector 
However,"asrUlustrated inFigure I-18, any comparison of growth rates among 
organized and unorganized workers across sectors needs to be put into the context of the 
base number of organized and unorganized workers for each sector. For example, at 39.7 
million, the total number of unorganized service sector workers in 2001 was nearly 
twenty times that of the total number of organized workers in the service sector (2.2 
million) for that same year. A similar pattern occurs in other sectors where by 2001 the 
total number of organized workers was only 4.1 million while the total number of 
unorganized workers had increased to 35.2 million. In contrast, in the manufacturing 
sector, where union density has long been much higher and both organized and 
unorganized firms had been hard hit by employment losses, the total number of 
unorganized workers (16.0 million) in 2001 was less than five times that of organized 
workers (2.9 million), while in the public sector, where both employment and union 
membership levels have remained relatively stable, the number of unorganized workers 
(12.0 million) is less than two times the number of organized workers (7.2 million). 
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Ficure 1-18: Number of union members and number of unorganized workers in 2001, by sector 
Manufacturing sector Service sector Other sectors Public sector 
Union members 2,722 2,184 4,182 7,162 
Unorganized workers 15,958 39,725 35,166 11,993 
Union membership trends by industry 
As described in Table 1-5 and Figure 1-19, substantial membership growth 
between 1997 and 2001 occurred in educational services (394,100) and construction 
(198,200). Significant increases were also seen in health care (81,900), business services 
(69,400), and communications (52,900). 
The retail industry suffered the largest decline in union membership, falling by 
more than 134,000 members in five years. As for manufacturing, nearly every 
manufacturing industry lost union members between 1997 and 2001. Auto and auto parts 
and food processing lost the greatest number of union members, 85,400 and 82,700 
respectively. Electronics and electrical parts lost 65,800 union members, followed by 
industrial equipment and machinery, metal fabrication, and metal production, which all 
lost between 50,000 and 56,000 union members. Rubber products and household and 
-recreational products were the only manufacturing industries with membership growth, 
adding 3,000 and 2,500 members respectively. 
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Table 1-5: Employment, union membership, and union density by sector and industry, 1997-2001 
Employment Union Membership Union Density 
Manufacturing sector 
Aerospace 
Apparel, textiles, and leather 
Auto and auto parts 
Building materials 
Chemicals and petroleum 
Electronics and electrical products 
Food processing 
Household and recreational products 
Industrial equipment and machinery 
Metal fabrication 
Metal production 
Mining, quarrying and extraction 
Paper products 
Plastic products 









Finance, insurance, and real estate 
Health care 
Hotels and motels 
Laundries 
Other professional services 
' Social services 
Other personal services 
Other sectors 
^ • Communications 
Construction 
J Retail 
£.,"; " Sanitation 
/%'*•.. Transportation 
felSyati -.Utilities-
£t, . ; • Warehousing 
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Figure 1-19: Current number of union members and changes in union membership by 
manufacturing industry, 1997-2001 
Aerospace 
Apparel, textiles, and leather 
Auto and auto parts 
Building materials 







Mining, quarrying, and extraction 
Paper products 
Plastics 
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I Change in union members, 1997-2001 • Current union members, 2001 
Table 1-5 and Figures 1-19 to 1-21 also illustrate that certain manufacturing 
industries started with a much larger membership base than other industries. Auto and 
auto parts stands out with 423,000 union members, accounting for 15 percent of all 
organized manufacturing workers, followed by food processing with 298,400 members 
(11 percent of manufacturing membership) metal production (232,900 members) and 
industrial equipment and machinery (230,700 members) which both account for 8 percent 
of manufacturing membership), and metal fabrication (188,600 members) which accounts 
m" t**w 
IB 
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for 7 percent of manufacturing membership. Together these five industries account for 
half of all union members in manufacturing (Figure 1-20). 
Figure 1-20: Proportion of union membership in manufacturing by industry 






7°/ Wood products , ° ^ 
Aerospace





























The proportion of non-union workers in manufacturing industries tends to be 
more heavily concentrated in industrial equipment (13 percent), electronics (10 percent), 
printing and publishing (9 percent), chemicals and petroleum (8 percent), food processing 
(8 percent), and metal fabrication (7 percent), which together account for 55 percent of all 
unorganized manufacturing workers (Figure 1-21). 
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Fieure 1-21: Proportion of non-union employment in manufacturing industries 
Aerospace 
2% 
Figure 1-22 compares changes in union membership with changes in employment 
by manufacturing industry. The staggering losses in apparel, textiles, and leather again 
dominate the landscape of employment changes in manufacturing, but there are several 
other notable trends. In a few industries — food processing, metal fabrication, and metal 
production — the loss of union members exceeded the total employment loss, signaling a 
shift from union employment to non-union employment within the industry. Also worth 
noting were the positive, but weak, signs of membership growth in household and 
recreational products, and rubber products, showing an opposite shift, from non-union to 
union employment, in those industries. 
Overcoming the Challenges to Organizing in Manufacturing - page 39 





















I Employment change I Union membership change 
$5 The true impact of these changes in union membership and employment are best 
%l\, s e e n ^ comparing the percent change of union members to the percent change of non-
life.',. union workers by manufacturing industry (Table 1-6 and Figure 1-23). Thus, although the 
IljSiu ^ecline of union members in apparel, textiles, and leather seems small in comparison to 
mm-^
 lotai employment loss, those losses resulted in a 43 percent drop in union membership, 
jg, more than ten percentage points higher than losses in the non-union segment of the 
'¥$• 
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industry- An even larger percentage decrease occurred in wood products, where union 
membership declined by 45 percent, nearly four times the decline in non-union 
employment in the industry. 
figure 1-23: Percent change in union members compared to percent change in non-union 
empIoyment by manufacturing industry 
Aerospace 
Apparel, textiles, and leather 
Auto and auto parts 
Building materials 







Mining, quarrying, and extraction 
Paper products 
Plastics 




H Percent change in union membership H Percent change in non-union employment 
\ Other industries that experienced much greater losses in union employment than 
L in non-union employment include auto and auto parts (-17 percent versus -4 percent), 
^ ; building materials (-27 percent versus -5 percent), electronics (-31 percent versus -4 
Kt:. Percent)» industrial equipment (-14 percent versus -5 percent), and mining, quarrying, 
jjj^ f; and extraction (-22 percent versus -11 percent). For all of these industries, many of 
^ which have had a long history of relatively high levels of union membership, these 
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H'fferences suggest that job loss has had a much more devastating impact on union 
workers than non-union workers, leading to significantly lower levels of union 
employment and higher levels of non-union employment. 
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There was also evidence of a shift from union to non-union employment in food 
processing, metal fabrication, and metal production, where membership levels dropped 
22 percent for food processing, 21 percent for metal fabrication, and 18 percent for metal 
production, while non-union employment increased by 3 percent for food processing, 1 
percent for metal fabrication, and 6 percent for metal production. 
There were a few industries, however, where employment loss impacted non-
union workers more than union workers, including household and recreational products, 
paper products, plastics, and rubber products. For household and recreational products 
Overcoming the Challenges to Organizing in Manufacturing — page 42 
and rubber products, union membership actually increased 5 percent while non-union 
ernployment decreased (-13 percent for household and recreational products and -8 
percent for rubber products), suggesting a shift from non-union to union work, despite the 
overall loss of employment in those industries. In still other industries, such as aerospace 
and printing and publishing, changes in union membership and non-union membership 
were relatively equal, both dropping less than 10 percent. 
Union density trends by sector and industry 
Because union density measures the proportion of the workforce who are union 
members, these data best capture the true impact of recent changes in union membership 
relative to changes in employment across and within economic sectors. As described in 
Figure 1-24 there is great variation in union density across sectors that is rooted in the 
combination of changing patterns of employment and union membership across sectors, 
coupled with differences between sectors in both organizing activity and success. By 
2001, the public sector and manufacturing sector each accounted for 16 percent of total 
employment, and the service sector and other sectors each accounted for approximately a 
third of all non-farm employment. Yet, while public sector union density held steady at 
approximately 37 percent, increasing only half a percent between 1997-2001, union 
density in the manufacturing sector suffered a 9.9 percent decrease during the same 
period, dropping down to 14.6 percent by 2001. 
Union density in other sectors also dropped significantly, falling by 7.8 percent to 
a density rate of 10.6 percent by the end of 2001. In contrast, union density in the service 
sector increased 8.3 percent during the same period. However, given the relatively low 
level of union density, by 2001 the overall union density rate in the service sector still 
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averaged only 5.2 percent. Thus, the stability of public sector union density, combined 
with the increase in service sector union density, could not make up for the nearly 18 
percent drop in union density in manufacturing and other sectors, resulting in a decline in 
union density of-4.3 percent between 1997 and 2001 in all sectors combined, bringing 
down the overall union density rate to 13.5 percent by the end of 2001. 











Change in union density, 1997-2001 























There was significant variation in union density across manufacturing industries, 
ranging from a high of 36.7 percent in auto and auto parts to a low of 6.7 percent in 
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apparel, textiles, and leather (Figure 1-25). Other industries with high union density 
include metal production (32.0 percent), paper products (30.9 percent), and aerospace 
(28.6 percent). 
Figure 1-25: Union density and change in union density in manufacturing industries 
Between 1997 and 2001, there was also significant variation in the changes in 
union density across industries. The largest decline occurred in metal production, which 
dropped from 37.9 percent in 1997 to 32.0 percent in 2001 (Table 1-5). Building 
materials, food processing, and mining, quarrying, and extraction fell between 4.2 and 4.6 
percentage points. Auto and auto parts and wood products declined by 3.5 and 3.7 
percentage points, respectively. However, given the low rate of union density in wood 
products, a 3.7 percentage point drop represents a 34.6 percent change in union density in 
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that industry, the largest proportional drop of all manufacturing industries. Electronics 
and electrical equipment also experienced a significant decline in union density, falling 
by 2.9 percentage points, a 26 percent drop in density. 
Figure 1-26: Percent changes in employment, membership, and density by sector, 1997-2001 
Percent change in employment 
Percent change in union membership 





















Figure 1-26 summarizes the changes in employment, union membership and union 
density across all economic sectors. In all areas, the manufacturing sector exhibited the 
greatest decline, moderating employment gains for all sectors, all but nullifying overall 
union membership gains, and driving to the continuing decline in union density, 
particularly in the private sector. These data suggest that even with continued growth in 
service sector employment, membership, and density, and continued stability in the 
public sector, the future of the U.S. labor movement cannot be isolated from both 
employment in the manufacturing sector and the membership losses that are currently so 
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dominant in the manufacturing sector. Overall union growth, and the increased 
organizing success and bargaining power on which it depends, cannot occur absent a 
strategy to reverse declining employment, union membership, and union density in 
manufacturing industries. 
Bargaining unit demographics and union density by sector and industry 
As we discussed earlier in this report, both women workers and workers of color 
were highly concentrated in service sector industries such as health care, hotel, social 
services, and laundries; a few manufacturing industries such as food processing and 
apparel, textile, and leather, and in retail and financial, insurance, and real estate. 
Industrial relations research has consistently found that not only are women workers and 
workers of color more positively pre-disposed to unions, but also that union certification 
election win rates were significantly higher in bargaining units with a majority of women 
and/or workers of color (Freeman and Rogers 1999; Bronfenbrenner and Hickey 2002). 
Yet, as we can see in Figure 1-27 below, unions have yet to fully capitalize on this 
opportunity. 
With the exception of the public sector and a few industries such as education and 
food processing, union density rates tended to be highest in sectors and industries with 
the lowest concentrations of women workers and workers of color such as aerospace, 
auto and auto parts, metal production and fabrication, paper, rubber, and wood products, 
transportation, utilities and sanitation. In contrast, union density tended to be lowest in 
service sector industries such as health care, hotel, and laundries, manufacturing 
industries such as apparel, textile, and leather, electronics, and printing and publishing, 
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and other sectors such as retail and finance, insurance and real estate where women 
and/or workers of color predominate. 
Figure 1-27: Workforce demographics and union density by sector and industry, 2001 
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Although much of this is a product of the historical concentration of unions in 
industries such as heavy manufacturiiig, construction, and transportation, as well as long-
term patterns of race and sex discrimination in those industries, it is further exacerbated 
by employment losses in industries where unions historically have had the highest union 
, coupled with massive employment gains in industries where unions have their 
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lowest concentration of members. Most of all, however, it demonstrates labor's failure, 
both historically and currently, to strategically target and organize in those industries in 
both the manufacturing sector and other sectors of the economy where women and 
workers of color predominate. 
Trade and investment trends 
We can gain important insights into the employment, union membership, and 
union density trends discussed above by placing them in the context of the current trade 
and investment environment. This is particularly important for manufacturing industries, 
which are the most sensitive to changes in global trade and investment patterns. Our 
findings suggest that accelerating trade deficits, coupled with significant shifts in capital 
investments and corporate ownership, place industrial unions in a difficult and uniquely 
challenging position compared to unions that have their primary jurisdiction in other 
sectors of the economy. At the same time, the trade and investment patterns reveal that 
manufacturing remains the most important sector to the global economy. 
Declining trade balances 
The U.S. trade deficit in goods and services grew rapidly in the late 1990s, 
increasing from $107.8 billion in 1997 to $358.3 billion in 2001.n The trade deficit in 
goods grew from $181.5 billion in 1997 to $410.1 billion in 2001, a 117 percent increase 
(U.S. Bureau of Census 2002). Figure 1-28 and Table 1-7 show that most commodities 
exhibited a negative trade balance in 2001, but deficits were highly concentrated among 
four groups: Auto and auto parts had the largest trade deficit in 2001 at -$106.9 billion, 
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2002. U.S. International Trade in Goods 
and Services, Balance of Payments (BOP) Basis. 
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followed by oil and gas (-$93.4 billion), apparel, textile, and leather (-$79.2 billion), and 
electronics and electrical equipment (-$54.1 billion). 
Tabic 1-7: U.S. trade balance by commodity and year, 
Aerospace 
Apparel, textiles, and leather 
Auto and auto parts 
Chemicals 
Electronics and electrical products 
Food processing 
Furniture and fixtures 
Games, toys, and sporting goods 
Jewelry and jewelers' material 
Machinery 




Oil and gas 
Petroleum and coal 
Plastics products 
Printing and publishing 
Rubber products 
Transportation equipment 
Wood and paper products 












































































































































The U.S. Department of Commerce reports U.S. exports of total goods on a census basis, using free alongside ship valuation of goods. The U.S. Department of 
Commerce reports U.S. imports on a Census, Customs valuation basis. 
The only commodities with a positive trade balance were led by aerospace ($27.1 
billion) and niachinery ($8.9 billion), followed by medical supplies and equipment ($2.1 
billion), chemicals ($2.1 billion), printing and publishing ($1 billion), and food and 
beverages ($0.5 billion). However, the trade surpluses in these commodities have all 
been declining in the last five years. 
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As we see in Figure 1-29 and Table 1-8, imports have grown faster than exports 
for every commodity. We see particularly high levels of import growth in auto and auto 
parts ($46.1 billion), electronics and electrical equipment ($42.5 bilhon), oil and gas 
($31.3 billion), and chemicals ($27.3 bilhon). In contrast to this universal increase in 
imports, exports declined in six major commodity categories: machinery, primary metal, 
m 
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wood and paper, mineral products, oil and gas, and other manufactured goods. 
Substantial export growth occurred in only three areas: electronics and electrical 
equipment ($14.5 billion), chemicals ($9.9 billion), and aerospace ($9.8 billion). 
Table 1-8: U.S. trade flows by commodity 
Aerospace 
Apparel, textiles, and leather 
Auto and auto parts 
Chemicals 
Electronics and electrical products 
Food processing 
Furniture and fixtures 
Games, toys, and sporting goods 
Jewelry and jewelers' material 
Machinery 




Oil and gas 
Petroleum and coal 
Plastics products 
Printing and publishing 
Rubber products 
Transportation equipment 
Wood and paper products 





























































































































































































































































































The U.S. Department of Commerce reports U.S. exports of total goods on a census basis, using free alongside ship valuation of goods. The 
U.S. Department of Commerce reports U.S. imports on a Census, Customs valuation basis. 
12 In the trade discussion, other manufactured commodities include tobacco products and NAICS products 
codes 339941 through 339999, including art supplies, musical instrumeats, buttons, brooms, needles, and 
other manufactured goods. 
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The relative growth rates for imports and exports are shown in Figure 1-30. The 
value of most categories of imported goods grew by more then 20 percent between 1997 
and 2001. The most rapid growth rates of imports occurred in petroleum and coal (87 
percent), aerospace (82 percent), and furniture and fixtures (70 percent). The 
commodities with the largest rates of growth among U.S. exports included jewelry and 
jewelers' materials and medical supplies and equipment, each increasing by 35.6 percent 
er five years. The value of oil and gas exports decreased by 20 percent. The seventeen 
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r c e n t drop in exports of other manufactured goods was concentrated in tobacco 
products, which fell from $5 billion to $2.8 billion. 








I Percent change in imports I Percent change in exports 
Between 1997 and 2001, the trade balance for every commodity declined. Not 
surprisingly, the four commodities with the largest trade deficits in 2001 — apparel, 
textiles and leather, auto and auto parts, electronics and electrical equipment, and oil and 
gas — also experienced the largest reduction in trade balance from 1997 to 2001. 
i:l However, even the commodities with a positive balance in 2001 had all declined in those 
£- t l v e years. For example, chemicals exhibited a steep decline in trade balance, falling 
| ; from $19.5 billion in 1997 to just $2.1 billion in 2001 (Table 1-8 and Figure 1-31). 
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Apparel, textile, and leather 
Auto and auto parts 
Chemicals 
Electronics and electrical equipment 
Food and beverages 
Furniture and fixtures 
Games, toys, and sporting goods 
Jewelry and jewelers' material 
Machinery 




Oil and gas 
Petroleum and coal 
Plastics products 
Printing and publishing 
Rubber products 
Transportation equipment 
Wood and paper products 
Other manufactured commodities 
HJW-H-^I 
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(Millions US$) 
Although these data cannot provide a direct link between trade, employment loss, 
and declining union density, they do lend further support to previous research 
j§f/ • (Bronfenbrenner, Burke, et al. 2001) that did find a link between trade and employment. 
» -
gpT Industries with the largest trade deficits—apparel, auto, and electronics—were those that 
g£* experienced the greatest reduction in employment and union membership between 1997 
W-
'$&. ^ d 2001. The other manufacturing industries that displayed large employment losses— 
§K 
Wj' machinery and wood and paper products—also had decreasing exports. Industries that 
life n a v e historically enjoyed strong trade surpluses, such as aerospace and chemicals are 
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:€,: 
r<. increasingly facing the same type of global trade environment as autos, electronics, and 
steeL The trade data we have summarized here makes clear that the strategic 
implications of trade for manufacturing unions are substantial, particularly when we add 
recent capital mobility trends to the picture of the global economic environment. The 
seriousness of the challenge to the labor movement, most of all to industrial unions, that 
current trends in trade policy and practices provide, are only further compounded by the 
recent dramatic shifts in the nature and extent of foreign direct investment, into and out of 
j , . the U.S. 
Trends in capital investment 
«. Investment data relating to manufacturing industries highlight two trends that are 
strategically significant for union organizing activity.13 First, the mobility of capital 
\ across borders increased rapidly during the second half of the 1990s. Second, the extent 
of capital mobility varied across industrial sectors, with industrial machinery, electronics, 
instruments and related products, and auto and auto parts most heavily impacted by the 
;
 M growing levels of capital mobility. 
**[/. Table 1-9 and Figure 1-32 show the total flow of capital out of the U.S. by major 
jj*f ' sectors and manufacturing industries. Between 1997 and 2001, the flow of U.S. capital 
g j •'• abroad was concentrated in two major sectors: finance, insurance, and real estate and 
manufacturing. 
13 
f£&X , The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) describes the term "direct investment" in the following 
j£c*^ " manner. "Balance of payments data cover the foreign affiliates' transactions with their U.S. parent. The 
|u<;;w major direct investment items included in balance of payments data are capital flows (equity, inter-
fc3fcT* company debt, and reinvested earnings), income, royalties and license fees, and other services transactions. 
'*%>, 3\ ^ °f ft^sz items are flow data and provide measurement for a particular time frame, such as for a quarter 
£jT' o r f°r a year. Direct investment position data are stock data and are cumulative, and thus measure the total 
^outstanding level of USDIA. The position is equivalent to the year-end book value of U.S. parents' equity 
|; UL, and net outstanding loans to, their foreign affiliates. Data are available by country and/or by industry of 
jk foreign affiliate and by industry of U.S. parent." BEA Description of Data 
&f (fctp://wwwhp.fl doc.gov/bea/di/usdscrpt.htm). 
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Manufacturing 
Apparel, textiles, and leather 
Auto and auto parts 
Chemicals 
Computer and office equipment 
Electronics and electrical products 
Food processing 
Furniture and fixtures 
Glass products 
Industrial machinery 
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Not surprisingly, finance insurance, and real estate dominated capital outflow 
l o u r i n g this period, totaling $276.8 billion. U.S. capital outflow in manufacturing trailed 
Mf 
Overcoming the Challenges to Organizing in Manufacturing - page 57 
H t the financial sector at $183.3 billion, but was significantly larger than capital outflow in 
:r.V''' ^y other sector. 






























































There were also significant variations across sectors changes in capital outflows 
over the five-year period. In finance, insurance and real estate, capital outflows started at 
$39.0 million in 1997, peaked in 1999 at $86.4 million, and then dropped back down to 
$35.0 million by 2001. For manufacturing, capital outflows went from $27.9 million in 
J^997, dropping slightly to $24.3 miUion in 1998 and then increasing each year to a high 
of $58.2 in 2000, dropping back down to $37.2 million in 2001. 
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Table 1-10: Foreign capital flows into the U.S. by commodity 
1997 1998 1999 
and year in millions of U.S. dollars 
2000 2001 1997-2001 
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Auto and auto parts 
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Computer and office equipment 
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Industrial machinery 






"Printing and publishing 
Rubber products 






























































































































































































































» W i Foreign capital flows into the U.S. between 1997 and 2001 (Table I-10 and Figure 
gf 1-33) were dominated by manufacturing investments, which totaled more than $318 
-billion. Other major industries also saw significant foreign capital flows into the U.S., 
it 
including finance, insurance, and real estate ($149 billion), petroleum ($122 billion), 
fcrvices ($107 billion), and other industries including agriculture, forestry, fishing, 
instruction, transportation, communication and public utilities ($153 billion combined). 
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AS with capital outflows, yearly capital inflows peaked in manufacturing in 2000 at 
$100.7 million, dropping precipitously to $29.2 million in 2001. 

































































*v. Notably, in manufacturing the U.S. experienced a net inflow of $135 billion in 
|;-. capital (Figure IH-34). At the other extreme, the finance, insurance and real estate sector 
!&. experienced a net outflow of $127 billion in capital. Most other major industries also 
fc;' sn°wed a net inflow of capital into the U.S., with the exception of the retail industry. 
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U.S. capital outflows (or reversals) for manufacturing sector industries and 
mining are described in Figure 1-35. Between 1997 and 2001, the largest portion of U.S. 
manufacturing capital invested abroad was in chemicals and allied products ($47.7 
billion), followed by electronics and electrical equipment ($26.5 billion), computer and 
office equipment ($23.7 billion), and autos and auto parts ($16 billion). The 
manufacturing industries with the lowest levels of capital outflows (less than $2 milhon) 
include apparel, textiles, and leather, furniture and fixtures, metal production, 
transportation equipment (other than auto), and rubber, glass, wood, and stone, clay and 
mineral products. 
J* 
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Investment Abroad, U.S. capital outflows by manufacturing industry, 1997-
-5,000 





Figure 1-36 shows the flow of foreign direct investment into U.S. manufacturing 
industries by year. Notably, the industries with the highest capital outflows also had the 
greatest inflow of foreign capital into the U.S., with the exception of computers and allied 
products. More than $58 billion in foreign capital was invested into the U.S. chemical 
industry between 1997 and 2001. Foreign-owned multinational corporations invested a 
staggering $91 billion in the U.S. electronics and electrical industry in five years; triple 
the amount of U.S. capital invested in foreign electronics industries. The $36 billion 
acquisition of Chrysler by German owned Daimler/Benz in 1998 accounted for most of 
the $52.9 billion of foreign capital invested in the U.S. auto and auto parts industry over 
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y: this period Food and kindred products exhibited a net reversal of foreign capital 
'i investment with nearly $5 billion pulled out of the U. S food processing industry. 






Table I-10 and Figure 1-37 show the overall balance of capital flow by 
/- manufacturing industry between 1997 and 2001. Most manufacturing industries 
r-. experienced a net inflow of capital into the U.S. economy. Electronics and electrical 
jj^ equipment led with a net inflow of $65.4 bilHon, followed by auto and auto parts ($36.9 
I 
: billion), industrial machinery and equipment ($14.7 billion), printing and pubhshing ($13 
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« ? • 
' %& ' Million), and chemicals and allied products ($10.5 billion). Net capital outflow occurred 
***** * 
f*::. - ^
 0nly a handful of manufacturing industries, most notably food and kindred products 
' - arid computer and office equipment. 
Figure 1-37: Capital flow balance for manufacturing industries, 1997-2001 
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The industries that had the greatest mobility of capital investments, chemicals, 
electronics, and auto, also displayed significant changes in trade, employment, and union 
membership. This linkage between trade, investment, and employment is consistent with 
earher research by Bronfenbrenner, Burke, et al. (2001) that found that productions shifts 
from the U.S. to China, Mexico, and other Asian and Latin American countries, were 
highly concentrated in certain industries such as electronics, chemicals, household 
products, and auto parts. They also found that production shifts in these industries had a 
disproportionate effect on union members in that 46 percent of jobs shifted to Mexico and 
14 percent of jobs shifted to China were from unionized facilities. 
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These shifts in production coincided with growing trade deficits and increased 
capital mobility. Similarly, our current examination of U.S. employment, trade, and 
investment patterns in manufacturing industries suggests that these trends are linked. 
Given that global and investment trends have greatly intensified in unionized industries in 
the two years since the Bronfenbrenner and Burke et al study was conducted we can only 
assume that production shifts out of the country in industries most effected by foreign 
direct investment have only served to escalate losses in union employment in those 
industries. Indeed, trends in union membership and density are tied into the web of 
global economic changes. Global trade and investment trends have forced unions into an 
increasingly hostile environment. At the same time those trends reveal that the global 
economy is not driven by service industries. To the contrary, manufacturing still 
dominates the world of international trade and investment. For unions, the challenges are 
greater today in manufacturing, but the importance of that sector, both in the U.S. and 
global markets, is just as great. 
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$ P PART Hi NLRB ELECTION ACTIVITY AND OUTCOMES BY INDUSTRY 
5g& AND SECTOR: 1997-2001 
•;A •„ 
• • r, just as the last five years have revealed major shifts in employment and union 
density across sectors and industries, this period has also brought major changes in the 
; - industries and sectors where private sector union activity and organizing success have 
been concentrated. This shift in focus has been particularly evident among industrial 
unions. Driven by the loss of union jobs in manufacturing and mining, they are putting 
more of an emphasis on organizing than perhaps any time since the founding of the CIO 
.: in the 1930s. Less than a decade ago, many industrial unions spent less than five percent 
^— of their annual budget on organizing, and several major industrial unions did not even 
have an organizing department. By the end of the 1990s the majority of industrial unions 
had begun to shift resources into organizing and to develop and expand their organizing 
activity. In some cases this involved going outside their primary industrial jurisdictions 
to service sector and public sector units. In others it meant trying new strategies 
including joint organizing efforts such as those initiated by the UAW, USWA, and I AM, 
or using bargaining leverage to gain card check recognition. 
In this section we will use NLRB certification election data from lanuary 1, 1997 
through December 31, 2001 to examine changes in the nature, extent, and outcome of 
NLRB elections in the manufacturing sector during this period and how that activity 
compared to organizing activity in other sectors and industries. We will also examine 
•whether and how changes in organizing activity correspond to the changes in 
employment, trade and investment, workforce demographics, and union density described 
i in the previous section. 
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IWfv'snJffi election activity - all sectors 
'C ,.^ f f . As we described in Part I, in the last five years the number of unorganized private 
r -J, - j S 
I ''S * ctor workers grew by more than six million while the number of union members in the 
/i / j »* 
' I
 % -jrivate sector increased by more than 177,000 workers. However, these changes in non-
•" ' rmion employment and union membership varied greatly across sectors, ranging from a 
net loss in manufacturing of 615,000 union members to a net gain in the service sector of 
T; . 382,000 members (see Figure 1-14 on 29). Under these circumstances the U.S. labor 
* V* movement has to organize hundreds of thousands of workers just to stand still, and 
' \', millions of new workers to make any significant gains in private sector union density. 
But for industrial unions the bar is much higher. They need to organize more than 
700,000 new members just to maintain their current density in manufacturing, much less 
to grow. 
Unfortunately, despite all the efforts to change to organize, the number of new 
workers organized each year, especially in manufacturing, continues to be well under the 
number needed to reverse the decline. 
l\„ Number of elections 
s. Between 1997 and 2001, U.S. unions were involved in a total of 14,902 NLRB 
•" certification elections (Table II-1). Starting in 1997 with 3,268 elections, the total 
number of elections remained above 3,000 until 2000, when it dropped to 2,868, most 
likely as a consequence of union staff and financial resources being shifted from 
organizing into political action during a national election year. NLRB election activity 
declined even further in 2001 (to 2,361 elections), as the recession began to take its toll in 
unionized industries and there were fewer union resources available for organizing. At 
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the same time, in the aftermath of devastating political losses in the 2000 presidential and 
0ngressional races, many unions began to put more of a focus on political action, 
leaving even more limited staff and financial resources available for organizing. 
Table H-1: Summary statistics for NLRB election data by sector and year, 1997-2001 
Manufacturing Service Sector Other Sectors 
Number of elections in 1997 
Percent of all 1997 elections 
Percent of all 1997 elections won 
Election win rate 
Number of elections in 1998 
Percent of all 1998 elections 
Percent of all 1998 elections won 
Election win rate 
Number of elections in 1999 
Percent of all 1999 elections 
Percent of all 1999 elections won 
Election win rate 
Number of elections in 2000 
Percent of all 2000 elections 
Percent of all 2000 elections won 
Election win rate 
Number of elections in 2001 
Percent of all 2001 elections 
Percent of all 2001 elections won 
Election win rate 
All elections 1997-2001 
Percent of all elections 1997-2001 
Percent of all elections won 


































































































The decline in NLRB election activity was most evident in manufacturing where 
the total number of elections declined from 904 elections in 1997 to only 501 elections in 
2001. This contrasts with the service sector, where the number of elections dropped from 
1,067 elections in 1997 to 822 elections in 2001. For the period from 1997-2001, only 25 
percent of all elections took place in manufacturing, compared to 34 percent in the 
service sector and 41 percent in other sectors such as transportation, construction, 
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orfimunication, and retail/wholesale. By the end of 2001 the percent of elections in 
manufacturing had dropped to only 21 percent of all NLRB elections. 
The variation across sectors was even more pronounced when we examine the 
decline in the number of elections won. As described in Figure II-1, in 1997 unions won 
392 NLRB elections in manufacturing, compared to 643 elections in the service sector, 
and 622 elections in other sectors. By 2001 the number of elections won in 
manufacturing had dropped to only 195, compared to 508 elections in the service sector 
and 562 elections in other sectors. 
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Election win rates 
: < • NLRB election win rates within sectors have remained relatively constant for the 
z- last five years, but with dramatic variation between sectors (Figure IT-2). Overall win 
fc*«-3tes increased slightly from 51 percent in 1997 to 54 percent in 2001. During this same 
:. period, manufacturing win rates dropped from 43 percent in 1997 to 39 percent in 2001; 
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service sector win rates ranged from 60 to 63 percent; and election win rates in other 
sectors ranged from 48 percent in 1997 to 54 percent in 2001. 
























5 1 % 
1998 
42% 







5 1 % 
52% 
2000 










4 1 % 
6 1 % 
5 1 % 
52% 
Due to this combination of declining election activity and win rates, 
manufacturing accounted for 25 percent of all elections that took place between 1997 and 
2001 but only 20 percent of all elections won. In contrast, the service sector accounted 
for 34 percent of all elections and 40 percent of elections won, while other sectors 
accounted for 41 percent of all elections and 40 percent of elections won (see Table II-1). 
Unit size 
Although unions organizing in the manufacturing sector are ninning and winning 
fewer elections than unions organizing in other sectors, they are organizing in larger 
units. This is not surprising given that manufacturing firms tend to have more workers 
concentrated in single production and maintenance units. In contrast, with the exception 
of large universities, hospitals, and hotels, most service sector firms are relatively small 
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nd are often divided into multiple technical, professional, white collar, and service and 
maintenance units. As shown in Figure II-3, 46 percent of all manufacturing elections 
took place between 1997 and 2001 in units with fifty or more eligible voters while 27 
percent occurred in units with one hundred or more eligible voters. In contrast, 75 
percent of units in other sectors such as retail, transportation, utilities, and 
communications had fewer than fifty eligible voters while only 12 percent had one, 
hundred or more eligible voters. In the service sector 62 percent of the units had fewer 
than fifty eligible voters and 20 percent had more than one hundred eligible voters. 
Figure II-3: Proportion of elections by unit size and sector, 1997-2001 
Win rates for all sectors were highest in units with fewer than fifty eligible voters, 
.averaging 50 percent in manufacturing, 64 percent in service, and 54 percent in other 
sectors. In manufacturing and service sector elections, win rates decreased to their lowest 
point in units with between one hundred and five hundred voters (averaging 27 percent in 
nianufacturing and 50 percent in the service sector) and then increased slightly in the in 
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the 3 percent of the units in those sectors with five hundred or more eligible voters (30 
r c e n t in manufacturing and 54 percent in the service sector). In contrast, in other 
sectors, where three quarters of the campaigns were in units of fewer than fifty eligible 
voters and only 1 percent were in units with five hundred or more voters, win rates 
continued to decline, reaching their lowest point (23 percent) in the largest units. This is 
consistent with previous research that found that although larger units were often more 
difficult to organize because of the increased power of the employer and the additional 
resources required of the union, this did not always hold true. In part this was because 
the largest units were also more likely to be targeted by those unions that ran the most 
aggressive and effective campaigns (Bronfenbrenner and Juravich 1998, Bronfenbrenner 
2001). 
Although there were fewer elections in the manufacturing sector, because of a 
large average unit size, the total number of eligible voters who participated in NLRB 
elections in manufacturing was higher than, or almost as high as, the total number of 
eligible voters who participated in elections in the service sector for every year except 
1999 (Figure II-4). However, because win rates were so much lower in manufacturing 
units, from 1997 to 2001 there were between 16,000 and 25,000 fewer eligible voters 
involved in elections won in the manufacturing sector than elections won in the service 
sector. Thus, although in 1997 there were a total of 84,018 eligible voters who 
participated in NLRB elections in manufacturing units, only 22,715 were in units where 
the election was won. By 2001 the total number of eligible voters participating in 
manufacturing elections had dropped to 76,438 and the number in units where the 
election was won was only 12,813. 
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Figure II-4: Number of eligible voters in NLRB elections by outcome and year, 1997-2001 
I All Manufacturing Elections 
I Manufacturing Elections Won 
I All Service Sector Elections 
I Service Sector Elections Won 
BAH Elections in Other Sectors 




































Because the majority of election wins continue to be concentrated in smaller 
units, the percent of eligible voters in elections won tends to be significantly lower than 
the percent of elections won. As described in Figure II-5, these differences were 
particularly dramatic in the manufacturing sector. Starting in 1997 unions won 43 
percent of all elections in manufacturing but only 27 percent of all eHgible voters were in 
units where the election was won. The gap narrowed somewhat from 1998 to 2000, 
when the win rate in manufacturing dropped below 43 percent, but because unions were 
running more elections and running them in slightly larger units, the percent of voters in 
elections won increased to 33 percent. However, for unions organizing in manufacturing, 
the percent of workers in elections won plummeted to 17 percent in 2001. 
A similar pattern was evident in other sectors, where election win rates averaged 
between 48 and 54 percent and the percent of eligible voters in elections won ranged 
from a high of 45 percent in 1998 to a low of 38 percent in 2001. In the service sector the 
iPP, 
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gap was much smaller, with win rates averaging between 60 percent and 63 percent and 
the percent of eligible voters ranging from 52 percent to 60 percent. For all sectors 
combined, only 446,174 (42 percent) of the 1,102,786 who participated in NLRB 
elections between 1997 and 2001 were in units where the election was won. 









1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
I Manufacturing win rate 43% 42% 38% 41% 39% 
I Service sector win rate 60% 61% 62% 63% 62% 
I Other sector win rate 48% 50% 51% 52% 54% 
I All sectors win rate 5 1 % 52% 52% 53% 54% 
•Percent voters in manufacturing wins 27% 33% 34% 33% 17% 
•Percent voters in service sector wins 52% 60% 55% 56% 55% 
•Percent voters in other sector wins 40% 45% 40% 42% 38% 
•Percent voters in all wins 39% 46% 44% 44% 36% 
Between 1997 and 2000 the proportion of all newly organized workers who were 
in manufacturing and service sector units remained relatively stable, ranging from 19 
percent to 28 percent in the manufacturing sector and from 45 percent to 55 percent in the 
service sector (Figure II-6). The proportion of newly organized workers in other sectors 
;; showed much greater fluctuation during this period, starting at 29 percent in 1997, 
^•"dropping to 23 percent in 1999, and then moving back up to 27 percent in 2001. 
fi v-
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In 2001, when the proportion of all eligible voters in manufacturing units 
plummeted to 17 percent (Figure II-5), there was a dramatic shift in the proportion of 
newly organized workers in each sector, with only 19 percent of newly organized 
workers coming out of the manufacturing sector, 55 percent out of the service sector, and 
27 percent out of other sectors. If this trend continues, industrial workers will represent 
an increasingly smaller percentage of all organized workers, and union density in the 
manufacturing sector, and the bargaining power that goes with it, will decline 
significantly. 
Figure 11-6: Percent of workers organized under the NLRB by sector and year, 1997-2001 
B Other sectors 
B Service sector 
I Manufacturing 




Election activity by industry 
Table E-2 provides a more detailed breakdown of election activity by industry 
from 1997-2001. Across all sectors and years, the greatest number of elections was in 
health care, starting at 442 elections in 1997, increasing to 505 elections in 1999, and 
^dropping to 300 elections in 2001. 
vt 
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Table II-2: Summary statistics for NLRB elections by industry 
Manufacturing 
Aerospace 
Apparel, textiles, and leather 
Auto and auto parts 
Buflding materials 
Chemicals and petroleum 
Electronics and electrical products 
Food processing 
Household and recreational 
products 




Mining, quarrying and extraction 
Paper products 
Plastic products 
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For the five years combined, health care accounted for 2,107 elections (14 percent), 
followed by 1,728 elections in transportation (12 percent), 1,391 elections in construction 
(9 percent), 915 elections in other services (6 percent), 807 elections in wholesale (5 
percent), 746 elections in business services (5 percent), and 601 elections in food 
processing (4 percent). 
Figure 11-7: Win rates across sectors and industries, all years combined, 1997-2001 
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The highest win rates during this period were all concentrated in service sector 
industries (Figure II-7). Overall, from 1997-2001, win rates averaged at least 50 percent 
for all service industries, and above 60 percent for building services, business services, 
education, health care, laundries, and social services. This contrasts with the 
manufacturing sector where win rates in all industries averaged less than 50 percent and 
in some industries, such as household and recreational goods, and plastics products, 
averaged below 30 percent. In other sectors, win rates averaged above 50 percent in 
communications, retail, transportation, and utilities and below 40 percent in warehousing. 
The health care industry accounted for the largest number of workers, from any 
one industry that participated in NLRB elections between 1997 and 2001 (Table II-3). A 
total of 248,611 eligible voters participated in health care elections between 1997 and 
2001, representing 23 percent of all workers participating in NLRB elections during that 
period. Transportation, with 93,405 voters (8 percent), was a distant second; followed by 
food processing with 64,297 voters (6 percent); and wholesale, auto and auto parts, retail, 
metal production, construction, business services, and industrial equipment and 
machinery, all with between 35,900 and 47,500 voters (3 percent to 4 percent). 
Table II-4 provides summary statistics on the number of workers in units where 
the election was won. Because of the combination of election activity, unit size, and high 
win rates, health care encompasses the largest number of workers organized under the 
NLRB in the last five years (138,621 voters or 30 percent); followed by transportation 
with 45,305 voters (10 percent); business services with 21,443 voters (5 percent); and 
food processing, social services, other services, retail, wholesale, metal production, auto 
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- *'" 
T' and auto parts, and construction, all with between 13,600 to 17,900 voters (3 percent to 4 
percent). 
Table II-3: Number of eligible voters in NLRB elections by sector, industry, and year, 1997-2001 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 1997-2001 
Manufacturing 
Aerospace 
Apparel, textiles, and leather 
Auto and auto parts 
Building materials 
Chemicals and petroleum 
Electronics and electrical products 
Food processing 
Household and recreational products 
Industrial equipment and machinery 
Metal fabrication 
Metal production 
Mining, quarrying and extraction 
Paper products 
Plastic products 
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Table U-4: Number of eligible voters in NLRB elections won, by sector, industry, and year, 1997-2001 




Apparel, textiles, and leather 
Auto and auto parts 
Building materials 
Chemicals and petroleum 
Electronics and electrical products 
Food processing 
Household and recreational products 
Industrial equipment and machinery 
Metal fabrication 
Metal production 
Mining, quarrying and extraction 
Paper products 
Plastic products 
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:f;t: 2 < More than half of these newly organized workers were in industries such as health 
are food processing, social services, retail, hotel and motel, and laundries, which, as we 
reported in Part I, were also the industries where women and workers of color 
predominate. 
Figure II-8: Industry demographics and percent win rate, 2001 
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I Percent women I Percent African-American and Hispanic Percent win rate 
As described in Figure II-8, in 2001 election win rates averaged higher in those 
industries where women and workers of color were most concentrated, especially in 
industries such as apparel, textiles and leather, printing and pubhshing, education, health 
care, social services, laundries, and retail. Thus, although the majority of elections still 
take place where women and/or workers of color were in the minority, these data suggest 
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a significant shift in the gender, ethnic, and racial make-up of the unionized labor force 
because union organizing is more successful in these units.14 
Election activity in manufacturing 
If we focus our attention on industries in the manufacturing sector, we find a 
diversity of organizing activity and success across a range of industries. 
Figure II-9: Number of NLRB elections in manufacturing industries, 1997-2001 
Because the NLRB does not collect data on workforce demographics in bargaining units where elections 
are held, we were unable to use the BLS data on race and gender to assess the actual gender, racial, and 
ethnic make up of the units unions are targeting for organizing, other than noting where union activity is 
concentrated relative to which industries where women and workers of color are concentrated. However, 
as we discuss in Part III of this report, we were able to collect bargaining unit demographic data for a 
representative sample of NLRB election data, which provide even stronger evidence of the link between 
race, gender, and other demographic characteristics and organizing success. Unlike the BLS data, which 
provide no information on the overlap between race and gender, as part of our survey research we were 
able to collect data on the proportion of eligible voters who were white men, white women, male workers 
of color, and women workers of color. 
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As described in Table II-2 (page 75) and Figure IT-9, from 1997-2001 the greatest 
election activity was in food processing, with a high of 145 elections in 1997 and 1998, to 
a low of 82 elections in 2001. Although, at 601, the total number of elections held in 
food processing between 1997 and 2001 was less than half the number of elections held 
in sectors such as health care, transportation, and construction during this same period, 
food processing was the only manufacturing industry represented in the top ten industries 
where NLRB organizing activity has been concentrated. 
The other manufacturing industries that had a relatively high level of organizing 
activity from 1997-2001 include metal production (390 elections), industrial equipment 
(320 elections), metal fabrication (303 elections), building materials (281 elections), 
chemicals and petroleum (277 elections), and auto and auto parts (274 elections). Until 
2000, in most of these manufacturing industries the number of elections averaged above 
sixty elections each year. However, as it did throughout the economy, organizing activity 
in these industries declined significantly in 2001, dropping to fewer than fifty elections in 
metal fabrication, building materials, and chemical and petroleum, and down to only 
thirty-six elections in industrial equipment and machinery, and twenty-four elections in 
auto and auto parts. 
The second tier of industries, including printing and pubHshing (191 elections), 
paper products (178 elections), wood products (139 elections), electronics and electrical 
products (128 elections), and plastics products (100 elections), averaged fewer than forty 
elections a year from 1997 to 2000, and most dropped below twenty-five elections in 
2001. The manufacturing industries where the fewest NLRB elections took place during 
this period include mining, quarrying, and extraction (99 elections), household and 
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recreational products (89 elections), apparel, textiles, and leather (72 elections); 
aerospace (51 elections), and rubber products (46 elections). In these industries the 
number of elections averaged fewer than twenty elections from 1997 to 2000 and fewer 
than fifteen elections in 2001. 
Win rates in manufacturing 
Overall, between 1997 and 2001 win rates for all manufacturing industries 
averaged below 50 percent. Once again, there was a great variation across industry and 
year (Figure 11-10). The highest average win rates for the five year period were in 
apparel, textiles and leather and aerospace (both 49 percent), auto and auto parts (48 
percent), mining, quarrying, and extraction (46 percent), and electronics and electrical 
products (45 percent). Win rates averaged below 30 percent in plastics and in household 
and recreational products, and between 35 percent and 45 percent in all other industries. 
There was a great deal of variation in the average yearly win rates for most of 
these industries. For example, in auto and auto parts the win rate was 63 percent in 1997, 
moving down to 33 percent by 2000, and then moving back up to 50 percent by 2001. A 
similar pattern was evident in metal fabrication, where win rates started at 52 percent in 
1997, went down to 25 percent by 2000, and back up to 46 percent in 2001. In other 
industries such as household and recreational products, and paper, win rates dropped 
steadily from 1997 to 2001, down below 20 percent, while in marring, quarrying, and 
excavation, win rates started just above 40 percent in 1997, moved up to 56 percent by 
2000, only to drop down to 29 percent in 2001. 
Perhaps the most interesting year was 2001. Despite a wave of layoffs, 
bankruptcies, plant closings, and declining organizing activity across the economy, win 
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rates in some manufacturing industries, such as aerospace, auto and auto parts, apparel 
and textiles, printing and publishing, and rubber, averaged 50 percent or more, higher 
than they had for most of the five-year period. At the same time, other industries, such as 
paper, wood, plastic, and household and recreational products, experienced their lowest 
winratesin2001. 
Figure 11-10: Percent win rates in manufacturing industries, 1997-2001 
Aerospace 
Apparel, textiles, and leather 
Auto and auto parts 
Building materials 
Chemicals and petroleum 
Electronics and electrical products 
Food processing 
Household and recreational products 
Industrial equipment and machinery 
Metal fabrication 
Metal production 
Mining, quarrying, and extraction 
Paper products 
Plastic products 
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Unit size in manufacturing 
For a more complete understanding of union organizing activity in manufacturing 
industries, it is essential to examine the number of elections and percent win rates in 
concert with the data on unit size in both NLRB elections and NLRB elections won. As 
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described in Figures II-11 the average unit size for all elections was highest in aerospace 
(556 voters); followed by rubber products (173 voters); apparel, textile, and leather (171 
voters); auto and auto parts (156 voters); electronics and electrical products (137 voters); 
plastics products (119 voters); and industrial equipment and machinery (112 voters). 
Figure 11-11: Average number of voters in all manufacturing elections and in elections won, 1997-
2001 
BAN elections I I Elections won 
However, the results are quite different when we look at the average unit size for 
elections won (Figure 11-12). Aerospace was still the highest with an average of 235 
eligible voters in elections won, followed by apparel, textiles, and leather (224 voters), 
plastic products (110 voters), auto and auto parts (104 voters), and metal production (100 
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voters), while rubber products dropped down to 70 voters, and electronics and electrical 
equipment to 79 voters. 
Figure 11-12: Total number of voters in all manufacturing elections and in elections won, 1997-2001 
• Total eligible voters, 1997-2001 a Eligible voters in units won 
These differences in unit size data become even more dramatic when we look at 
the total number of eligible voters involved (Figure 11-12). Food processing stands out, 
' with a total of 64,297 eligible voters involved in the 601 elections in the industry between 
1997 and 2001. Despite a 42 percent overall win rate, only 17,814 (28 percent) of those 
_ eligible voters were in winning elections. This occurred in part because of several large 
union losses that occurred in the food processing industry during this period, including 
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[ '* 4 000 workers at Smithfield Packing in North Carolina in 1997; 2744 workers at IBP in 
•t, 
* - Kansas in 2000; 1,073 workers at IBP in Tennessee in 2001; 1,335 workers at Gold Kist 
j0 Georgia in 2001; and 1,100 workers at Tyson Foods in Pennsylvania in 2000. During 
this same period there was only one large win in food processing, involving 1,333 
workers at Brach and Brock Confections in Illinois in 1998. 
Despite an average win rate of 49 percent, aerospace exhibited an even more 
dramatic drop from total number of eligible voters (28,376) to number of eligible voters 
in elections won (5,863). Once again this is explained by some extremely large losses, 
including the largest single NLRB election loss in the entire five-year period, involving 
13,142 workers at Boeing in Washington in 2001. Because there were relatively few 
elections overall in aerospace during this period (51), and only one large win (4,064 
engineers at Boeing in Kansas in 2000), unions were only able to win representation for 
21 percent of all the workers involved in NLRB elections in aerospace between 1997 and 
2001. 
Auto and auto parts was another industry with a great deal of organizing activity, 
covering more than 42,000 workers in 274 elections from 1997-2001. Of those workers, 
13,674 (32 percent) were in units where the union won the election. Despite some fairly 
significant wins in the industry during this period, such as 840 workers at Mexican 
Industries in 1999 and 652 workers at Eagle Pitcher in 2000 (both in Michigan), the 
industry also endured several major losses. The most notable of these were the election 
loss covering 4,075 workers at Nissan in Tennessee in 2001 and a series of three election 
losses, each involving more than 1,100 workers, at Emergency One in Florida. 
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These data contrast sharply with apparel, textiles, and leather, which had a 
relatively small number of elections (72) during this period, but a higher average unit size 
in elections won (224) than in elections overall (171). This occurred because of a 
combination of consistently high win rates in large units and one particularly significant 
win, 5,000 workers at Pillowtex (Fieldcrest Cannon) in 1999 after more than two decades 
of organizing by UNITE and its predecessor, ACTWU. Thus, despite devastating job 
losses and plant closings in the industry during this period, unions were able to win 
representation for 64 percent of all workers they attempted to organize in the apparel, 
textile, and leather industry. 
The industries where there were the fewest number of new workers organized 
include rubber; plastics; paper; wood; household and recreational products; mining, 
quarrying, and extraction; and printing and publishing, all of which had fewer than 5,000 
new workers organized over the entire period from 1997-2001. 
Figure 11-13 presents the proportion of all new workers organized in 
manufacturing, broken down by industry, from 1997-2001. As expected, food processing 
accounts for the largest proportion of new manufacturing workers organized (15 percent), 
followed by metal production (12 percent); auto parts (11 percent); metal fabrication and 
industrial equipment and machinery (both 8 percent); building materials and apparel, 
textiles, and leather (both 7 percent); and aerospace (5 percent). Each of the remaining 
ten manufacturing industries account for fewer than 5 percent of all new workers 
organized during this period and in combination account for only 27 percent of all 
workers organized during this period. 
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Figure 11-13: Share of manufacturing employees organized by industry, 1997-2001 
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There was also a great deal of variation in the number of new workers organized 
each year both within and across manufacturing industries (Table H-4 and Figure 11-14). 
For more than three quarters of the industries, and for all manufacturing industries 
combined, 2001 was the year where the least number of new workers were organized. 
Although 2001 was the most successful year for two industries, building materials and 
rubber, in all but seven of the remaining manufacturing industry categories (auto and auto 
parts, building materials, chemicals and petroleum, food processing, metal fabrication, 
metal production, and printing and pubhshing) fewer than five hundred new workers 
•were organized in 2001. 
For nearly two thirds of the industries, 1998 and 1999 were the years when the 
most new workers was organized in the industry. In contrast with 2001, only three 
industries - household and recreation products; mining, quarrying and extraction, and 
m 
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i rubber -had fewer than five hundred new workers organized in 1999, half had more than 
K *% - thousand, and a third had more than two thousand new workers organized. 
'Vi''~l Aerospace, chemicals and petroleum, and household and recreation equipment, had the 
$S^R most new workers organized in 2000, while metal fabrication, plastic products; and other 
§K-'; manufacturing had the most new workers organized in 1997. 
'*< * . , Figure 11-14: Number of new workers organized through NLRB elections in manufacturing 
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i Food processing had the most consistent and substantial gains in newly organized 
,?. workers, averaging more than 3,500 new workers each year followed by auto and auto 
| parts and metal fabrication both of which gained more than 3,500 new workers each year, 
owever, as we will discuss in the following section, even the gains in these industries 
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w ere almost inconsequential relative to the changes in employment, union membership, 
and union density that have occurred in many of these industries over the same period. 
Employment, union membership, union density, and organizing activity 
The 120,291 new workers organized in manufacturing, along with the 340,883 
workers organized in the service and other sectors combined, must be put in context of 
the dramatic changes in employment, union membership, and union density that occurred 
between 1997 and 2001. Figure 11-15 graphically displays just how paltry recent private 
sector organizing gains have been relative to private sector employment changes that 
occurred during the same period. 
Figure 11-15: Changes in private sector employment and new workers organized under the NLRB, 
1997-2001 
• Changes in employment 










&w. These data also demonstrate the very different challenges faced by unions trying 
1'"" 
£••-
%• to gain density in the manufacturing sector versus those attempting to gain density in the 
^ • 
p.C s e r v i c e and other sectors. In manufacturing, there has been a net loss of nearly two 
million jobs since 1997, at the same time that just over 120,000 new workers were 
[reorganized under the NLRB, which means that the manufacturing sector has been losing 
y 3°bs, nearly a third of which were union, at a rate sixteen times the number of new 
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rkers being organized. In contrast, in the service sector, 223,000 new workers were 
raanized at the same time net service sector employment grew by four million jobs and, 
.
 otker sectors net employment has increased nearly three million, while slightly more 
than 118,000 new workers were organized. This resulted in the service sector gaining 
new jobs at a rate nineteen times greater than new workers were being organized in the 
sector and other sectors gaining new jobs at a rate twenty times that of new workers being 
organized. 
Figure 11-16: Changes in manufacturing employment and new manufacturing workers organized 
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When we focus on the manufacturing sector alone (Figure 11-16) we find a great 
deal of variance across industries in net employment losses relative to organizing gains. 
The results range from the apparel, textile, and leather industry where more than 500,000 
jobs have been lost in the last five years alone, and just over 12,000 new workers were 
organized; to metal production, where 45,000 jobs were lost and 15,000 new workers 
were organized, and rubber products where approximately 12,000 jobs were lost, and 
1,200 new workers were organized. 
While the employment change versus new workers organized data provide some 
insights into the economic climate in which unions are organizing today, the comparison 
•V-\l' between membership changes and workers organized provides a better measure of the 
si "-. 
significance of organizing gains across sectors. 
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-As described in Figure 11-17, approximately the same number of new workers 
i- were organized in manufacturing (120,291) as were organized in other sectors including 
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transportation, retail, construction, utilities, and communications (118,177). However, 
whereas in other sectors there was only a small net loss in membership (5,000), in 
manufacturing the net membership loss of 615,000 was nearly five times the number of 
new workers organized from 1997-2001. In the service sector, some of the enormous 
employment growth occurred among already organized employers, resulting in a 
membership growth of 382,000, which was actually greater than the number of new 
workers organized (222,706). 








I Number of new workers organized I Changes in membership 
The greatest net membership losses occurred in auto and auto parts where more 
than 85,000 union members were lost while only 14,000 new workers were organized; 
m 
•Is V k l 
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food processing where nearly 83,000 members were lost but only 17,814 new workers 
t ' were organized; and electronics and electrical products, where approximately 66,000 
members were lost but only 4,500 new workers were organized (Figure 11-18). 
In apparel, textiles, and leather, where, as we noted above more than 500,000 jobs 
were lost between 1997 and 2001, just over 58,000 union members were lost, reflecting 
the fact that the oveiwhelming majority of job losses in the industry were among non-
union workers. Still, only 7,856 new workers were organized in the apparel, textile, and 
leather industry, resulting in membership losses seven times the number of new workers 
organized. 
In two manufacturing industries there was actually membership growth during 
this period, albeit negligible relative to massive membership losses experienced in other 
manufacturing industries. These include rubber products, with a net membership gain of 
3,000, and household and recreational products, with a net membership gain of 2,500. 
Unfortunately, fewer than 1,300 new workers were organized in either of these industries, 
suggesting a lost opportunity to make significant membership gains. Other industries 
such as aerospace, paper products, plastic products, and printing and publishing, all had 
relatively small membership losses (less than 10,000) during this period, most organizing 
at least half as many new workers as they had net members lost. This means that that if 
unions organizing in these industries were able to organize three or four times the number 
of workers they are currently organizing they would actually be gaining rather than losing 
members. 
Even with the combination of massive membership losses and fairly minimal 
£ organizing gains, unions organizing in the manufacturing sector continue to account for a 
%,. -
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1 reer proportion of all workers organized than the proportion of total employment or 
n0rganized workers that are in the manufacturing sector (Figure 11-19). 
TTigure 11-19: Proportion of private sector employment, union membership, and union activity by 
sector, 1997-2001 
Proportion of Proportion of union Proportion of Proportion of all 
employment in 2001 membership in 2001 unorganized workers in workers organized 
2001 under NLRB, 1997-2001 
(Manufacturing I Service Sector B Other Sectors 
By the end of 2001 manufacturing unions accounted for only 19 percent of 
employment and 18 percent of unorganized workers, but 30 percent of all union members 
and 26 percent of all new workers organized under the NLRB. This compares with the 
service sector, which accounted for 42 percent of employment, 24 percent of union 
members, 44 percent of unorganized workers, and 48 percent of newly organized 
workers. Other sectors accounted for 39 percent of total employment, 46 percent of 
union membership, 39 percent of unorganized workers, but only 26 percent of all new 
, workers organized under the NLRB. 
Table II-5 and Figure 11-20 examine the relationship between employment, union 
membership, and union organizing activity and success across manufacturing industries. 
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Xablc II-5: Employment, union membership, and organizing activity in manufacturing industries 
Proportion of 
Proportion of Proportion of Proportion of net Proportion of manufacturing 
manufacturing manufacturing membership loss unorganized workers organized 
employment in membership in in manufacturing, manufacturing under NLRB, 
2001 2001 1997-2001 workers in 2001 1997-2001 
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These data show significant differences across industries in the proportion of new 
workers organized that were based in each industry relative to the proportion of 
employed workers, union members, unorganized workers, and membership losses based 
in that same industry. This variation was most dramatic in auto and auto parts, which, by 
the end of 2001, accounted for only 6 percent of manufacturing employment and 5 
percent of unorganized manufacturing workers, but 15 percent of manufacturing 
membership, 14 percent of manufacturing membership loss, and 11 percent of new 
manufacturing workers organized. Thus, although the auto and auto parts industry, 
where the industrial labor movement was born, continues to employ the largest 
percentage of unionized manufacturing workers, it has also suffered disproportionately 
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from membership and employment losses in manufacturing, particularly given that it 
accounts for such a large portion of new rnanufacturing workers organized. 
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Apparel, textiles, and leather; food processing, and metal production were other 
industries which accounted for a much higher percentage of membership losses than they 
did overall employment in the industry, but also accounted for a higher proportion of new 
workers organized. Food processing, which by 2001 accounted for 8 percent of all 
manufacturing employment and unorganized manufacturing workers and 11 percent of 
union membership in manufacturing, accounted for 14 percent of union members lost and 
15 percent of new workers organized in all manufacturing industries combined from 1997 
to 2001. 
By 2001 apparel, textiles, and leather accounted for only 6 percent of 
manufacturing employment, 6 percent of unorganized workers in manufacturing, and 7 
percent of new workers organized. Yet it accounted for 10 percent of union members lost 
between 1997 and 2001 and, by the end of 2001, only 3 percent of all organized workers 
in the manufacturing sector. Metal production, which accounted for only 4 percent of 
manufacturing employment and 3 percent of unorganized manufacturing workers in 
2001, accounted for 8 percent of all manufacturing jobs lost and 12 percent of all new 
manufacturing workers organized between 1997 and 2001. 
Other industries, such as metal fabrication and mining, quarrying, and extraction, 
were much more consistent across all the employment, membership, and organizing 
activity data presented in Figure 11-20, averaging between 7 percent and 8 percent for 
metal fabrication and 2 percent and 3 percent for mining and related industries across all 
categories. Still others, such as printing and publishing, electronics and electrical 
production, chemicals and petroleum, and household and recreational productions were 
underrepresented among new workers organized (4 percent for chemicals and petroleum 
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and electronics and electrical production, 3 percent for printing and pubhshing, and 1 
percent for household and recreational products) compared to their proportion of 
unorganized workers (8 percent for chemicals and petroleum, 10 percent for electronics 
and electrical production, 9 percent for printing and publishing, and 4 for percent 
household and recreational products). This suggests that unions in those industries have 
not been effectively using their density and bargaining power in the industry to support 
new organizing. 
In contrast, aerospace, which by the end of 2001 accounted for only 2 percent of 
unorganized workers, thanks to several victories in relatively large units during this 
period, accounted for 5 percent of new manufacturing workers organized, while building 
materials, which accounted for 3 percent of unorganized workers, accounted for 7 percent 
of new workers organized. 
In combination these data suggest that, if unions can successfully organize in 
industries such as auto parts and metal production, which have been devastated by 
membership and employment losses, then they have the potential for much more 
effective organizing in industries such as printing and pubhshing, chemicals and 
petroleum, paper production, wood production, and household and recreational products, 
which have not been as devastated by membership losses and account for a larger share 
of the unorganized manufacturing workers, yet have had relatively little organizing 
activity and success. 
Regional differences in organizing activity and success 
As would be expected, there was a great deal of regional variation in organizing 
activity and success across both sectors and industries. Thirty-eight percent of NLRB 
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elections in manufacturing and 39 percent of all newly organized manufacturing workers 
were concentrated in what is considered America's industrial heartland - the Midwest, 
while only 22 percent of all manufacturing elections and 17 percent of all new 
manufacturing workers organized were in the Northeast. As much as 19 percent of 
manufacturing elections and 25 percent of newly organized manufacturing workers were 
in the largely right-to-work Southeast, and 16 percent of manufacturing elections and 12 
percent of new manufacturing workers organized were in the West Coast and Mountain 
states (Figure 11-21). 
Figure 11-21: Percent of elections and percent of new workers organized by sector and region, 1997-
2001 
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For the service sector, more than a third of organizing activity (36 percent) and 
newly organized workers (39 percent) were concentrated in the Northeast, followed by 
the Midwest (26 percent of elections and 23 percent of newly organized workers), West 
Coast and Mountain states (19 percent of elections and 21 percent of newly organized 
workers), and Southeast (13 percent of elections and 12 percent of newly organized 
workers). 
In other sectors such as transportation, retail, construction, and communications, 
NLRB organizing activity was fairly evenly divided between the Midwest (30 percent of 
elections and 23 percent of newly organized workers) and Northeast (28 percent of 
elections and 30 percent of newly organized workers), followed by the West Coast and 
Mountain states (23 percent of both elections and new workers organized), and the 
Southeast (13 percent of elections and 16 percent of new workers organized). For all 
sectors, only 3 percent to 6 percent of elections and new workers organized were in the 
Southwest, and 1 percent to 3 percent were in the Territories (primarily Puerto Rico). 
In addition to regional differences in the extent of union activity and success for 
each sector, there were also differences in how win rates were distributed across regions 
for each industrial sector. As illustrated in Figure 11-22, in the manufacturing sector the 
lowest win rates were found in the Southeast (37 percent) and the Southwest (35 percent), 
compared to 44 percent in the West Coast and Mountain states and 41 percent in both the 
Midwest and Northeast. This contrasts with the service sector, where win rates averaged 
as high as 65 percent in the Southwest and 59 percent in the Southeast, compared to 58 
percent in the Midwest, 64 percent in the Northeast, and 61 percent in the West Coast and 
Mountain states. Win rates averaged approximately 70 percent for the 1 percent of 
Overcoming the Challenges to Organizing in Manufacturing -page 103 
manufacturing elections and 3 percent of service sector elections held in the Territories 
between 1997 and 2001. Win rates in other sectors of the economy were much more 
stable across regions, averaging between 49 percent (Southwest) and 54 percent (West 
Coast and Mountain states) for all regions. 







































These data suggest that lower manufacturing win rates in the Southeast and the 
Southwest can not be attributed simply to differences in the legal and economic climate 
in those states, since unions in the service sector and other sectors of the economy do not 
have their lowest win rates in those regions. While there is no question that some 
manufacturing industries in the Southwest and Southeast (in particular apparel, textile, 
and leather) have suffered major losses in employment and union membership from 
productions shifts to Mexico, China, and other Asian and Latin American countries 
(Bronfenbrenner and Burke, et al. 2002), other industries, such as auto and auto parts, 
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have experienced comparable levels of employment and membership losses in states in 
the Midwest, where win rates were higher. Instead, as we will discuss in Part EI of this 
report, these differences in win rates are much more likely to be a function of a complex 
interaction of company, union, and bargaining unit characteristics and employer and 
union organizing tactics. 
Regional variation across manufacturing industries 
Table II-6 describes regional variation in election activity in manufacturing 
industries. As would be expected, NLRB elections and elections won for core 
manufacturing industries were highly concentrated in the Midwest. This was particularly 
true for auto and auto parts, where approximately three quarters of all elections (72 
percent) and elections won (76 percent) were in the Midwest, and for metal fabrication 
and industrial equipment and machinery, where approximately half of all elections and 
the majority of all elections won were in the Midwest. Other industries that had 
organizing activity concentrated in the Midwest include metal production (41 percent of 
elections and 40 percent of elections won), rubber products (52 percent of elections and 
41 percent of elections won), building materials (39 percent of elections and 42 percent 
of elections won), and plastic products (40 percent of elections and 37 percent of 
elections won). Approximately a third of elections and elections won in food processing, 
paper products, wood products, and mining, quarrying, and extraction were also in the 
Midwest region. 
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Approximately two thirds of the elections and elections won in apparel, textile, 
and leather were evenly divided between the Northeast and Southeast, while more than 
40 percent of elections won in printing and pubhshing, and approximately a third of the 
elections won in chemicals and petroleum were concentrated in the Northeast. The only 
industry with organizing activity concentrated in the West Coast was aerospace (33 
percent of elections and 44 percent of elections won). 
These regional differences in organizing activity within manufacturing industries 
*7 become even more pronounced when we examine the total number of newly organized 
^ workers by industry and region. As described in Figure 11-23, in the last five years, half 
^*«*-of the newly organized workers in metal production and the overwhelming majority of 
jg\ newly organized workers in aerospace (70 percent), auto and auto parts (76 percent), and 
t. -
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^Si- - - dustrial equipment and machinery (61 percent) were employed by firms in the 
>>f ^  A/fjdwest. Forty-eight percent of newly organized workers in household and recreational 
n fa^ -pjoducts and approximately one third of workers in paper products, plastic products, and 
printing and publishing were employed by firms in the Northeast. Seventy-seven percent 
of newly workers organized in apparel, textile, and leather, 55 percent in metal 
fabrication, and 45 percent of newly organized workers in wood products were in the 
Southeast. 
74 
'*$•' Figure 11-23: Percent.of newly organized workers by industry and region, 1997-2001 
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The industries with the highest concentration of newly organized workers in the 
Southwest include chemicals and petroleum (10 percent) and wood products (21 percent), 
while those with the highest concentration of newly organized workers in the West Coast 
and Mountain states include household and recreational products (30 percent) and food 
processing (28 percent). There were no newly organized workers under the NLRB in 
apparel, textile, and leather, auto and auto parts, or printing and publishing in the 
Southwest in the last five years, and 3 percent or fewer newly organized workers in the 
Southwest in aerospace, building materials, household and recreational products, 
industrial equipment and machinery, metal fabrication, paper products, and rubber 
products. Fewer than 3 percent of all newly organized workers in apparel, textiles, and 
leather; auto and auto parts; and industrial equipment and machinery, and none of the 
newly organized workers in plastic products, were in firms in West Coast and Mountain 
states. 
Organizing activity by union and primary union sector 
In the last decade there have been major changes in the structure and focus of the 
industrial union movement. These include several significant mergers, such as the 
ILGWU and ACTWU merging into UNITE in 1995; the mergers of the URW in 1995 
and ABGW in 1996 with the USWA; OCAW merging with UPIU into PACE in 1999; 
the AFGM merging with the BCTW into the BCTGM in 1999; the ICWU merging into 
the UFCW in 1996; and the IUE merging into CWA in 2000. In addition there was the 
dissolution of the AFL-CIO Industrial Union Department in the late 1990s; an aborted 
effort by USWA, UAW, and IAM to form one large metal workers union by 2000; and 
then, in 2002, the establishment of a new Industrial Union Council within the AFL-CIO. 
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P l i a b l e D-7- Number of elections and percent of elections by year, 
1997 1998 1999 
union, and union sector, 1997-2001 
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%L . Industrial unions have also begun to shift more of their organizing outside of their 
' traditional jurisdictions, including the U A W s efforts to organize thousands of graduate 
I students at public and private sector universities, UNITE's increased focus on the laundry 
i industry and wholesale distribution, and the USWA's recent forays into health care and 
. the public sector. 
Table II-7 and Figure 11-24 provide summary statistics for union activity in the 
* last five years broken down by union and primary union sector.15 For the purposes of our 
analysis we have grouped unions into '^primary sector" categories including industrial 
;' mrinns, communications and utilities unions, transportation unions, building trades 
unions, service sector unions, and small independent unions. 
The proportion of NLRB elections remained very stable across the five years on 
which this study focuses. Industrial unions accounted for approximately a quarter of all 
NLRB elections each year (24 percent to 28 percent) while the total number of elections 
involving industrial unions averaged approximately 800 elections each year until 2001, 
when the number of elections per year dropped down to 560. 
Communications and utilities unions accounted for 2 percent of NLRB elections 
for each year, averaging between fifty and seventy elections each year. Transportation 
We listed separately all industrial unions that were involved in at least 20 NLRB certification elections 
between 1997 and 2001, and all other unions that were involved in at least 30 NLRB elections. We have 
listed IUE elections under industrial unions for 1997-2000, but starting in 2001 all IUE elections are 
included under CWA in the communications and utilities union group. The UE, UBC, and UTU are listed 
lg|,-.. individually under their primary union grouping rather than being included in the general independent 
'"V • ^ o a category. The ANA, which only recently affiliated with the AFL-CIO, is also listed individually. In 
££ * addition, we have listed the thirty-six campaigns conducted jointly by the LAM, USWA, and UAW under 
|££ the auspices of the United Organizing Committee (UOC), prior to the breaking off of merger discussions in 
p ; , 2001. Although unions such as the IBT, UBC, IBEW, and CWA are all actively involved in organizing in 
fe^Jhe industrial sector, we did not include them in the industrial union category because that was not the 
W; primary sector associated with those unions. We did include the UFCW under industrial unions because 
| |" food processing has been part of its primary jurisdiction since its origins in the merger of the Retail Clerks 
|c- ^ d Meat Cutters unions in 1979. The independent unions range from company specific unions such as the 
If Dupont Workers to smaller national independents such as UGSOA and UPWU 
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*M<9' mcms (primarily the EBT) accounted for approximately a third of all elections each year 
11 J " /aQ percent to 34 percent). The total number of elections run by transportation unions 
- vi ranged frommore than 1,100 in 1997-1998 down to 744 elections in 2001. Building 
[41 trades unions accounted for between 17 percent and 22 percent of elections each year, 
averaging approximately 550 elections a year, while service unions accounted for 
between 14 percent and 17 percent of elections (between 319 and 534 elections a year), 




', gkjfe .^l -figure 11-24: Proportion of elections by primary union sector and year, 1997-2001 
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The number and percent of elections each year also remained relatively stable for 
ji- the individual unions listed in Table H-7. Among industrial unions the UFCW had the 
£. most elections, averaging approximately 200 elections (5 percent to 6 percent of all 
elections) per year, followed by the USWA, which averaged between 100 and 150 
<*•> 
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elections a year (4 percent to 5 percent). The UAW and IAM both averaged 
approximately one hundred elections a year (3 percent to 4 percent of all elections for 
that year), except for 2001, when the number of elections for the UAW dropped down to 
55 (2 percent). All of the other industrial unions averaged fewer than 50 elections each 
year and so accounted for 1 percent or less of all the elections for that year. 
Among the non-industrial union groupings, the IBT stands out, averaging from 
650 to 970 elections each year, accounting for just under a third of all NLRB elections 
during that period. SEIU averaged 200 to 300 elections a year (7 percent to 9 percent), 
with the exception of 2001, when they averaged only 150 elections (6 percent). The 
IUOE and the EBEW averaged approximately 140 elections each year (4 percent to 5 
percent), while AFSCME, LIUNA, CWA, and the UBC averaged from 50 to 100 
> 
i\: elections each year (2 percent to 3 percent). All other unions averaged fewer than 50 
=*** «. 
*£ 
elections a year (0 percent to 1 percent). 
w%\ -\ Union organizing across sectors and jurisdictions 
m
 Table II-8 and Figures 11-25 to 11-27 provide summary statistics broken down by 
( J union and primary union sector for NLRB election activity and outcomes within and 
across industrial sectors. Industrial unions account for only a slight majority (51 percent) 
!>-' of all manufacturing sector elections between 1997 and 2001. Transportation unions 
{js- , were involved in 29 percent of manufacturing elections; however, almost all of these 
gUj* were IBT elections (28 percent), with all remaining transportation unions combined 
^L ulvo*vec* ^ o m y 1 P e r c e r i t of manufacturing elections. Building trades unions were 
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and independent unions were involved in 3 percent; and service sector unions in only 1 
percent of manufacturing campaigns. 
Service sector unions were on the ballot in only 37 percent of all service sector 
elections, followed by transportation unions (20 percent), industrial unions (16 percent), 
building trades unions and independent unions (13 percent each), and communications 
and utilities unions (2 percent). Transportation unions (44 percent) and building trades 
unions (27 percent) dominate union organizing in other sectors, which includes 
.*- transportation, and construction. Industrial unions account for 18 percent of organizing 
inactivity in other sectors followed by service sector unions (6 percent), independent unions 
(3 percent), and communications unions (3 percent).16 •' 
I- Figure 11-25: Percent of new workers organized within industrial sectors by primary union sector, 1997-2001 
$, It is Important to note that the majority of organizing in the communications industry today takes place 
•outside of the traditional NLRB certification election process, particularly in the wireless industry. Thus, 
•to tens of thousands of workers that CWA has organized in wireless companies in the last several years 
•arenot included in these figures. 
Overcoming the Challenges to Organizing in Manufacturing - page 113 
* f f fable H-8: Summary si 
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:&, 
!lr"i?v Because of dramatic differences in win rates within sectors (Table II-10), the 
'"* S percent of newly organized workers in each industrial sector varies significantly across 
unions and primary union sectors. Thus, as illustrated in Figure 11-25, with a win rate of 
only 41 percent in manufacturing and with election wins concentrated in smaller units, 
industrial unions accounted for only 31 percent of newly organized workers organized 
even though they participated in 51 percent of all elections in manufacturing. In contrast, 
'^X ". because of much higher win rates (55 percent for communications and utilities unions, 52 
V ; >-
•*\r* percent for service unions, and 64 percent for small independent unions), the percentage 
J * * • 
fjjjr*-". of new manufacturing workers organized was twice as much for communications and 
utilities unions (4 percent of new workers compared to 2 percent of elections) and service 
unions (2 percent of new workers compared to 1 percent of elections) and four times as 
much for small independent unions (4 percent of elections compared to 16 percent of new 
workers organized). For building trades and transportation unions the percent of 
• < & • > . 
stff -j manufacturing workers organized was within a few percentage points of the percent of 
elections. 
|% Because of much higher win rates (61 percent), industrial unions do slightly better 
;"£.. in service sector elections, participating in 16 percent of service sector elections but 
|K accounting for 19 percent of new service sector workers organized, while 
v communications, transportation, and building trades unions do much worse, with their 
rk, percentage of new workers organized less than half of their percentage of elections in the 
p service sector. With win rates of 66 percent in the service sector and 64 percent in other 
[• sectors, service sector unions account for 51 percent of all new service sector workers 
i 
k * 
, r^ A. 
p. HI* 
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P *£'£ organized, but only 37 percent of all service sector elections, and 33 percent of new 
;
*. T* workers organized in other sectors but only 6 percent of elections 
-if 
• *%.* Transportation unions were involved in 44 percent of all elections in other sectors 
\ Vl but account for only 39 percent of newly organized workers in other sectors, and building 
trades unions participated in 27 percent of elections but account for only 19 percent of 
newly organized workers in other sectors. 
fit/ 
- x.f 
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I Manufacturing B Service I Other 
There were also significant differences in the extent to which unions concentrated 
their organizing efforts within their primary sector. As illustrated in Figure 11-26, service 
^ sector unions were those most likely to remain within their primary jurisdiction, 
B£'- concentrating 83 percent of all their organizing campaigns in service sector industries. 
M Only 2 percent of service sector union campaigns were in manufacturing industries, and 
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15 percent were in other sectors, most of which were transportation units connected with 
health care, education, and social services. Small independent unions also concentrated 
jjjost of their organizing efforts in service sector units (68 percent), while only 11 percent 
of smaller local and national independent union campaigns were in manufacturing and 21 
percent were in other sectors. 
These trends are particularly obvious when we look at the three most active 
unions organizing in the service sector - AFSCME, HERE, and SEIU. As described in 
Figure 11-27, 87 percent of all SEIU elections were in service sector units, 2 percent were 
in manufacturing, and 11 percent were in other sectors.17 AFSCME had 84 percent of its 
elections in the service sector, 15 percent in other sectors, and 1 percent in 
manufacturing. Seventy percent of HERE elections were in the service sector, 3 percent 
in manufacturing, and 27 percent in other sectors, which included a significant number of 
food service related retail estabHshments. 
Although to a lesser degree, building trades unions also concentrated the majority 
of their NLRB organizing efforts in their primary sector, holding 58 percent of their 
elections in other sectors, primarily construction (Figure 11-26). It is important to note, 
however, that most construction organizing occurs outside of the NLRB process, and, if 
included with these data, it would significantly increase the proportion of building trades 
organizing in construction, which is included under other sector. 
As described in Figure 11-27, there was great variation among building trades 
unions. The IBEW had the highest concentration of its organizing activity in other 
sectors (71 percent). However, these included units in the utilities and communications 
Figure 11-27 covers the fifteen most active unions organizing under the NLRB today, which together 
account for 78 percent of all NLRB elections and 83 percent of all NLRB elections excluding small 
independents. 
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w-; 
.'^-. 
industry as well as construction. Similarly, the UBC had 29 percent of its organizing 
campaigns in manufacturing, 9 percent in the service sector, and 62 percent in other 
sectors, primarily construction In contrast, the IUOE was involved in relatively few 
manufacturing campaigns (18 percent), but a growing number of service sector 
\ • * ' -!» 
~R * 
• .&-~ 
'.£•' campaigns (45 percent), primarily health care, and only 37 percent in others sectors. 
LIUNA was the most diversified of any of the building trades unions, with 22 percent of 
'$-. its campaigns in manufacturing, 32 percent in services, and 34 percent in other sectors, 
$*r •: • reflecting the range of its current membership which includes mail handlers, health care 
£'»•*» . workers, and factory workers, as well as laborers. 
:MwrV 
|kr Figure 11-27: Percent of elections by sector for fifteen most active unions, 1997-2001 
I Manufacturing • Service Sector H Other Sectors 
Although there were many unions with transportation as their primary sector, 
Ijjf90 percent of NLRB elections involving transportation unions that occurred between 
f 1997 and 2001 were conducted by the IBT. Fifty-six percent of transportation union 
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elections were in other sectors, including a particularly high percentage of campaigns in 
t^ e waste-hauling industry. Twenty-three percent of transportation union campaigns 
were in manufacturing units, including a large number of IBT campaigns in the food 
processing industry, while 21 percent of transportation union campaigns were in the 
service sector. 
Industrial unions have also increasingly been shifting more of their organizing 
efforts outside of the manufacturing sector. While 50 percent of all industrial union 
campaigns occurred in manufacturing units, 21 percent took place in service sector units, 
and 29 percent were in other sectors. Of the industrial unions most actively organizing 
under the NLRB, those with the highest percentage of manufacturing elections include 
PACE (74 percent), UAW (68 percent), and USWA (65 percent). The UFCW and 
UNITE had the least concentration in any one sector. The UFCW had only 25 percent of 
its campaigns in manufacturing (primarily food processing), 32 percent in the service 
sector (primarily health care), and 44 percent in other sectors (primarily retail). UNITE 
had 35 percent in manufacturing, 45 percent in service (primarily laundries), and 20 
percent in other sectors (primarily wholesale distribution). Communications and utilities 
unions were also less concentrated in one industrial sector with 31 percent in services, 
and 22 percent in manufacturing (Figure 11-26), and fewer than half (47 percent) of their 
campaigns concentrated in the other sector category, which encompasses the 
communications and utility industry. These numbers in part reflect the recent merger of 
CWA with IUE and their earlier merger with the Typographical Workers' Union, both of 
which were almost entirely industrial unions prior to merging with CWA, and the fact 
that both CWA and UWUA continue to organize in service sector industries such as 
V 
***-
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health care and education. As described in Figure 11-27, when all CWA and IUE 
elections are combined, 29 percent were in manufacturing, 32 percent in the service 
sector, and 39 percent in other sectors. 






Industrial Communications/Utilities Transportation Building Trades 
• Manufacturing • Service 
Win rates also varied significantly across industrial sectors by union and primary 
union sector. With the exception of communications and utilities unions which had 
slightly higher win rates in manufacturing (55 percent) than in service sector units (53 
percent), the highest win rates for all the other union categories were in service sector 
elections, ranging from 51 percent for transportation unions, to 61 percent for industrial 
unions, 66 percent for service unions, and 72 percent for small independent unions. In 
fact the smaller independent unions had relative high win rates in every sector. This most 
likely is because they tend to be concentrated in small units and often face much less 
employer opposition, since they are less threatening to employers than the large national 
d international unions affiliated with the AFL-CIO. 
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For industrial, transportation, and building trades unions, win rates were lowest in 
the manufacturing sector, averaging 41 percent for industrial, 39 percent for building 
trades, and 38 percent for transportation unions. The greatest variation in win rates was 
found in the campaigns in other sectors, where unions whose primary jurisdictions were 
in those sectors (communications and utilities, transportation, and building trades unions) 
had the lowest win rates (48 percent to 51 percent), while industrial and service unions 
had higher win rates (54 percent for industrial unions and 64 percent for service sector 
unions). 
Figure 11-29: Percent win rate by sector for fifteen most active unions, 1997-2001 
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I Manufacturing B Service sector B Other sectors 
When we look more specifically at those unions most actively organizing under 
jj£ the NLRB, we find that all of the most active industrial unions (UAW, USWA, IAM, 
g - UNITE, CWA/TUE and PACE) had higher win rates in the service sector and other 
K " Sectors than in manufacturing (Figure H-29). For the USWA the service sector win rate 
efr 
g^ v*l percent) was nearly double the manufacturing win rate (35 percent), while the USWA 
&•, 
Overcoming the Challenges to Organizing in Manufacturing -page 121 
fi$* win rate in other sectors was 52 percent. The UFCW, which also had a very low win rate 
** / - in manufacturing (35 percent), had a win rate of 58 percent in the service sector and 54 
' v. 
-V '^- percent in other sectors, while PACE had a manufacturing win rate of 40 percent, a 
'• h?j 
• ?&. p -#* service sector win rate of 57 percent, and a win rate in other sectors of 51 percent. 
F- -
,*".v, UNITE's service sector win rate was as high as 75 percent, compared to a 50 
percent win rate in manufacturing and a 54 percent win rate in other sectors. Win rates 
J* i 
JH: • for the IAM were relatively high across all sectors, ranging from 61 percent in 
\t 
Jftlf ' - manufacturing to 63 percent in other sectors and 68 percent in the service sector. 
\:ilc' When the elections from the IUE are included in with CWA, the lowest win rates 
-'% Sfe, •* / 
Jyjp-i; were in manufacturing sectors (46 percent), compared to 51 percent in other sectors, and 
*J&* 
,*£"* 57 percent in the service sector. The relatively small difference in win rates in 
y£* manufacturing and other sector reflects the particular challenges faced by CWA in 
-\il organizing in a deregulated and constantly restructuring telecommunications industry. 
t > 3> 
^ j ^ ; • Over the last five years, the IBT had lower win rates across all three sectors than 
gfe <. most of the other unions, averaging only 37 percent in manufacturing, 48 percent in the 
fet -
fop*- service sector, and 46 percent in other sectors, which includes transportation. Among the 
• . . " * 
|V; building trades unions, LIUNA also had relatively low win rates, averaging only 36 
Sj-. percent in manufacturing, 47 percent in the service sector, and 52 percent in other sectors. 
II?« 
|^ »vThe UBC also did fairly poorly in manufacturing (31 percent) and other sectors (38 
•; percent) but averaged as high as 68 percent in the small number of elections they had in 
the service sector (a total of 34 elections for all five years). The remaining building 
> trades unions fared better. For the five-year period, for both the IBEW and the IUOE win 
; rates in manufacturing averaged 43 percent and win rates in other sectors averaged 54 
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• V-' ' nercent, while in the service sector they averaged 52 percent for the IBEW and 63 percent 
fortheIUOK 
The two most active service sector unions, SEIU and AFSCME, had high win 
'*£ rates in the service sector (SEIU won 69 percent and AFSCME won 66 percent), where, 
**-' for both unions, more than 80 percent of their NLRB organizing activity was 
concentrated. They also had relatively high win rates in other sectors (AFSCME won 73 




ft - the manufacturing sector where AFSCME won two out of the four elections it had in 
•^?'~v manufacturing (50 percent) and SEIU won 48 percent of the 21 total elections it had in 
•v 
it <•'/ manufacturing. HERE was not as successful, winning two out of only six total t J 
if 
m< 
manufacturing elections (33 percent), and mamtaining an average win rate of only 47 
percent in the service sector and 53 percent in other sectors. This reflects the fact that 
HERE concentrates almost all of its organizing activity outside of the NLRB process, 
successfully using voluntary recognition campaigns for thousands of hotel workers each 
year. 
Unions most actively organizing in manufacturing 
Figures 11-30,11-31, and 11-32 describe which unions have been running the most 
elections and winning the most new voters in the manufacturing sector. The most active 
unions by far were the IBT (30 percent of all elections), USWA (13 percent), UAW (8 
percent), UFCW (7 percent), IAM (6 percent), PACE (5 percent), and IUOE (4 percent). 
GCIU, SMW, PPF, CWA/IUE, UBC, IBEW, BCTGM, and LIUNA each account for 3 
: percent of manufacturing election, while UNITE, BSOIW, UMW, BBF, NPW, and PAT 
each account for 1 percent. 
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•' f&& j^gm-e 11-30: Percentage of manufacturing elections run by the top twenty unions organizing 
f**'" Manufacturing, 1997-2001 
in 
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However, because of dramatic differences in win rates and the average unit size in 
|^; elections won (Figure 11-31) these proportions change dramatically when we examine the 
<-
. percentage of newly organized manufacturing workers organized by each of these unions. 
:•• The most dramatic differences involve the UAW, which participated in only 8 
L. percent of all manufacturing elections but accounts for 20 percent of new workers 
>:
 organized, and UNITE, which participated in only 1 percent of all manufacturing 
> elections but accounts for 8 percent of new workers organized. In both cases this results 
from a combination of relatively high win rates (50 percent for UNITE and 54 percent for 
AW) and larger average unit size of 178 for UNITE and 75 for the UAW. 
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*£ t-4 Figure D-31: Percent win rates and average unit size for top twenty unions organizing in 
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•3- O 
This contrasts with the IBT, which was involved in 30 percent of all 
J manufacturing elections, but due to a win rate of only 37 percent and an average unit size 
ll'of only 15 eligible voters, accounted for only 15 percent of newly organized workers in 
l-manufacturing. The USWA (13 percent), UFCW (7 percent), IAM (7 percent), and 
|PACE (4 percent) differed by no more than 1 percentage point in the percent of new 
manufacturing workers organized compared to the percent of manufacturing elections in 
they participated, while the IFPTE, which was involved in fewer than 1 percent of 
manufacturing elections, accounted for 4 percent of all new workers organized 
gcause of wins in several large aerospace units. CWA/TUE accounted for 4 percent of 
j £ . 
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*^fc* new workers organized, while IBEW accounted for 3 percent. LIUNA, UBC, GCIU, and 
;. ^ | ' ' SMW accounted for 2 percent, and UMW, BCTGM, IUOE, NPW, UE, and UOC (United 
r *$i Organizing Committee for USWA, UAW, and IAM) all accounted for 1 percent of new 
* c+%.^ 
*«£>' workers organized. 
'Mp, pigure 11-32: Percentage of new industrial workers organized by the top twenty unions organizing in 














Table E-9 and Figure 11-33 display the percentage of newly organized workers in 
| manufacturing industries by each of the unions most active in the manufacturing sector. 
| These percentages result from the combination of number of elections, win rates, and the 
plumber of eligible voters in elections won. Thus, for example, in aerospace, 77 percent 
^ f newly organized workers were in IFPTE because of the several large Boeing units 
|rganized by the IFPTE in the last five years. Other unions active in aerospace include 
ijte'IBT (10 percent) and the IAM (9 percent). As would be expected, apparel, textiles, 
?d leather were almost entirely dominated by UNITE (82 percent of newly organized 
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t'WS workers),- both because of the large number of campaigns and high win rates they had in 
, £ $.< V*
 f' 
J %"^
 tjjat industry and because of the one very large win at Fieldcrest Cannon/Pillowtex 
$ * involving 5,000 workers. Other unions active in apparel, textiles, and leather include 
r*j fWA/IUE (6 percent of newly organized workers), small independents (5 percent), and 
K "'• '* 
-I* -s IBT (4 percent). Similarly the UAW dominated auto and auto parts, accounting for 79 
• 'Us 4 , * 
percent of all new workers organized in the industry. The IAM (12 percent) was the only 
Tf*- other union organizing in auto and auto parts that organized more than 2 percent of new 
i> **• .• 
3fc . , workers gaining representation in the industry. 
$7 
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figure n-33: Percentage of new voters organized in manufacturing industries by union, 1997-2001 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
i* Organizing gains in other manufacturing industries were much less concentrated 
j|$> in any given union. The UAW (40 percent), IBT (25 percent), UNITE (11 percent), 
y,i XJSWA (10 percent), and I AM (6 percent) dominated the building materials industry. 
^^^jworkers organized in the chemicals and petroleum industry were concentrated 
among PACE (33 percent), IBT (32 percent), and IBEW (11 percent). CWA/IUE (27 
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| |P?>
 erCent), IBEW (21 percent), and the UOC (20 percent) dominated the electronics and 
f^S'f electrical equipment industry, along with USWA, IAM, PACE, and SMW (all between 5 
I*- percent and 7 percent). The IBT (28 percent) and the UFCW (32 percent) accounted for 
%*\ 
Mb the majority of new workers organizing in food processing, along with small 
P§. 'if 
| | , independents (17 percent), BCTGM (7 percent), and GCIU (5 percent). 
; |f - In household and recreational products the IBT was the primary union organizing 
^ ^ ' new workers along with the UAW (10 percent) and small independents (16 percent). The 
USWA, UAW, IBEW, and small independents all organized between 19 percent and 23 
SS£ percent of new workers in industrial equipment and machinery, while the UMW (33 
l | h < percent), PACE (26 percent), LIUNA (19 percent), and the IUOE (12 percent) were the 
f%r primary unions organizing new workers in mining, quarrying, and extraction. As would 
•j^, be expected, the UAW and the USWA dominated both metal fabrication (USWA with 49 
$TJ ' percent, UAW with 17 percent) and metal production (USWA with 23 percent, UAW 
5fc 
i - with 26 percent). The IBT was also active in metal production, organizing 16 percent of 
;-" ^ new workers in the industry. PACE (31 percent), IBT (17 percent) and small 
p independents (22 percent) were the primary unions successfully organizing new workers 
g : in paper products, while UNITE (27 percent), USWA (22 percent), and small 
%\- ^dependents (18 percent) were the primary unions in plastic products. 
Not surprisingly, GCIU (35 percent) and CWA/IUE (24 percent) accounted for 
^ the majority of workers organizing in printing and pubhshing, along with the UFCW (14 
| | i percent) and the IBT (12 percent). Organizing gains in rubber products were dominated 
| by the USWA (31 percent), the IBT (28 percent), and the UAW and CWA/IUE (14 
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"i**" percent to 15 percent), while workers in wood products were primarily being organized 
« 7 P 
*£%L- - bv the XJBC (35 percent), the EBT (24 percent), and PACE (13 percent). 
£<•• 
W Summary of NLRB findings 
'M 
$jhp In combination these data provide us is with an in-depth understanding of the 
L^f 
"jt£\'' extent and outcome of NLRB certification election activity in the last five years. 
•yf-
*3^ ' Although we found broad differences across sectors and industries, what these data 
'8J4-: suggest is that despite dramatic changes in the organizing environment, and despite major 
9ftjk' organizing initiatives by the AFL-CIO and affiliates, for the most part, union organizing 
rfifftfo' under the NLRB has remained profoundly stable, even stagnant, throughout this period. 
raw,; • Some might argue that that is because most of the labor movement's most ||&r;_ aggressive and effective organizing initiatives have been outside the NLRB certification 
HK\V . election process. While it is true that there is no accurate data on the number of new 
$.v--' workers organized in public or private sector voluntary recognition campaigns, even 
ESLV when new workers organized through the NLRB are combined with whatever uncounted 
j^ fc' gains have come from non-NLRB organizing and membership growth through 
employment expansion in organized industries, it still has done little more than slow 
fe< down the decline in union density overall, and nothing to stem the escalating decline of 
*?-.' union density in the manufacturing sector. 
The most important question remaining then is not what is happening with union 
£. organizing activity and membership decline in the manufacturing sector but why, a 
?sjr question that can only be answered if we go beyond government statistics to the analysis 
Sf*° u r s u r v e y data on factors contributing to union organizing success in manufacturing 
and other sectors. 
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 p A R T HI: FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO ORGANIZING SUCCESS IN 
***" MANUFACTURING: NATIONAL SURVEY RESULTS 
li 
As we learned in Part II, in the last five years unions have made some gains in 
both win rates and the size of the units where elections are won. Yet these gains have not 
11 . been consistent across all industries and sectors. In particular, there has been a dramatic 
\ .". decline in union activity and success in much, but not all, of the manufacturing sector. In 
**&." this section we will use survey data to examine whether and how differences in 
*£. - organizing environment, corporate structure, company characteristics and tactics, union 
S '* tactics, and organizer background affect certification election outcome across different 
Mfjr industries and sectors. In addition, we will examine the most effective organizing 
strategies to overcome employer opposition across a broad range of industries, bargaining 
units, corporate structures, and organizing environments. 
# . -
••*-' 
Table HI-1: Summary election statistics for NLRB survey sample 
"fh Manufacturing Service Other sectors All sectors 
'Vy1 - Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
J %,'. of of of of of of of of 
K? / , elections Ejections Win rate elections Elections Win rate elections Elections Win rate elections Elections Win rate 
Election outcome 
$*£ ' All Elections 135 33% 30% 175 43% 57% 102 25% 42% 412 100% 44% 
Electionsheld 1998 64 32% 23% 95 47% 51% 42 21% 50% 201 100% 42% 
Elections held 1999 71 34% 35% 80 38% 65% 60 28% 37% 211 100% 47% 
^
 t Elections won by union 40 30% 100% 100 57% 100% 43 42% 100% 183 44% 100% 
Elections lost by union 95 70% 0% 75 43% 0% 59 58% 0% 229 56% 0% 
First contract outcome 
5^" All elections 32 24% - 69 39% - 23 23% - 124 30% 
*' .Elections won by union 32 76% - 69 68% 23 52% 124 68% -
V€H 
f&py^ 
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ixaT,lein-2: Organizing activity in the sample by industrial sector, primary union sector, and union 
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As mentioned earlier, the findings reported in this sector are based on a 
| / representative random sample of 412 NLRB certification elections in units with fifty or 
more eligible voters that took place in 1998 and 1999. Tables m-1 and HI-2 provide 
j£_. summary statistics for the 412 elections in our sample. Consistent with the population of 
elections with fifty or more eligible voters we found that a third of the elections in the 
^sample are in manufacturing, 43 percent are in the service sector, and 25 percent are in 
other industries such as construction, transportation, retail, communications, finance, 
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%_' utilities, and wholesale and warehouse distribution. Because unions win less than a third 
"" of the elections in the manufacturing sector, only 22 percent of all NLRB elections won 
*.'"" are in manufacturing, compared to 55 percent for the service sector. 
4 * 
" •' As discussed in Part II, because of the recent wave of mergers of industrial unions 
with diverse primary jurisdictions and increased industrial union activity in the service 
\ sector, we find that industrial unions today account for a growing proportion of all NLRB 
0 election activity across all sectors. Table HI-2 provides background on the election 
)-; - activity of the unions in our sample broken down by the primary sector in which their 
v. • I • current membership is concentrated.18 Industrial unions are involved in 39 percent of all 
4f> elections, 67 percent of elections in manufacturing, 23 percent of elections in the service 
' *" * sector, and 27 percent of elections in other sectors. The remaining manufacturing sector 
elections in our sample involve transportation unions (17 percent IBT and 1 percent other 
transportation unions), building trades (11 percent), independent unions (3 percent), and 
service sector unions (1 percent). 
S & First contract outcomes 
J^£' Although the NLRB regularly reports data on election outcome, there are no 
i*"-
} government reporting requirements relating to the first contract process. Thus, this 
survey provides one of the few data sources on private sector first contract rates. 
When we initially examined first contract campaigns in the late 1980s, first 
r contract rates averaged just below 80 percent of elections won (Bronfenbrenner 1994). 
I More than a decade later, the first contract rate within two years of the election has 
|r dropped to 68 percent (Table HI-l). With an election win rate of only 44 percent, this 
gs; AS we mentioned in Part II, because both the UFCW and the CWA are the result of mergers of industrial |gv unions and unions active in other sectors (retail and communications), we have included them in the 
Industrial union category. 
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means that only 30 percent of all the certification elections in our sample resulted in a 
first agreement. 
figure HI-1: Percent win rates and first contract rates for elections in survey sample 
- 80%-! 
70%-
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As with election outcome, we find significant variation in first contract rates 
>m& a c r o s s s e c t o r s (Figure IH-2). Although win rates average lower in the manufacturing 
WjS* sector than in the service or other sectors, first contract rates are higher in manufacturing 
vaje, (76 percent) than in either the service sector (68 percent), or other sectors (52 percent). 
ps^.JFigure IDE-2: Percent first contract rate by unit size and sector 




Manufacturing Service sector Other sectors All sectors 
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The higher first contract rates in the manufacturing sector are partially a 
r 
.;' Jr? resequence of the increased bargaining power that comes from higher levels of union 
* 3|* density in the manufacturing sector. Another possible factor is the larger average unit 
^ti* size in manufacturing and the potential increase in bargaining power and financial and 
' ' • *$•» 
fVr~ 
>-2^ staff resources that larger units can provide. Faced with aggressive employer opposition, 
'* !*; 
'$('• unions often have to devote as much staff time and resources to bargain a contract for ten 
\ ^%' • 
i^r people as they do for a thousand; the difference is that a thousand new members provide 
IrH one hundred times more dues dollars to spend on the first contract campaign. 
$'*£ y figure III-3: Number of eligible voters m elections in the sample, by sector and election and first 
J&P*. contract outcome 
^ Number of eligible voters in all elections 
, -/: JNumber of eligible voters with tirst contract 
It is the combination of unit size, percent win rates, and percent first contract rates 
jg.* that best measures variation in organizing gains across sectors (Figure IH-3). For 
m.
 example, because of a relatively high first contract rate in manufacturing, the number of 
£* eligible voters in units where the first contract was won (11,985) is only 7 percent lower 
:,- than the 12,702 workers involved in units where the election was won. Yet when put in 
!?.tne context of the low average- win rate in the manufacturing sector, this means that only 
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11 985 voters, just 34 percent of the 34,768 ehgible voters who participated in all the 
jjjanufacturing elections in our sample, gained coverage under a first contract. 
Figure BQ-4: Percent of voters in all elections, in elections won, and in first contracts won, by sector 
B Other sectors 
H Service sector 
• Manufacturing 
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4 1 % 
As described in Figure HI-4, these differences in unit size, win rates, and first 
contract rates across sectors result in a significant difference between the proportion of all 
eligible voters involved in NLRB elections who are in each sector, versus the proportion 
who are in units where elections were won and first contracts were reached. While 
manufacturing workers account for as much as 44 percent of all workers participating in 
NLRB elections, they account for only 35 percent of all workers in units where the 
election was won and 41 percent of workers in units where a first contract was reached. 
Service sector workers account for 38 percent of all workers involved in elections in our 
sample, but 48 percent of all workers involved in both elections and first contracts won. 
Workers in other sectors account for only 18 percent of all ehgible voters, 17 percent of 
voters in elections won, and 11 percent of voters in units where a first contract was 
reached. 
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Corporate structure and company characteristics 
As our previous research has shown, unions organizing today are operating in a 
Lf|fi's jfluch more global, mobile, and rapidly changing corporate environment. The majority of 
'£% union private-sector organizing campaigns continue to be concentrated in relatively small 
•$$(' units in U.S.-owned for-profit companies. At the same time, many unions, in reaction to 
[fp-f' the rapid changes in corporate structure and increased capital mobility, have shifted more 
f 
,**? of their organizing efforts to less mobile industries, particularly in the nonprofit sector 
(Bronfenbrenner 2001). 
Figure DI-5: Percent of elections and elections won by corporate structure and industrial sector 
m 
• Manufacturing elections 
• Manufacturing elections won 
B Service sector elections 
• Service sector elections won 
• Other sector elections 
• Other sector elections won 
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As described in Figure HI-5, 23 percent of NLRB certification elections take 
^place in nonprofit companies such as hospitals, social service agencies, and educational 
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1990s (Bronfenbrenner 2001). This reflects both the surge in organizing activity among 
unions who normally dominate the nonprofit sector, such as SEIU, and a renewed effort 
among traditionally public sector unions, such as AFT and AFSCME, to follow public 
sector work as it is shifted to the private, nonprofit sector. It also reflects a continuing 
trend among industrial and building trades unions to branch out into the nonprofit sector 
in search of organizing gains they have found difficult to achieve in their own industries. 
As would be expected, firms in the manufacturing sector are almost entirely for-
profit (99 percent), except for the 1 percent of manufacturing facilities that are in 
sheltered workshops. One hundred percent of the campaigns in other sectors involve for 
profits, while the majority of campaigns in the service sector (53 percent) involve 
nonprofit employers. 
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The attraction of nonprofit companies is not surprising given that organizing win 
rates average as high as 58 percent, compared to a 40 percent win rate in all for-profit 
^companies and a win rate of only 29 percent in for-profit companies in the manufacturing 
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wBfc sector (Figure III-6). Although our research has found that many nonprofit employers, 
*'*$.' particularly in health care and higher education, aggressively oppose union organizing 
*i efforts (Bronfenbrenner 1997, 2001), these data suggest that unions are better able to 
%*<L• overcome that opposition in the nonprofit environment where they have greater access to 
A**-? 
'•{$. ' 
the workplace, multiple sources of client, community, and political leverage, a higher 
concentration of women and workers of color, and less likelihood that the employer will 
move or threaten to move in response to union activity. 
Fifty five percent of the manufacturing elections are in publicly-held corporations, 
• & 
r # : 
2§lL while 44 percent are in privately-held companies. However, because win rates in the 
l l l l manufacturing sector are higher in privately-held firms (35 percent) than in publicly-held 
tsS,' firms (24 percent), the majority of elections won in the manufacturing sector are in 
* j ^ privately-held companies. A similar pattern is found in other sectors where 49 percent of 
' J?T all elections, but 58 percent of elections won, are in privately-held companies. 
The higher win rate in privately-held companies in part reflects the fact that 
^ publicly-held companies are much more likely to be large," multinational corporations 
than privately-held companies. More than 80 percent of publicly-held companies in both 
1^  manufacturing and other sectors, and 56 percent in the service sector, are multinationals 
compared to less than 40 percent of privately-held companies in manufacturing and other 
sectors and 17 percent in the service sector. 
As described in Figure IH-7, NLRB elections are also much more likely to 
1^ involve subsidiaries of larger parent companies in the manufacturing sector (92 percent) 
ythan in the service sector (76 percent) and other sectors (85 percent). 
v3* 
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r^r; -~ In manufacturing, win rates decrease from 36 percent to 29 percent in companies 
fcSf •. that are not subsidiaries of larger parent companies versus companies that are 
subsidiaries. The drop in win rates between firms that are not subsidiaries and those that 
fc,. are is much greater in the service sector and other sectors decreasing from 71 percent to 
[ y 53 percent in the service sector and 60 percent to 39 percent in other sectors. 
J*©* -
&pP Figure III-8: Percent of elections and elections won by corporate ownership and industrial sector 
o%-
• Percent of manufacturing elections 
• Percent of manufacturing elections won 
• Percent of service sector elections 
• Percent of service sector elections won 
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• Percent of elections in other sectors won 
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Compared to five years ago, companies targeted for organizing campaigns are 50 
percent more likely to be subsidiaries of large multinational parent companies, both U.S. 
and foreign-based, and are much less likely to have all sites and operations based in the 
U.S. Only one third (34 percent) of the manufacturing campaigns are in for-profit 
companies with all sites and operations based in the U.S., while 66 percent are in 
multinational companies of which a third are foreign-based (22 percent of all 
manufacturing elections). In contrast, in the service sector, only 17 percent of campaigns 
involve multinationals, almost entirely U.S.-based, while in other sectors 60 percent are 
in multinationals, including 16 percent that are foreign-owned companies. 
Figure BDE-9: Corporate ownership and election outcome by industrial sector 
P.: 
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Overall, among for-profit companies win rates are highest for U.S.-based 
companies with all sites in the U.S. (51 percent), and lower for foreign-based 
multinationals (29 percent) and U.S.-based multinationals (39 percent). The lowest win 
rates (23 percent) are found in manufacturing sector elections involving foreign-based 
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j j j p 1 *• jjjultiaationals, compared to a 31 percent win rate in U.S.-based multinationals, and a 33 
Ni§f: 
"AJ^ C' percent win rate for manufacturing firms with all sites and operations in the U.S. This 
•i '4 contrasts with the service sector where win rates range from 50 percent in foreign-based 
• y^S "• Tnultinationals to 58 percent in companies with all sites and operations in the U.S. 
$%*i Industrial union activity 
>*.-; Because industrial union activity is spread across diverse sectors and industries, 
-S3FC "•' there is also a great deal of variation in the corporate ownership and structure of the 
iM 
R$M 
companies in which industrial unions are organizing. As described in Figure HI-10, 86 
V$i l percent of industrial union activity is concentrated in for-profit companies, split evenly 
B*v f I between pubhcly-held and privately-held companies (both 43 percent) and in subsidiaries 
;* £ \ of larger parent companies (88 percent). Fifty-four percent of industrial union campaigns 
£]£, take place in multinationals, including 18 percent in foreign-based companies. 
*#c t&'. Figure DI-10: Industrial union activity and outcome by ownership structure 
B B Elections 
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Win rates for industrial unions average highest in nonprofits (50 percent) and 
?lo"west in foreign-based multinationals (24 percent). Win rates for industrial unions are 
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lso higher i*1 privately-held companies (39 percent) than in publicly-held companies (35 
percent) or subsidiaries of larger parent companies (also 35 percent). 
r0mpany characteristics 
Table HI-3 provides additional summary statistics about differences across sectors 
in company employment and financial characteristics for the elections in our sample. 
These data confirm that unions organizing in the manufacturing sector at the end of the 
last decade faced giant, global, and extremely profitable corporations. 
.Tabic DI-3: Firm employment and financial characteristics and election outcome by industrial sector 
Employment 
Total number of employees at parent 
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The average number of employees at parent companies in the manufacturing 
sector is over 23,000, more than two thirds of which are outside of the U.S., with just 
over 7,100 employees in the U.S. The average number of employees at parent companies 
mother sectors is even larger (31,177), despite the much smaller average unit size in 
Overcoming the Challenges to Organizing in Manufacturing — page 143 
those industries. More than half of the employees in other sectors (16,781) are in the 
U.S., reflecting the fact that many of the industries in other sectors, such as retail, 
transportation, and construction, are much less mobile than manufacturing industries. 
As would be expected, given that these elections occurred during the period of 
high corporate profitability in the late 1990s, 65 percent of all companies in our sample 
are in good or excellent financial condition.19 Thirty-nine percent have at least $1 billion 
in annual revenue, and 22 percent have net income of at least $100 million. Seventy 
percent of manufacturing companies are in good or excellent financial condition, 41 
percent have at least $1 billion in annual revenue, and nearly a third (31 percent) of 
manufacturing firms have incomes averaging at least $100 million, including firms in 
manufacturing industries that experience massive job losses during this period. These 
data indicate that the escalating wave of plant closings, plant closing threats, and 
production shifts out of the country in the latter part of the 1990s were less a function of 
declining profitability than a constant search by multinational corporations for increased 
profits wherever they could find them (Bronfenbrermer 2001; Bronfenbrermer and Burke, 
et al. 2001). Overall, win rates are lower in companies in excellent condition than in 
other units, reflecting the fact that those employers have greater resources to improve 
conditions for workers and to devote to an aggressive anti-union campaign. 
Other organized sites and operations 
Some of the biggest obstacles to union organizing are lack of access to the 
workplace, lack of information on the bargaining unit and the company being organized, 
and lack of bargaining power within the company and the industry necessary to restrain 
&&&**£=:.~-_. 
19 
Financial condition was determined by a combination of criteria including annual revenues, net profits, 
credit rating, earned price per share, newspaper and trade journal articles, and organizer interviews. 
< r * 
& 
m 
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the employer's anti union campaign and bargain a first agreement. Many argue that one 
0f the first steps to overcoming these obstacles is to make a priority of organizing 
residual units in the sites where the union already represents some workers at the same 
site, and organizing wall-to-wall in as many facilities as possible in large, multi-site 
operations. Under this model union organizing success and bargaining power depend on 
concentrating organizing efforts in those firms, industries, and sectors in which the union 
already has density. 











 S e i v j c e S e c t o r 
B Other organized units at same site 
Other sectors All sectors 
I Other organized units at other sites 
Figure HI-11 shows the level of organizing activity in NLRB elections in units in 
| g firms that have already organized units at the same site or other sites and locations. 




| | ; targeting units among firms with already organized units, and the win rates associated 
fey 
i t with those campaigns. 
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Because most manufacturing workplaces have only a limited number of 
bargaining units, typically just production and maintenance and clerical/technical, unions 
organizing in the manufacturing sector are least likely (7 percent) to have already 
organized workers at the same site where the election is taking place. A srmilar pattern is 
found in many of the industries included under other sectors, in particular construction, 
retail, and transportation, where only 10 percent of the elections take place in units with 
already organized units at the same site. 
In the service sector, particularly in heath care, multiple bargaining units at the 
same site are much more common, increasing the likelihood that unions might be 
attempting, over time, to organize more than one unit at the same facility. In contrast, 
campaigns in units where there are already organized units at other sites and locations of 
the same company are much more common in manufacturing and other sectors than in 
the service sector, simply because, as discussed in Part I, union density is so much higher 
in many industries in those sectors than it is in most of the service sector. Thus, while 64 
percent of elections in manufacturing and 68 percent of elections in other sectors take 
place in firms that have previously organized units at other sites and locations, in the 
service sector only a slight majority of the campaigns (54 percent) occur in firms with 
previously organized units. 
Figure HI-12 compares win rates in elections with other organized units at the 
same site or other sites with those where there are no organized units at either the same or 
other sites or locations. For all sectors, win rates are higher in elections involving 
companies that have other organized units and operations at other sites and locations than 
in elections with no other units organized, and win rates are also higher in both 
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*' tnanufacturing and service sector elections where there are other organized units at the 
same site. The difference in win rates is especially notable in the service sector. While 
S:J55?* the overall service sector win rate averages 57 percent, it increases to 64 percent in 
*$$'.> campaig118 with units organized at other locations and 73 percent in elections with units at 
IP? 
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ln In manufacturing, win rates are also higher in units with other organized units at 
** other sites (31 percent) and in the small percentage of units with other organized units at 
I*' the same site (33 percent), but the differences are quite small compared to the overall win 
rate of 30 percent and the 27 percent win rate in elections where no other units are 
^organized. In other sectors, win rates increase to 60 percent in elections where there are 
j ! other organized units at the same site, but win rates remain constant at 42 percent when 
fc there are other organized units at the other sites, and increase to 44 percent in elections 
Pi. 
with no other organized units. These data suggest that service sector unions have been 
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JL&r
 o r e effective at using other organized units as an opportunity to gain access, 
*..|t£ -^onnation, and bargaining leverage, and to recruit more member volunteers from the 
* target company to assist with the organizing effort. This could be either a function of 
J, KSS jjjore strategic organizing by service sector unions or, particularly with nonprofits, less 
if^ ' Dowerful and less global employer opposition to organizing. 
Union density and Union Cities 
*-^ It would be natural to assume that high union density rates in the vicinity where 
& ***** 
~$% ' the organizing drive is taking place would be associated with higher win rates because in 
&r. those communities workers have more exposure to unions, unions have more resources 
*%":" and pubhc support, and employers are more vulnerable to labor support. However, 
previous research has found union density to have a fairly weak and inconsistent 
relationship with union organizing success (Bronfenbrenner 1993). This is because until 
V;x the late 1990s it was relatively rare for central labor bodies or other labor organizations to 
awf. capitalize on union density by becoming involved in area organizing campaigns or by 
building active and effective community labor coalitions. This has changed in recent 
years because the AFL-CIO and affihate unions have encouraged local unions and central 
labor bodies to play a more active role in supporting organizing efforts in their 
communities. In particular, the AFL-CIO Union Cities program has established a set of 
standards to encourage organizing and strike support, membership mobilization, and 
community labor coalitions. As described in Figure III-13,24 percent of all NLRB 
|j elections occur in communities with at least 20 percent union density20 and 12 percent of 
all NLRB elections are located in one of the fourteen communities where the Central 
.c 20 
fe- We used metropolitan area union density for 1998-1999 for all elections that were held in metropolitan 
I*.-, areas and state union density for all elections that were held in more rural communities outside of 
;*• metropolitan areas. 
l\ .s 
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JS" V- ^ j . Council (CLC) has met the criteria to be designated a Union City by the AFL-
f£ 'V ^Q 21 Because service sector organizing tends to be much more highly concentrated in 
£* large urban areas, 36 percent of all service sector elections but only 16 percent of 
- *.'•_
 maIlufacturing elections and 14 percent of elections in other sectors are in areas with at 
^ least 20 percent union density and 14 percent of service sector elections, but only 10 
percent of manufacturing elections and 12 percent of elections in other sectors, take place 
•'- in Union Cities. 
V Figure IH-13: Union density, Union Cities, and organizing activity and success, by sector 
'"19A 
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• Percent where at least 20% density 
• Win rate where at least 20% density 
H W i n rate where less than 20% density 
• Percent in Union Cities 
• Win rate in Union Cities 





























Win rates for all sectors increased in areas with higher union density, averaging, 
for all sectors combined, 54 percent in elections in areas with at least 20 percent union 
density and 42 percent in areas with less than 20 percent union density. For elections in 
the manufacturing sector, win rates averaged 36 percent in areas with at least 20 percent 
union density but only 28 percent in areas with less than 20 percent union density. Not 
21 Union cities include Atlanta GA, Cincinnati OH, Cleveland OH, Houston TX, Los Angeles CA, Madison 
" "WI, Milwaukee WI, New York NY, Quad Cities IA, San Diego, CA, San Jose CA, Seattle WA, Syracuse 
NY, and Washington DC. 
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surprisingly, given the higher level of active labor and community support for organizing 
activity in Union Cities, win rates increase even further in elections in Union Cities, 
averaging 43 percent in manufacturing and 59 percent overall. 
Table HI-4: Bargaining unit demographics 
percent women in unit 
No women in unit 
1-49 percent women 
50-74 percent women 
75 percent or more women 




No workers of color in unit 
1-49 percent workers of color 
50-74 percent workers of color 
75 percent plus workers of color 
Percent women of color in unit 
No women of color in unit 
1-49 percent women workers of color 
50-74 percent women workers of color 
75 percent plus women workers of color 
Percent recent immigrants 
Percent undocumented workers 



































3 8 % 
29% 
2 3 % 
32% 
-

































2 1 % 









7 1 % 
-
































4 3 % 
32% 





1 1 % 
44% 
50% 





















































Bargaining unit demographics 
Table IH-4 provides a detailed picture of the demographic characteristics of the 
workers involved in NLRB certification elections and which workers are most likely to 
vote for unions. These data confirm that organizing is increasingly concentrated in units 
with a majority of women and people of color. Overall, only 10 percent of the units are 
all male or all white, while women made up the majority in half the units and workers of 
color make up the majority in 39 percent of the units. 
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mi As described in Figure EI-14, in all sectors, workers of color make up a larger 
tiS#r* proportion of workers being organized than the proportion of workers of color in the 
J j l sector. These differences are most dramatic in the service sector, where 27 percent of 
v£/' eligible voters in the elections in our sample are African-American , but African-
7., Americans accounted for only 13 percent of the service sector workforce, and in other 
* sectors where 21 percent of eligible voters are African-American and 20 percent are 
[j Hispanic, yet only 11 percent of workers in the workforce in other sectors are African-
I, American and 12 percent are Hispanic. The differences between workforce and eligible 
I. voter demographics are much less (1 to 4 percentage points) among Hispanic workers in 
f the service sector and both African-American and Hispanic workers in manufacturing. 
Our findings relating to the gender composition of the units being organized, 
versus the gender composition of the work force, are much more mixed. While in the 
^service sector 78 percent of the workers being organized are women compared to 62 
"Because BLS does not distinguish between Black non-Hispanic workers from the Caribbean and Africa, 
^aad since the proportion of eligible voters in our sample who were Black non-Hispanic but not African-
i/*rnerican was less than 1 percent, for the purposes of this analysis we have included all Black non-
lspanic workers under African-American workers. 
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percent of the workforce, in manufacturing and other sectors the proportion of women 
workers involved in NLRB elections is eight to twelve percentage points lower than the 
proportion of the workforce who are women. This suggests that unions organizing in 
manufacturing and other sectors are continuing to concentrate a disproportionate share of 
their organizing among male production workers, and failing to take advantage of the 
more pro-union disposition of women workers. 
Figure IH-15: Bargaining unit demographics and industrial sector 
B Manufacturing elections 
I Manufacturing elections won 
I Service sector elections 
H Service sector elections won 
I Other sector elections 
I Other sector elections won 
I All sectors 
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Gender composition of NLRB bargaining units 
Figure HI-15 and Table IH-4 describe the race and gender composition of the 
bargaining units where elections are taking place. As would be expected, service sector 
units have a much higher percentage of women (76 percent) relative to manufacturing (23 
percent) and other sectors (27 percent). Only 2 percent of service sector units have no 
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women workers, 89 percent have at least 50 percent women workers, and 65 percent have 
at least 75 percent women (Table HI-4). Thirteen percent of manufacturing elections and 
20 percent of elections in other sectors are all male, while 17 percent of the units in both 
manufacturing and other sectors have at least 50 percent women in the unit. 
Figure HI-16: Percent women in unit by manufacturing industry 
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There is also a great deal of variation in the gender composition of bargaining 
M units within the manufacturing sector (Figure IE-16). Elections in apparel, textiles, and 
g leather have the highest percentage of women workers, averaging above 50 percent. 
:> Other industries which average at least 30 percent women include auto and auto parts, 
jfslectronics and electrical products, food processing, household and recreational 
g^quipment, printing and publishing, and rubber. The voters in mining and quarrying 
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elections are almost entirely male (only 1 percent women), while elections in building 
materials involve fewer than 10 percent women, and those in aerospace, fuel and 
chemical processing, industrial equipment and machinery, metal products, and paper 
products all have fewer than 20 percent women. 
Race and ethnic composition ofNLRB bargaining units 
Referring back to Figure IE-15, we find that 30 percent of manufacturing workers 
are workers of color, including 17 percent Hispanic, 11 percent African-American, and 2 
percent Asian.23 This compares to the service sector where 42 percent are workers of 
color and other sectors where 45 percent are workers of color. Only 12 percent of 
manufacturing sector units have no workers of color and 26 percent have a majority of 
workers of color. Eight percent of manufacturing workers are women of color compared 
to 32 percent in the service sector and 12 percent in other sectors. 
Similar to our findings relating to gender, we also find significant variation in the 
racial composition ofNLRB election units within the manufacturing sector (Figure EI-
17). The industries with the largest proportion of workers of color in NLRB bargaining 
units include paper (more than 50 percent) and plastics (more than 40 percent). Apparel, 
textiles, and leather; auto and auto parts; fuel and chemical processing; household and 
recreational equipment; paper; plastics; and rubber; which all average at least 30 percent 
workers of color in the unit. Food processing, industrial equipment and machinery, and 
metal products, all average above 20 percent workers of color. Once again mining and 
$!• quarrying is the least diverse, averaging less than one tenth of a percent workers of color. 
23 
Although we include Native Americans with workers of color, the percentages are too small (less than 1 
percent of all eligible voters) to separate out by industrial sector. 
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*• African-American workers are most concentrated in apparel, textiles and leather; 
gr auto and auto parts; paper; plastics; and rubber where they average from 19 percent to 30 
fclf-' percent of the unit. Hispanic workers have their highest concentration (between 25 
|& percent and 34 percent) in fuel and chemical processing, household and recreational 
&t 
If products, paper products, and plastics. They also average at least 15 percent of the unit in 
{r aerospace, auto and auto parts, food processing, industrial equipment, and rubber 
IP 
H products. Asian workers and workers from the Pacific Islands have their greatest 
B 
p . concentration (between 2 percent and 6 percent) in apparel, textiles, and leather, auto and 
p- auto parts, and metal products, and plastics. 
F* -
f* 
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sf > /toce fl»^ gender characteristics and NLRB election outcome 
Consistent with earlier research (Bronfenbrenner 1997, 2001), overall win rates 
increase substantially as the proportion of women and people of color grows beyond 50 
*-*. percent, but are lower in units where women or workers of color are in the minority than 




 Milkman (1992) and Bronfenbrenner and Hickey (2002) that suggest that although 
*$ women and workers of color have a greater propensity to vote for unions than white male 
J3 
#*r workers, employers are better able to capitalize on race and gender divisions in units 
3»; :. where women and/or people of color are in the minority. However, these demographic 
effects do not remain constant across different sectors of the economy, suggesting that the 
relationship between race, gender, and election outcome depends on differences 
ii I particular to the industry in which they operate, and on the characteristics of both the 
*; union and the employer involved in the campaign. 
4*. Win rates for the complete sample average 43 percent in all male units, dropping 
t"-; - to 40 percent in units where women are in the minority, increasing to 46 percent in units 
^.p: with between 50 percent and 74 percent women, and increasing to 56 percent in units 
where three-quarters or more of the unit are women (Figure HI-18). In service sector 
Jv industries, where, on average, 76 percent of workers in the unit are women, win rates 
\ average only 21 percent in units with a minority of women and 33 percent in the 2 
*-, percent that are all male units, but increase above 60 percent in units with a majority of 
r women. In other sectors, win rates are lowest (32 percent) in units with between 50 
& 
4° percent and 74 percent women, but increased to 75 percent in the 8 percent of the units 
y where at least three-quarters of the unit are women. 
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v i , I h trigure DI-18: Gender composition of the unit and election outcome, by sector 





In contrast, manufacturing win rates are highest in all male units (53 percent) and 
then gradually increase from 26 percent to 33 percent as the proportion of women 
increases in the workforce. In part this reflects the fact that only 17 percent of all 
manufacturing units in the election sample have at least 50 percent women in the unit, 
and only 2 percent have 74 percent or more women in the unit. But, it also suggests that 
unions organizing in manufacturing are failing to take full opportunity of the more pro-
union sentiments of women workers and appear to be less effective at organizing women 
workers than their counterparts in other sectors of the economy. 
A similar, but not identical, pattern is evident among workers of color (Figure III-
19). Overall win rates are lowest (40 percent) in units with a minority of workers of 
color, but gradually increase to 56 percent in units with at least 75 percent workers of 
color. Once again, the highest win rates in manufacturing (38 percent) are in all white 
-units, while the win rates in units with 75 percent or more workers of color average only 
32 percent. In the service sector win rates are 67 percent in the 9 percent of the units with 
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n 0 workers of color, and 71 percent in the 28 percent of the units with at least three 
Quarters workers of color, but only 49 percent in the units with a minority of workers of 
color in the unit. In other sectors win rates are extremely low (11 percent) in units with 
no workers of color, and average around 50 percent for units with at least 50 percent 
workers of color. 


























The highest win rates overall (82 percent) are in units with 75 percent or more women of 
color (Figure HI-20). In the service sector, in particular, win rates are highest in the 31 
percent of elections with a majority of women of color, ranging from between 69 percent 
to 79 percent. In manufacturing, unions won only 29 percent of the less than 1 percent of 
units which have 75 percent women, but have an average win rate of 40 percent in units 
with no women of color and units with between 50 percent and 74 percent women of 
color. 
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i> Referring back to Figure HI-15, we find that while women account for 46 percent 
££~ of the total number of eligible voters in our sample, they account for 55 percent of votes 
ET in elections won. Similarly, workers of color account for 39 percent of eligible voters in 
-^ all elections but 43 percent in elections won, and women of color account for 19 percent 
g,, of eligible voters and 26 percent of elections won. These data suggest that not only are 
p r women and workers of color, and in particular women of color, participating in union 
W elections in ever increasing numbers — but, because win rates are so much higher in 
I units where these workers are concentrated, the majority of new workers coming into the 
jgr - labor movement today are also women and people of color. 
§|. We also found significant differences across sectors. Although win rates are 
p r ^uch higher in units in the service sector industries with large percentages of women 
|.~ workers and workers of color, in the manufacturing sector the percent of women workers 
BI elections won (21 percent) is actually lower than percent of women workers in all 
^manufacturing elections (23 percent) and the percent of workers of color (30 percent) and 
ft 
I"-
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gt percent of women of color (8 percent) remain the same in both elections and elections 
won. The only exception to this trend in the manufacturing sector involves Hispanic 
workers, where the percent of workers in elections won (18 percent) is slightly higher 
than the percent in all elections (17 percent). As we will discuss later in the paper, 
although these findings provide further evidence that workers of color have a greater 





 much more on a combination of factors including the make up of the organizing team, 
E/!". and the nature and intensity of both the union and employer campaigns. 
X \ 
:: -_ Immigrant workers and organizing 
, In the last five years some of the labor movement's most significant organizing 
victories have involved large numbers of recent immigrants, including many 
undocumented workers, primarily from Latin America, Asia, and the Caribbean. 
However, the vast majority of these victories have been outside the NLRB process, 
particularly in hotels, home care, building services, and laundries. The fact that so much 
•• of the organizing among immigrant workers goes on outside the NLRB process should be 
t> no surprise, since recent immigrants, particularly undocumented workers, are highly 
% concentrated in the kinds of contingent, contract, and temporary employment systems 
v.-
p that are least-suited to the traditional NLRB process. Immigrant workers who are not 
;-" American citizens, both those who are undocumented and those with working permits, 
i are much more vulnerable to employer threats or actual referral to the Immigration and 
;V Naturalization Service (INS) during NLRB certification election campaigns than they are 
"4 
i' m ^gs scale voluntary recognition campaigns such as those listed above. Thus, even 
when unions do try going through a traditional NLRB campaign with large numbers of 
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undocumented workers, those campaigns often never get to an election because they fall 
apart once the employer threatens to involve the INS. 








































Still, we find that a growing number of recent immigrants are participating in 
NLRB elections particularly in certain industries. As described in Figure IH-21, 19 
percent of all workers participating in NLRB elections are recent immigrants who spoke 
a language other than English as their primary language 24 and this percentage stays 
relatively stable across sectors. As expected, the percent of undocumented workers is 
24 
Because organizers and bargaining unit members could not easily identify which workers were recent 
immigrants, we used the proportion of the workforce who had a language other than English as their 
primary language as a proxy for immigrant status. Thus these figures may undercount the number of recent 
J,Ittrmgf"ants since they do not include workers from countries such as Singapore or India who were raised 
speaking English as their primary language. This should be balanced out, however, by those workers 
whose families have lived in the U.S. for several generations but continue to have a language other than 
English as their primary language. 
Overcoming, the Challenges to Organizing in Manufacturing—page 161 
eXtremely small — 4 percent over all, 3 percent in manufacturing, 2 percent in other 
sectors, and 1 percent in the service sector. 
Figure 1H-22: Percent new immigrants by industry 
Aerospace 
Apparel, textiles, and leather 
Auto and Auto Parts 
Building Materials 
Electronics and Electrical Products 
Food Processing 
Fuel and Chemical Processing 
Household and Recreational Products 
Industrial Equipment and Machinery 
Metal Products 
Mining and Quarrying 
Paper Products 
Plastic Products 




15% 20% 25% 
Percent new immigrants in unit 
30% 
Because immigrant workers are so concentrated in certain industries, sector 
figures alone fail to capture the full extent of immigrant participation in the NLRB 
election process. Outside the manufacturing sector, iromigrant workers in particular are 
concentrated in service sector industries such as laundries, hospitality, and building 
services, as well as industries in other sectors such as wholesale, waste disposal and 
construction. Within the manufacturing sector, industries such as printing and 
publishing, mining and quarrying, and building materials have almost no immigrant 
workers in the bargaining unit, others such as household and recreational products, paper, 
«*«and rubber all have at least 20 percent immigrant workers, auto and auto parts, food 
processing, fuel and chemical processing, plastics, industrial equipment and machinery, 
Overcoming the Challenges to Organizing in Manufacturing - page 162 
and metal products have between 15 percent and 20 percent immigrant workers (Figure 
m-22). 
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Similar to our findings for women workers and workers of color, win rates vary 
significantly as the percent of recent immigrant and undocumented workers increases. 
As described in Figure 111-23, the highest win rates (50 percent in manufacturing, 60 
percent in the service sector, and 47 percent in other sectors) are in the 16 percent of the 
units where at least a third of the workers in the unit are recent immigrants. The lowest 
win rates (ranging from 29 percent in manufacturing to 49 percent in the service sector) 
are in units with between 1 percent and 32 percent recent immigrants. 
Overall, win rates average 45 percent in the 93 percent of the elections, which 
have no undocumented workers, decreasing to 32 percent in units with between 1 percent 
and 32 percent undocumented workers, and then increasing back up to 43 percent in 
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«sr.
 campaigns with at least a third undocumented workers. In manufacturing, win rates are 
f highest (50 percent) in the 3 percent of the units with at least a third undocumented 
workers, making manufacturing the only sector where the percent of undocumented 
i workers is higher (4 percent) in units where the union wins the election than in units 
«*, -
f where the election is not won (3 percent). 
Bargaining unit characteristics and election outcome 
*• Wages 
£ In addition to demographic data about the gender, race, ethnicity, and immigrant 
** - status of workers participating in NLRB elections, we also gathered data on wages, hours 
*' of work, and type of bargaining unit. As described in Table HI-5, the average wage for 
i 
* workers organizing today is above $10 an hour in all sectors, averaging $10.94 for all 
elections. Most of the variation in wages among workers being organized is within 
bargaining units and industries rather than across industrial sectors. In manufacturing 
I units the average wage is $10.72 an hour. Only 28 percent of unorganized workers 
participating in manufacturing elections make more than $12 an hour, 51 percent make 
?y between $8 and $11 dollars an hour and 20 percent make less than $8 an hour. While the 
;;, average is higher in the service sector ($11.61 an hour), and more than a third (34 
y percent) of workers in service sector elections average more than $12 an hour, a larger 
- percentage make less than $8 an hour (24 percent), and 39 percent make between $8 and 
}; $12 an hour. Although the average wage is lower ($10.14 an hour) in other sectors, the 
J wage breakdown is almost identical to manufacturing, with 27 percent averaging more 
| than $12 an hour, 52 percent averaging between $8 and $12 an hour, and 20 percent 
£"_ earning less than $8 an hour. 
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Tabic in-5: Bargaining unit characteristics and election outcome by industrial sector 
Manufacturing Services Other All Sectors 
Mean or Mean or Mean or Mean or 
proportion proportion proportion proportion 














Average wage more than $12/hour 
Average wage $8-$12/hour 
Average wage less than $8/hour 
Hours of Work 
Percent part-time 
percent on call, temporary, per diem 
Average weekly hours of overtime 
Percent average 5hrs/week or more 
overtime 







Production and maintenance 
ProfessionalAechni cal 
Service and maintenance 
Wall to wall/cross departments 










































































































































Consistent with previous research (Bronfenbrenner 1997; 2001), win rates are 
higher (53 percent) in the 22 percent of the units where the average wage is less than 
$8.00 per hour. Win rates are lowest (39 percent) in units with an average wage of more 
than $ 12.00 an hour. The higher-wage units tend to include more white, male, production 
and maintenance employees, truck drivers, and more highly paid, majority white, male, 
professional and technical employees. These groups are less predisposed to unions than 
their non-white, female counterparts in non-professional, largely service, occupations 
(Bronfenbrenner 1993; Freeman and Rogers 1999). Part of the reason for this is because 
these higher paid workers often tend to be more tied in to internal labor markets in their 
firm and so are more vulnerable to employer threats of job loss and blacklisting. Win 
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n: 
\ ^
 ateS are especially low among these high wage workers in manufacturing, averaging 
J*
 0I1[y 24 percent compared to 47 percent in the service sector, and 30 percent in other 
sectors. For both manufacturing and services the highest win rates are for workers 
earning between $8 and $12 an hour (33 percent in manufacturing and 70 percent in the 
service sector), while in other sectors the highest win rates are associated with average 
wages of less than $8 an hour. 
Bargaining unit type 
Table III-5 also provides data on the extent and nature of bargaining unit types 
across sectors. Despite the shift in organizing activity toward more service sector 
industries, 92 percent of manufacturing elections, and 43 percent of elections in our 
sample overall, are in traditional blue collar production and maintenance units. The 
remaining 8 percent of manufacturing elections occur in driver (2 percent), non-
professional (1 percent), and wall-to-wall cross department units (4 percent). In the 
service sector the majority of elections are in service and maintenance (31 percent), 
professional technical units (29 percent), and wall-to-wall cross department units (17 
percent). In other sectors, which are highly dominated by the EBT, the majority of 
organizing is concentrated in drivers units (34 percent) and production and maintenance 
units (45 percent). Overall, only 14 percent of all elections are in professional technical 
units, 3 percent are in clerical white-collar units, and 1 percent are in skilled trades units. 
As they have been for more than a decade, win rates are highest in non-
professional (62 percent) and service and maintenance units (84 percent) and lowest in 
craft (25 percent) and production and maintenance units (33 percent). Also consistent 
with previous research, union Win rates are lower in units where the final unit is different 
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from the unit originally petitioned for, averaging only 23 percent in manufacturing and 44 
percent in service and other sectors. This is because an NLRB or court ordered unit 
change is a proxy for both increased employer opposition to the union and weakness in 
the union campaign. The former is because it signifies an employer willing to pay 
• extensive legal costs to pursue a unit determination decision and the latter signifies the 
inability of the union to correctly gauge the appropriate unit at the start of the campaign, 
or to have the power to leverage the employer to agree to a consent election. 
;j: Work and work schedules 
i -
*'.!. Our survey data also reflect how much the traditional five-day week eight-hour 
t. day work schedule has given way to significant increases in both the work week and the 
work day and to less regular schedules and less permanent full-time employment. As 
described in Figure IH-24, in manufacturing elections 37 percent of the bargaining units 
average over five hours of overtime a week, 27 percent work weekends, 33 percent work 
l- , evening shifts, 12 percent work rotating shifts, and 18 percent work ten to twelve hour 
J." 
\l days. A fairly similar pattern is found in other sectors where 32 percent average over five 
&• hours of overtime, 24 percent work weekends, 29 percent work evenings, 15 percent 
Ins*-
!Jf rotate shifts, and 23 percent work ten to twelve hour days. 
.4* 
Z • In the service sector, where twenty-four hour day, seven/day week operations are 
I: 
F - very common in industries such as health care and hospitality, a larger percentage work 
^? <\ -
£
 t weekends (40 percent) and rotate shifts (16 percent). In contrast to the manufacturing 
1* 
^ sector where only 1 percent of the workers are part-time or temporary workers, in the 
% • - - ' 
jr. service sector 21 percent of workers are part-time and 10 percent are temporary, while in 
I I other sectors 16 percent are part-time and 5 percent are temporary. 
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irtgure HI-24: Hours of work and industrial sector 
• Manufacturing elections 
• Manufacturing elections won 
B Service sector elections 
B Service sector elections won 
B Other sector elections 






















































Although these kinds of work schedules are one of the primary issues driving 
workers to organize today, the percent of elections won is lower than the overall percent 
of elections in all sectors for ten to twelve hours days, rotating shifts, evening shifts, and 
in the case of the service sector, weekend shifts. This suggests that more intensive work 
schedules may act as a barrier to organizing because they leave very little extra time for 
workers to actively assist in the organizing effort, and make it much more difficult for 
organizers to meet with workers outside the workplace. 
Change in management practices prior to the petition being filed 
In order to best capture the work environment prior to the union campaign, we 
also collected data on changes in management practices in the two years before the 
petition was filed. As described in Figure EI-25, we find that the majority of bargaining 
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W- units experience major upheavals in company structure, working conditions, and 
"I, 
I employment s t a ^ m t y i*1 m e t w 0 Years before the petition is filed. Overall, at least 40 
t percent of bargaining units experience changes in wages and benefits. Although 17 
i$ percent receive annual wage increases of 3 percent or more, most of these changes 
It*-
• * * • 
|h involve significant concessions in wages and benefits, such as wage freezes (39 percent), 
r wage cuts (9 percent), and significant cuts in benefits (40 percent). 
IP 
Tf~ Figure IQ-25: Changes in management practices before the petition was filed 
Threats of full or partial closing 
Major layoffs of 10% or more 
Serious threat of major layoff 
Contracting out more than 10% 
Job combinations for more than 10% 
Annual wage increase of 3% or more 
Wage freeze 
Wage cut 
Significant benefit cuts 
Significant increase in the pace of work 
Changes in technology 
Changes in company ownership 
Changes in management staff 
Employee involvement program in place 
I Manufacturing I Service sector I Other sectors I All sectors 
In 21 percent of NLRB elections, employers make threats of full or partial plant 
closing in the two years before the petition, while they institute major layoffs in 11 
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percent of the campaigns, threaten major layoffs in 16 percent of the campaigns, and 
contract out more than 10 percent of the unit in 11 percent of the campaigns. Forty-eight 
percent of the units experience a significant increase in the pace of work, 18 percent have 
changes in company ownership, 31 percent have changes in management staff, 13 percent 
face changes in equipment and technology, and 22 percent experience job combinations. 
Nearly a third of the units already have an employee involvement or team system in place 
before the election. 
What is most interesting about these changes in management practices is their 
consistency across sectors. For most of the changes listed in Figure UI-25, differences 
between sectors are within a few percentage points. The only significant differences are 
in technological change (less common in other sectors), contracting out (less common in 
the service sector), employee involvement programs and plant closing threats (more 
common in manufacturing), and job combinations, wage freezes, significant increases in 
the pace of work, and changes in management staff (more common in the service sector). 
What these data confirm is that the majority of workers participating in organizing 
campaigns today, operate in a rapidly changing and rapidly deteriorating work 
environment, including frequent threats to job security, major concessions in wages and 
benefits, and dramatic increases in the pace of work. 
Employer behavior in NLRB election campaigns 
Table IH-6 provides detailed summary statistics on the extent and nature of 
employer anti-union behavior during NLRB certification election campaigns. Consistent 
with our previous research, the overwhelming majority of employers in our sample 
t aggressively opposed the union's organizing efforts through a combination of threats, 
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discharges, promises of improvements, unscheduled unilateral changes in wages and 
benefits, bribes, and surveillance (Bronfenbrenner 1994; 1997b). 
Tabic IQ-6: Employer Behavior in NLRB Certification Election Campaigns 
Manufacturing Service sector 
by Sector: 1998-1999 
Other sectors All sectors 
Percent or 
mean of 
elections Win Rale* 
Percent or 
mean of 
elections Win Rale* 
Percent or 
mean of 
elections Win Rate* 
Percent or 
mean of 
elections Win Rate* 
Hired management consultant 
Held captive audience meetings 
Number of meetings 
More than 5 meetings 
Mailed anti-union letters 
Number of letters 
More than 5 letters 
Distributed anti-union leaflets 
Number of leaflets 
More than 5 leaflets 
Held supervisor one-on-ones 
One-on-ones at least weekly 
Used E-mail communications 
Established employee involvement program 
Made positive personnel changes 
Made promises of improvement 
Granted unscheduled raises 
Distributed union promise coupon books 
Distributed pay stubs with dues deducted 
Made unilateral changes 
Made plant closing threats 
Discharged union activists 
Number discharged 
Workers not reinstated before election 
Other harassment and discipline of union activists 
Promoted pro-union activists 
Held raffles relating to union dues 
Used bribes and special favors 
Used electronic surveillance 
Held company social events 
Assisted anti-union committee 
Use free mass media 
Purchased time or ad space on mass media 
Laid off bargaining unit members 
Contracted out bargaining unit work 
Used anti-union videos 
Threatened to report workers to INS 
Involved community leaders/politicians 
Hied ULP charges against the union 
Number of tactics used by employer 
.Employer used no tactics 
Employer used more than 5 tactics 
_ Employer used more than 10 tactics 
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As these data show, both individually and in combination, these tactics are 
ctremely effective at reducing union election win rates. 
When we look at campaigns in all sectors we find that 76 percent use an outside 
anagement consultant, 92 percent hold captive audience meetings, and 67 percent hold 
Lpervisor one-on-ones at least weekly. On average, employers hold more than twelve 
Lptive audience meetings, mail more than six letters, and distribute more than twelve 
aflets. Fifty-two percent of all employers make threats of full or partial plant closure 
ring the organizing drive while approximately one in every four employers (26 
rcent) discharge workers for union activity. 
In addition to plant closing threats and discharges for union activity, 
iployers also engage in other illegal or quasi illegal behavior such as promises of 
provement (48 percent), unscheduled wage increases (20 percent), unilateral changes 
benefits and working conditions (17 percent), bribes or special favors to those who 
posed the union (34 percent), assist the anti-union committee (31 percent), and 
ctronic surveillance of union activists during the organizing campaign (10 percent), 
iployers threatened to refer undocumented workers to the Immigration and 
turalization Service (INS) in 7 percent of all campaigns and in 52 percent of cases 
ere undocumented workers are present. 
Consistent with previous research we find that for most of the most aggressive 
ividual employer anti-union tactics, win rates average ten to twenty percentage points 
her in campaigns where the tactic is used compared to campaigns where the employer 
is not use the tactic (Figure 111-26). Differences in win rates are particularly striking 
more than five captive audience meetings (37 percent when used, 51 percent when not 
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sed), more than five leaflets (37 percent when used, 59 percent when not used), 
upervisor one-on-ones at least weekly (40 percent when used, 54 percent when not 
Lsed), establishing an employee involvement program after the petition is filed (33 
lercent when used, 47 percent when not used), promises of improvement (35 percent 
yhen used, 54 percent when not used), plant closing threats (38 percent when used, 51 
lercent when not used), and anti-union videos (36 percent when used, 55 percent when 
Lotused). 




vc*;* - ' <L 
•7. •-*'. " *- \-rt-n £ *_., *- •*••• m 
kMP-^W^^:'1-
I Tactic used in all sectors Tactic not used in all sectors 
For just two tactics, promoted pro-union activists and used the media, the win rate 
s actually higher in units where those tactics are used compared to the win rate where 
hey are not used. One possible explanation is that employers only bother to promote 
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union activists out of the unit or run a media campaign when there is a strong chance the 
union will win. 
Although most of the findings regarding employer behavior are consistent with 
earlier research, the percentages for some of the most egregious employer actions, such 
as discharges for union activity, have slightly declined (Bronfenbrenner 2001). However, 
rather than suggesting any reduction in employer opposition to union organizing efforts, 
these findings on employer behavior are primarily a function of the shift in union 
organizing activity away from some of the largest, most anti-union, mobile, 
multinational, for-profit employers, and towards much smaller, less mobile, nonprofit 
companies in the service sector. When, as described in Figure 111-27, we compare the use 
of some of the more aggressive anti-union employer tactics across sector, we find some 
important differences in the nature of employer campaigns in manufacturing and other 
sectors versus those in the service sector. 
Across a wide range of tactics, more than five captive audience meetings, 
supervisor one-on-ones, promises of improvement, plant closing threats, bribes and 
special favors, anti-union videos, and referring workers to INS, the percent of campaigns 
using these tactics in the service sector was lower than in either manufacturing or other 
sectors. Even for those tactics which are more actively used in the service sector than in 
manufacturing and other sectors, such as the media, electronic surveillance, social events, 
and unscheduled raises, the frequency with which these tactics are used in the service 
sector is only a few percentage points higher than in manufacturing and/or other sectors. 
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Figure 111-27: Aggressive employer anti-union tactics in NLRB certification elections, by sector 
100% f 
B Percent manufacturing I Percent service sector H Percent other sectors 
As we found in our previous research, the differences between employer behavior 
in manufacturing and the service sector become even more pronounced when we 
compare nonprofit to for-profit firms (Bronfenbrenner and Hickey 2002). Although some 
nonprofit employers, particularly hospitals and universities, have long been known for 
their opposition to unions and the substantial resources they spend on anti-union 
campaigns, the nature of their anti-union campaigns are quite different from those in for-
profit companies because nonprofits are much more accountable and accessible to the 
clients they serve. Thus, while nonprofit employers are more likely to use extensive unit 
challenges and public media campaigns, they are less likely to engage in more clearly 
identifiable illegal tactics such as discharges for union activity, bribes, or illegal unilateral 
changes in wages than their counterparts in the for-profit sector. For example, employers 
discharge workers for union activity in only 14 percent of campaigns in nonprofits 
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compared to a 29 percent discharge rate in campaigns in for-profit companies. Nine 
percent of employers in nonprofits use no anti-union tactics at all compared to less than 1 
percent of employers in for-profit companies. Similarly, only 15 percent of nonprofits 
use more than ten anti-union tactics compared to 21 percent of for-profit companies. 
Figure DI-28: Use of employer tactics and win rates in the manufacturing sector 
60% 
50% - -
I Tactic used Tactic not used 
The win rates associated with individual employer tactics also exhibit a different 
pattern in manufacturing from that in the service sector and other sectors (Table ITI-6) 
and in all sectors combined (Figure 111-26). As described in Figure 111-28 most individual 
employer tactics serve only to lower the win rate in maaufacturing points by a few 
percentage points. Even in elections where the tactics are not used, win rates hover close 
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to the 30 percent overall win rate for manufacturing. The only exceptions are more than 
five captive audience meetings (24 percent when used, 35 percent when not used) and 
established an employee involvement program during the campaign (18 percent when 
used, 32 percent where not used), which both have strong negative effects in all sectors.26 
This relative stability of low win rates in manufacturing across a wide range of 
employer tactics suggests that although manufacturing employers do run more aggressive 
campaigns against the union than employers in the service and other sector, employer 
anti-union campaigns are not the sole determinant of the low win rate in the sector. 
Employer campaign intensity and election outcome 
As our previous research has shown, the negative impact of employer tactics on 
organizing success becomes even greater when they are combined together with other 
aggressive antiunion tactics. In order to contrast the relative intensity and impact of anti-
inion behavior (Figure 111-29), we also looked at election activity and success in each 
sector, broken down by weak employer campaigns (zero to five aggressive tactics), 
noderately aggressive campaigns (six to ten aggressive tactics), and very aggressive 
:ampaigns (more than ten aggressive tactics). 
As would be expected, we find significant variation in the intensity of employer 
ampaigns across sectors. Employers run very aggressive campaigns in nearly a third (32 
ercent) of manufacturing elections, compared to 25 percent of service sector elections, 
nd 19 percent of elections in other sectors. While more than a third of service sector 
lections occur in campaigns where employers ran weak campaigns, only 16 percent of 
For an in-depth analysis of the impact of employee involvement programs on organizing see Rundle 
>98. 
"i. 
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manufacturing employers, and 24 percent of employers in other sectors, run weak 
campaigns. 
Figure 1H-29: Election activity and outcome by intensity of employer campaign and sector 
Figure 111-29 also shows win rates for each sector broken down by the intensity of 
the employer campaign. Despite the fact that manufacturing units have the greatest 
variation in number of tactics used, manufacturing sector win rates vary only slightly 
across industrial sectors, while win rates in the service sector and other sectors decline 
dramatically between weak campaigns and very aggressive campaigns. 
For all sectors, the lowest win rates are units where the employer runs a very 
aggressive anti-union campaign, ranging from 27 percent in manufacturing and 37 
percent in other sectors to 40 percent in service sector units. Win rates are as high as 77 
percent in service sector units and 58 percent in other sectors with in weak employer 
campaigns. In manufacturing units where the employer runs weak campaigns the win 
rates average only 29 percent, increasing to 31 percent in units where the employer runs a 
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moderately aggressive campaign. These data suggest that greater employer opposition 
alone cannot explain the low NLRB election win rates in the manufacturing sector. 
Instead, we must assume that there are other key factors that have kept manufacturing 
win rates in check. 
Organizer background 
A central component to labor's renewed commitment to organizing has been an 
effort to recruit and train a cadre of new organizers to staff and lead campaigns. Part of 
this effort has included an emphasis on developing a younger and more diverse pool of 
organizers who are a better match to the workers most actively organizing today. For 
many unions, this has not been an easy process, since their organizing departments tend 
to be woefully understaffed, and the staff they do have is neither young, nor diverse. 
Table III-7 provides some insight in to whether and how much progress unions 
have made in both recruiting enough organizers to staff campaigns, and developing a 
pool of organizers who are a better match for the workforce. These data also allow us to 
compare differences in organizing staff characteristics across sectors. 
Looking back at the last decade, we find there has been some improvement in 
staff levels in NLRB campaigns. Ten years ago the average number of eligible voters per 
organizer27 was 114.15 (Bronfenbrenner 1993). Today, the average number of eligible 
voters per organizer has decreased to 78.17 despite the increase in average unit size. 
Seventy-nine percent of the campaigns have the recommended standard of at least one 
organizer for every hundred workers, compared to 53 percent in 1995 (Bronfenbrenner 
1998). At 103.01, the average number of voters per organizer is much higher in 
27 , 
The organizer figures are based on the total organizer full time equivalents (FTE's) working on the 
campaign, combining both part-time and full-time organizers. 
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^manufacturing than it is in the service sector (69.71) or other sectors (59.80) in part 
fiNu reflecting the fact that the number of ehgible voters in manufacturing (258) is much 
.J- higher than the average number of eligible voters in either the service sector (172), or 
I r other sectors (142). 
* ? * 
























Organizer Staff Background 
Campaigns with more than one organizer .70 .28 (.33) 
Average number of organizers (FTE's) 3.94 — 
Average number of voters per organizer (FTE's) 103.01 
Organizer ratio at least 1 to 100 workers .71 .29 (.31) 
Organizers assigned to campaign by AFL-CIO 
Number of organizers assigned by Organizing Inst. .02 — 
Number of organizers assigned by Union Summer .07 — 
Women 
Lead organizer female . 11 
One or more female organizers on staff .27 
One or more female organizers lead or staff .34 
Average number of female organizers .78 
Percent female organizers .27 
Female organizers for units with at least 25% women .46 
People of Color 
Lead organizer person of color .14 
One or more organizers of color on staff .31 
One or more organizers of color lead or staff .37 
Average number of organizers of color 1.15 
Minority organizer for units at least 25% minority .59 
Lead organizer woman of color .03 
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While having enough organizers is necessary, it is not sufficient. As we will 
discuss later in the section on union tactics, organizer demographics, quality, training, 
f; experience, and strategy matter as well. However, because the ratio of number of 
||- organizers to number of ehgible voters acts as a proxy for union resources committed to 
H^ the campaign, and because so many unions take on large units without putting in 
sufficient resources to effectively run the campaign, we find that in units with more than 
500 ehgible voters the win rate increases to 88 percent in units with at least one organizer 
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e r hundred workers, compared to a win rate of 31 percent in units with less than one 
organizer per hundred workers. 
Twenty-one percent of all organizers are assigned to campaigns by either the 
-Organizing Institute (11 percent) or Union Summer (10 percent). While Union Summer 
participants are fairly evenly split across sectors (7 percent manufacturing, 11 percent in 
the service sector, and 10 percent in other sectors), those assigned by the Organizing 
Institute are mostly working in the service sector (21 percent), compared to only 2 
percent in manufacturing and 7 percent in other sectors. 
Organizer demographics 
Unions have not just been increasing the number of organizers assigned to 
campaigns, but have also been recruiting a more diverse organizing staff (Table HI-7). In 
the late 1980s only 12 percent of lead organizers were women and 15 percent were 
people of color (Bronfenbrenner 1993). By 1995 the proportion of lead organizers who 
were women had increased to 16 percent while the proportion that were organizers of 
color had dropped to 9 percent (Bronfenbrenner 1998). Today, 21 percent of lead 
organizers are women, 22 percent are workers of color, and 7 percent are women of 
color. When we look across sectors, we find that female lead organizers are much more 
common in the service sector (37 percent) than in manufacturing (11 percent) or other 
sectors (8 percent). The differences across industrial sectors for lead organizer race and 
ethnic background are not as dramatic. Twenty-nine percent of service sector campaigns 
have a person of color as the lead organizer, compared to 22 percent of other sectors and 
14 percent of manufacturing. However, female lead organizers of color are particularly 
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W
 c0ncentrated in the service sector (13 percent) compared to manufacturing and other 
$• sectors (both 3 percent). 
& Consistent with previous research we find that with the exception of the small 
If percentage of female lead organizers in other sectors, win rates are higher for lead 
£ organizers who are women or workers of color than they are for their white male 
~ counterparts (Bronfenbrenner 1993, 1998). However, rather than suggesting that women 
'*"" and people of color make inherently better organizers, our earlier research has shown that 
k 
| 4 the unions who hire more female organizers and organizers of color, are the unions, such 
ft' 
*'*-_ as UAW, SEIU, UNITE, CWA, and HERE, that tend to run more aggressive and 
*». effective campaigns. 
: * > ' • 
;; The increased diversity among organizing staff goes well beyond lead organizers. 
i 
L, Perhaps even more significant, 35 percent of the campaigns have at least one woman on 
:- staff and 45 percent have at least one woman as a lead or staff organizer. Similarly, 22 
Jt percent have at least one person of color on staff and 35 percent have at least one person 
* . „ 
U*«' of color as lead or staff organizer. 
St 
| p As would be expected, there is great variation across sectors. For all elections, 38 
^ percent of all organizers are women, 11 percent are women of color, and 33 percent are 
H; people of color (Figure n i -30 ) . This latter group are 13 percent African-American, 10 
gf." percent Hispanic, 2 percent Asian/Pacific Islander, 1 percent Native American, and 1 
I1 
K*. percent other races. As would be expected, the largest proportion of female organizers is 
y round in service sector units (43 percent). Still, more than a quarter of manufacturing 
jg: organizers are women (27 percent), which is much higher than many would expect. 
I However, only 7 percent of all lead organizers and less than a quarter of female 
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organizers in manufacturing are people of color. This compares to the service sector, 
where nineteen percent of organizers are women of color, and nearly half of all female 
organizers are people of color. 
Figure IH-30: Percent of total organizers by race, gender, and sector 
140% 
J » * " s. * _ . 
mk 
20%-
• Percent organizers of other races 
D Percent Native American organizers 
B Percent Asian organizers 
• Percent Hispanic organizers 
B Percent African-American organizers 
• Percent organizers of color 
n Percent women organizers of color 











a f^ftRl^ B^BBJS, 




























Just under a third of lead organizers in both manufacturing (31) and the service 
sector (32 percent) are people of color, compared to 39 percent in other sectors. In both 
manufacturing and other sectors, the overwhelming majority of these organizers are men, 
split fairly even between African-Americans and Hispanics. Three percent of service 
sector lead organizers and only 1 percent of lead organizers in manufacturing or other 
sectors are Asian or Pacific Islanders. 
When we compare the race and gender demographics of organizers with the race 
and gender demographics of the units being organized, a clear pattern emerges. 
Organizer demographics vary across sectors in proportion to the demographics of the 
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eligible voters across sectors, but the percentage of women and people of color is almost 
always significantly lower among the organizers than among the people they are 
organizing (Figure 111-31). 
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While these data reveal that there continues be a fairly significant gap between the 
demographic make up of the workforce targeted for organizing and the demographics of 
the organizers who staff these campaigns, they also indicate that across all sectors, unions 
are recruiting more organizers who match the workers being organized, albeit in 
relatively small numbers. It is worth noting that while the manufacturing sector 
workforce is less diverse than the workforce in the service sector or other sectors, 
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organizer demographics in manufacturing campaigns are a closer match with the 
demographics of the bargaining units they are organizing than they are in either the 
service or other sectors. 
Figure 111-32 provides further detail in differences across sectors relating to 
organizer race and gender. In manufacturing 34 percent of election campaigns have at 
least one female organizer as lead or staff, and less than half (43 percent) of campaigns 
with at least 25 percent women in the unit have at least one female organizer. Unions 
organizing in other sectors follow a similar pattern, while 63 percent of all service sector 
elections have at least one female organizer as either lead organizer or staff, and two 
thirds have at least one female organizer in units with at least 25 percent or more women. 
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The service sector also has a higher percentage of campaigns with at least one 
staff or lead organizer of color (51 percent), and at least one organizer of color for units 
with 25 percent or more workers of color. This compares to manufacturing where 37 
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percent of campaigns have a least one staff or lead organizer of color, and 59 percent 
have at least one organizer of color in units with 25 percent or more workers of color. 
As would be expected, having at least one or more organizers on staff who are a 
match for the unit does tend to be associated with higher win rates (Figure HI-33). On 
average, units win 44 percent of elections in manufacturing and 50 percent in other 
sectors when they do have at least one female organizer in units that have 25 percent or 
more women,.but win only 17 percent of elections in manufacturing and 38 percent in 
other sectors when they do not. 
Figure IH-33; Organizers in units with at least 25 percent women or workers of color, by outcome 
Woman organizer/unit No woman Organizer of color/unit No organizer of 
25% plus women organizer/unit 25% 25% plus workers of color/unit 25% plus 
plus women color workers of color 
Yet, in the service sector, where nearly two-thirds of the campaigns have at least 
one female organizer as lead or staff, win rates are almost the same in units with 25 
percent or more women when there is at least one woman organizer (59 percent) as they 
.^_.are when there are no female organizers in those units (62 percent). This may be because 
women workers organizing in the service sector are less likely to feel that their issues and 
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concerns will not be addressed, since they can see that the majority of the members and 
many of the local leaders in these unions are women. In contrast, woman workers 
choosing whether to vote for a large industrial or building trades union would have 
reason to be much more concerned about the degree to which their interests will be 
addressed in an organization where they make up such a small minority, and might see 
the failure to assign a woman organizer to the campaign as a signal that their interests are 
less likely to be represented. 
We find a different win rate pattern in units with at least 25 percent workers of 
color. In manufacturing and other sectors the win rates are not improved much by the 
presence of at least one organizer of color in such units, but in the service sector 
organizers of color make a big difference (66 percent where there is at least one organizer 
of color compared to 55 percent where there is not). 
Lead organizer characteristics 
Age 
Table m-8 provides a more detailed portrait of the characteristics of lead 
organizers in NLRB campaigns and reveals some important differences in those 
characteristics across sectors. During the last five years some unions have not only put a 
great deal of effort into recruiting a more diverse pool of organizers in terms of race, 
gender, and ethnicity, they have also made a concerted effort to bring in more young 
organizers, including rank-and-file members, the children of rank-and-file members and 
other young people recruited from college campuses. However, that process is relatively 
new, so much so that the average age of lead organizers (45.66) is not particularly 
different than it was in 1986-1987, when it was 44.95, or 1993-1995, when it averaged 
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47.92 (Bronfenbrenner 1993; 1998). Thus today, 30 percent of lead organizers are more 
than fifty years old and 77 percent are at least 40 years old. Only 5 percent are less than 
thirty years old and only 17 percent are in their thirties. This same pattern is followed in 
both manufacturing and other sectors, where only 2 percent of lead organizers in 
manufacturing, and 6 percent of lead organizers in other sectors are less than 30 years 
old, and 12 percent of organizers in manufacturing and 17 percent of organizers in other 
sectors are less than forty. 
Win rates are particularly low for young organizers in manufacturing and other 
sectors, with no wins in manufacturing and only a 33 percent win rate in other sectors. 
This contrasts with the service sector where nearly a third (32 percent) of the lead 
organizers are under the age of forty and 7 percent are less than thirty, win rates average 
as high as 62 percent in units where the lead organizer is younger than thirty. 
Table DI-8: Lead Organizer background in NLRB certification election i 
Lead organizer female 
Lead organizer person of color 
Lead organizer woman of color 
Lead Organizer Age 
Less than 30 years 
30-39 years 
40-50 years 
More than 50 years 
Lead Organizer Marital Status 
Single with no dependent children 
Married with no dependent children 
Single with dependent children 
Married with dependent children 
Lead Organizer Education 
8 grade 
High school or GED 
Two-year college 
Four-year college 
Professional or graduate degree 
Lead Organizer Training 
Organizing Institute 
Union Summer 
Non-credit union based organizer training 
Non-credit university based organizer training 











































































































































































































*Number in parentheses lists the percent win rate when the characteristic did not occur. 
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Marital status 
There is much more variation in marital status across sector, which is largely a 
function of differences in the gender and age characteristics between lead organizers in 
the service sector and those in manufacturing and other sectors. In the service sector, 
where organizers are much younger and there is a much higher percentage of female lead 
organizers, the majority of lead organizers (63 percent) have no dependent children hving 
at home and 26 percent are single with no children. This contrasts with manufacturing 
and other sectors, where more than 70 percent of lead organizers, most of them male, are 
married, and 37 percent in manufacturing, and 31 percent in other sectors are married 
with dependent children at home. 
These data suggest that for the majority of male lead organizers it is still possible 
to be married and have a family despite the long hours away from home, most likely 
because their spouses do a greater share of the child care and household chores. In 
contrast, because female lead organizers do not have the same support systems as their 
male counterparts, it appears that marriage and family continue to be a more difficult and, 
in some cases, an insurmountable challenge. Thus, if the labor movement wants to 
continue to recruit and retain more women as lead organizers they are going to have to 
find a way to make both work and family possible. 
Educational background and organizer training 
There are also significant differences in lead organizer educational background 
across sectors. In manufacturing only half of the lead organizers have had more than a 
high school education and only 20 percent have had more than four years of college. 
While the percentages for lead organizers in other sectors parallel those in manufacturing, 
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in the service sector we find that more than half of the organizers (54 percent) have at 
least a four-year college degree, and 15 percent have a graduate degree. 
We also find a great deal of variation across and within sectors in terms of the 
types of organizing training programs lead organizers have attended. Without question, 
the Organizing Institute has played an increasingly important role in organizer training 
and screening for unions across all sectors. Fifty-three percent of lead organizers in 
manufacturing, 34 percent in the service sector, and 44 percent in other sectors have all 
attended at least one Organizing Institute session. A much smaller portion received 
organizing training as participants in Union Summer including 13 percent in 
manufacturing, 3 percent in the service sector, and 8 percent in other sectors. 
In manufacturing, 51 percent of lead organizers have attended union based non-
credit organizing training programs, 16 percent have attended non-credit organizing 
training programs sponsored by university labor centers, and 8 percent have participated 
in credit courses on organizing through university labor programs. Thirty-percent of 
service sector lead organizers and 47 percent of lead organizers from other sectors have 
attended non-credit union based organizing training programs, 12 percent (service sector) 
and 17 percent (other sectors) have attended non-credit university labor center organizing 
programs, and 7 percent (service sector) and 13 percent (other sectors) have participated 
in university-based credit course focusing on union organizing. Twenty-five percent of 
all lead organizers have not participated in any union- or university-based education 
programs. 
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Union experience 
Figure HI-34 describes differences in lead organizer union experience across 
sectors. What these data show is that lead organizers in manufacturing and lead 
organizers in other sectors are much more likely to have spent many years as a rank-and-
file union member and/or a local union officer than their counterparts in the service 
sector, but have a similar number of years of staff experience. In contrast to the service 
sector, where lead organizers averaged less than eleven years of rank-and-file experience 
in any union and a little more than seven years experience in the union involved in the 
campaign, lead organizers in manufacturing and other sectors averaged between nineteen 
and twenty-one years of rank-and-file experience in any union and eighteen to nineteen 
years of experience in the union involved in the campaign. In manufacturing, lead 
organizers average nine years experience as a local officer, while lead organizers in other 
sectors average six years, and lead organizers in the service sector average only three 
years officer experience. At the same time lead organizers from all unions have, on 
average, eight years of experience on union staff. 
Figure UI-34: Years of lead organizer union experience, by sector 
Rank-and-file Rank-and-file Union paid staff Local union officer 
member of any union member of this union 
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In part, these findings are a function of very different traditions in industrial, 
transportation, and building trades unions, which are much more likely to have local 
officers, rather than have full-time staff organizers, act as lead organizers on campaigns, 
and are also much more likely to require their organizing staff to come out of the rank-
and-file of their unions. In contrast, service sector unions have been more likely to 
recruit a younger, more diverse organizing staff and so have reached out not only to 
younger members of their unions but also college students and community organizers 
who start out as organizers with only limited rank-and-file experience in any union. 
Figure HI-35: Lead organizer organizing, bargaining, and membership mobilization experience 
Campaigns lead Campaigns Contracts lead Contracts on Contracts 
organizer assisted with negotiator bargaining team assisted with 
organizing membership 
mobilization 
As described in Figure 111-35, when we focus on organizing and bargaining 
experience these differences across sector are much less extreme and, in fact, suggest that 
across all sectors, lead organizers have fairly extensive organizing and bargaining 
experience. Lead organizers in manufacturing have been, on average, the lead organizer 
for seventeen organizing campaigns. This compares to an average of twelve previous 
campaigns as lead organizer for service sector organizers, and twenty-one previous 
Overcoming the Challenges to Organizing in Manufacturing -page 192 
campaigns for. lead organizers in other sectors. Across all sectors, lead organizers have 
assisted with organizing for approximately fifteen to sixteen organizing campaigns. In 
manufacturing, lead organizers have been the lead negotiator for eighteen contracts, been 
on the bargaining team for another twenty-two contracts, and assisted with membership 
mobilization in twelve contract campaigns. This compares to lead organizers in service 
sector campaigns who have, on average, been the lead negotiator for seventeen contracts, 
been a member of the bargaining team for twelve contracts, and assisted with 
membership mobilization for thirteen contracts. Lead organizers in other sectors have 
been the lead negotiator for an average of thirty-six contracts, on the bargaining team for 
fifteen contracts, and assisted with membership mobilization for eleven contracts. 
Occupational background 
These cross-sector differences in lead organizer characteristics also extend to their 
occupational background. As described in Figure 111-36, we find that, overall, lead 
organizers come out of a diversity of occupations, including a mix of white collar, blue 
collar, and service and maintenance occupations (pink and gray collar) along with other 
groups such as students, managers, small business owners, and those that had no previous 
work experience before working in the labor movement. 
However, this diversity in occupational background does not extend to the 
manufacturing sector where nearly 80 percent of all lead organizers worked in blue collar 
occupations, including factory or production workers (47 percent), skilled trades (26 
percent), and drivers (5 percent), before going on staff with the union. This stands in 
sharp contrast to the service sector, where 59 percent came out of professional (27 
percent), technical (6 percent), managerial (6 percent) and other clerical and white collar 
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occupations (12 percent) and 11 percent were formerly "pink and gray collar" service and 
maintenance workers such as food service workers, nurse aides, or hotel workers. 















I Production/Factory Worker 
I Sales 
Q Security/Law Enforcement 
I Service/Maintenance worker 
0 Skilled trades 
• Small business owner 
• Student 
1 Technician 
I No previous work experience 
I Other 
Manufacturing Service Sector Other sectors All sectors 
But also, 11 percent were formerly production workers, and 7 percent came out of 
:he skilled trades. Similarly the former occupations for lead organizers in other sectors 
"eflect the spectrum of industries included in this category, including transportation, 
construction, communications, retail/wholesale, and utilities. 
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What is most striking about these findings is that despite the dramatic changes in 
the workforce and in the types of bargaining units where unions are most actively 
organizing, the majority of lead organizers continue to come out of blue collar 
occupations, while only a small number (6 percent) come out of service and maintenance 
units where unions have been having the greatest organizing success. It is also worth 
noting that the proportion of lead organizers who came into the labor movement just out 
of college is quite small (8 percent overall, 14 percent in the service sector, 3 percent in 
manufacturing, and 4 percent in other sectors). Similarly only 2 percent of lead 
organizers in all elections had no previous work experience before coming on staff with 
the labor movement. 
Union oi^anizing strategy and tactics 
Our findings on company structure and characteristics, unit demographics, and 
employer tactics provide a deeper understanding of just how challenging the current 
organizing environment has become for unions organizing in the private sector. These 
data also make clear the great difficulty that most U.S. unions have had in trying to 
overcome these challenges, particularly those unions organizing in manufacturing. 
Yet, as we know from the national NLRB data as well as our survey data, some 
unions in all sectors of the economy have been able to win even against some of the 
nation's most formidable anti-union employers, including in manufacturing. This raises 
several key questions about factors contributing to these differences in organizing 
outcomes. Why is it that some unions, operating in an equally hostile organizing 
environment, have been so successful in organizing large numbers of new workers in 
their primary industry while others have found it so difficult? How important are 
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differences in the nature, quality, and intensity of union organizing campaigns in 
explaining the dramatic differences in organizing success across sector, industry, 
bargaining unit, union, and employer opposition? Why is there so little variation in 
manufacturing win rates across a diversity of company characteristics, unit 
demographics, and employer campaigns? How do union campaigns in the manufacturing 
sector compare to campaigns in other sectors and industries where unions have had 
greater success at organizing? And finally, which strategies will be most effective in 
overcoming some of the complex challenges facing unions attempting to organize in the 
manufacturing sector? 
Bronfenbrenner' s survey of 261 private-sector NLRB certification elections in 
1986 and 1987 was the first detailed study of the role of union tactics in campaigns 
(Bronfenbrenner 1993; 1997a). The study showed that unions were more likely to win 
NLRB elections if they used rank-and-file-intensive tactics such as person-to-person 
contact, active representative committees, member volunteer organizers, solidarity days, 
and building for the first contract before the election. This research also found that union 
tactics as a group had a more significant impact on election outcomes than other groups 
of variables that have been the traditional focus of industrial relations research such as 
election environment, bargaining unit demographics, and employer characteristics. This 
was an important finding because some researchers (such as William Dickens 1983) had 
argued that union tactics were entirely reactive, determined solely by management 
tactics. Subsequent quantitative studies of both private-sector NLRB elections and public 
sector organizing campaigns have reinforced Bronfenbrenner's earlier research 
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(Bronfenbrenner 1997c, 2000, and 2002; Bronfenbrenner and Juravich 1998; Juravich 
and Bronfenbrenner 1998). 
However, as we have outlined in this report, fourteen years after 
Bronfenbrenner's first study, a great deal has changed in the economy, employer 
behavior, and the labor movement itself Workers in almost every industry face more 
sophisticated employer opposition to organizing coupled with dramatic increases in 
corporate restructuring, foreign trade and investment, and shifts in work and production 
to other companies and other countries (Bronfenbrenner 2000, 2001; Bronfenbrenner and 
s
 Burke et al. 2002). 
This process did not happen all at once. As Bronfenbrenner and Juravich found in 
their study of 1994 NLRB campaigns, traditional organizing approaches and the isolated 
use of innovative tactics gradually decreased in effectiveness as the organizing climate 
became more complex and employer opposition more sophisticated (1998). They found 
that when controlling for the influence of organizing environment, company and 
bargaining unit characteristics, and employer opposition, only some individual union 
tactics, such as representative committees, workplace job actions, and media campaigns 
had a statistically significant positive impact on election outcomes. Other tactics such as 
housecalling the majority of the unit, holding soHdarity days, staging rallies, or running a 
community campaign did not. Yet, when these variables were combined into a 
comprehensive union-building tactic variable, adding one unit for each additional union-
building tactic used, the probability of the union winning the election increased by as 
much as 9 percent for each additional tactic. According to Bronfenbrenner and Juravich 
this suggests "that whether there is a comprehensive union building campaign that 
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incorporates person to person contact, leadership development, escalating internal and 
external pressure tactics, and building for the first contract is more important in 
detenrjining election outcome than individual union tactics" (Bronfenbrenner and 
Juravich 1998: 32-33). 
Although many unions are running more effective and aggressive organizing 
campaigns than they were a decade ago, the majority of unions continue to run relatively 
weak campaigns (Table HT-9 and Figure ni-37). Even those that do use more innovative 
and rank-and-file intensive tactics tend to use them piecemeal rather than as part of a 
sophisticated, comprehensive, and consistent strategy. In the current organizing 
environment that has simply not been enough to increase union activity and union 
organizing success to the degree necessary for unions to regain both density and power. 
Figure 111-37 examines changes over the last decade in the use and effectiveness 
of some of the tactics that Bronfenbrenner and Juravich included as key elements of a 
comprehensive union building strategy. Overall these data confirm that today more 
unions are using more of these individual tactics. However, the percent that combine 
them into a more comprehensive campaign remains quite small. While there are 
increases of as much as 10 to 20 percentage points for many of the individual tactics, the 
use of some tactics, such as representative committees, ten or more small group meetings, 
or more than 70 percent surveyed one-on-one, actually declined by 1998-1999, and most 
of the key union building tactics are being used in less than a third of all campaigns. 
As expected, win rates associated with the individual tactics also exhibited no real 
pattern of improvement as the use of these tactics increased between the late 1980s and 
Figure HI-37 does not include data on the "ten or more member volunteers" variable for 1986-1987, 
because data on the total number of member volunteers was not collected as part of that study. 
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the late 1990s. In fact, the win rates associated with these tactics remain remark 
stable over the ten year period suggesting that any increase in the intensity an 4 
union campaigns was more than made up for by the deterioration of the organs 
environment and the increased intensity and sophistication of employer camp31*? 
1093-1995? and Figure DI-37: Union tactics, percent of elections, and percent win rates, 1986-1987, y?y 
1998-1999 
I Percent 1986-1987 elections 
•1986-1987 win rate 
I Percent 1993-1995 elections 
•1993-1995 win rate 
IPercent 1998-1999 elections 
1998-1999 win rate 
The one exception was job actions in the work place, which in 1986-1987 
included only 2 percent of all units, most of which are cases where the union went on 
strike during the organizing campaign and, in all but 10 percent of the cases, lost both the 
strike and the election. By 1998-1999 the percent holding job actions had increased to 16 
percent and the win rate in units with job actions had increased to 65 percent 
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When we look at all tactics combined, starting in 1986-1987, only 3 percent of all 
unions used more than five tactics and none used ten or more tactics. Win rates for 
campaigns using more than five tactics in 1986-1987 averaged as high as 100 percent. 
By 1993-1995, 30 percent were using more than five tactics and 6 percent were using ten 
or more tactics while win rates averaged 50 percent for using more than five tactics and 
72 percent for using at least ten tactics. In 1998-1999 the percent using more than five 
tactics had increased to 50 percent but the percent of campaigns using at least ten tactics 
dropped to 3 percent. Win rates averaged 51 percent for campaigns using more than five 
tactics and 64 percent for campaigns using at least ten percent. 
What is most striking about these results is how inconsistent the use of the tactics 
has been both within campaigns and over time. Although organizer training programs 
and materials have been emphasizing the importance of these tactics for more than a 
decade (CWA 1985; Diamond 1992), these data suggest that, even today, only a small 
number of unions are actually using these tactics in a consistent way, and even those that 
do, tend to use them in isolation, not as part of a comprehensive multi-faceted campaign. 
Most significantly, in light of labor's much touted effort at "changing to organize," there 
has been only a minimal increase in the use of these tactics, both individually and in 
combination, since 1995. 
Current use and effectiveness of individual union tactics 
Table III-9 provides a more detailed summary of the broad array of tactics being 
used by unions organizing under the NLRB today, and the win rates associated with those 
tactics. The data suggest that there continues to be a great deal of variation both within 
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and across industrial sectors in the kinds of tactics unions are using and the extent to 
which they are being used. 
A handful of tactics have become nearly universal. Eighty-eight percent of all 
NLRB election campaigns have organizing committees, 63 percent use house calls, and 
75 percent have small group meetings. But the effectiveness with which they are used is 
much less consistent. For example, only 37 percent have organizing committees that are 
representative of the unit, only 42 percent housecall the majority of the unit, and only 32 
percent hold at least ten small group meetings. Even a smaller number (28 percent) have 
small group meetings in worker's homes. Unlike house calls, which often end up being 
little more than canvassing, house meetings can be much more effective means of 
developing leadership, assessing membership support, and building commitment among 
the workers being organized. Yet, only 13 percent of union campaigns have house 
meetings involving at least a third of the unit. 
Campaigns in the service sector are slightly more aggressive than campaigns in 
manufacturing, averaging 5.16 union building tactics compared to 4.71 in manufacturing. 
Service sector campaigns are more likely to use community coalitions (33 percent), house 
meetings (32 percent), ten or more small group meetings (39 percent), one-on-one 
surveys (51 percent), written assessments (61 percent), free or paid media (22 percent and 
9 percent), or select the bargaining committee before the election. Manufacturing unions 
are more likely to have ten or more member volunteers (19 percent), involve other unions 
or labor groups (36 percent), and use rallies (32 percent), polling (16 percent), and videos 
(29 percent). 
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Table HI-9: Union Tactics in NLRB Certification Election Campaigns by Sector: 1998-1999 






















•Union used targeting 
Percent signed cards at petition 
*70% or more cards 
Union used rank-and-file committee 
Percent on committee 
*Representative committee 
Union used housecalls 
Percent housecalled 
*50% or more housecalled 
Union used house meetings 
Percent attending at least one house meeting 
*33% or more attended house meeting 
Union used small group meetings 
Number of small group meetings 
*Ten or more small group meetings 
Union used member volunteer organizers 
Number of member volunteer organizers 
*Ten or more member volunteer organizers 
Union used solidarity days 
Number of solidarity days used 
*Five or more solidarity days used 
Number of union letters 
Number of union leaflets 
Percent surveyed one-on-one 
*70% or more surveyed one-on-one 
•Bargaining committee established before election 
•First contract proposals developed before election 
•Union used written assessment system 
•Union held rallies 
*Union organized job actions in the workplace 
•Union used free media 
•Union used paid media 
Union used videos 
Union used E-mail 
Union used polling 
*Union ran community based campaign 
Union involved clergy 
Union involved public officials 
Union involved community groups 
Union made public campaign around ULPs 
Union involved students 
•Union involved other unions or labor groups 
•Union used corporate pressure tactics 
•Union used cross border solidarity 
Number of union building tactics used 
Union used no union building tactics 
Union used at least five union building tactics 









































































































































































































































































































































































































*Union building tactics 
••Win rate when tactic not used 
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The weakest campaigns are in other sectors such as transportation, construction, 
and retail, which averaged only 3.44 union building tactics overall, and where unions 
used fundamental tactics such as active representative committee, house calling the 
majority of the unit, ten or more small group meetings, ten or member volunteers, or 
community or labor coalitions in fewer than 25 percent of their campaigns. 
Comprehensive union strategies 
What these data reveal is that not only are very few unions running aggressive 
campaigns, but also in the current organizing environment it is not enough to simply 
utilize as many union tactics as possible. Instead, for unions to make any significant 
organizing gains in the private sector, they will have to mount organizing campaigns that 
are more aggressive, comprehensive, creative, and strategic. In our most recent study on 
NLRB campaigns we found that certain strategic elements, each comprised of clusters of 
key tactics, are essential ingredients for union organizing success (Bronfenbrenner and 
Hickey 2002). Some of these strategic elements, which we called comprehensive 
organizing tactics, are individually associated with higher win rates and in some cases 
have statistically significant positive effects on election outcomes when controlling for 
the impact of election environment, company characteristics, bargaining unit 
demographics, and employer opposition. 
However, given the hostile climate in which unions must operate, we found that 
the isolated use of even these more comprehensive tactics is not enough. Instead, our 
findings suggest that union gains depend on a multi-faceted campaign utilizing as many 
of the ten comprehensive organizing tactics as possible. 
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Table HI-10: Variable definition for comprehensive organizing tactics 
Comprehensive Union-Building Tactics Variable Definition 
1. Adequate and appropriate staff and financial 
resources 
2. Strategic targeting 
3. Active and representative rank-and-file 
organizing committee 
4. Active participation of member volunteer 
organizers 
5. Person-to-person contact inside and outside 
the workplace 
6. Benchmarks and assessments to monitor 
union support and set thresholds for moving 
ahead with the campaign. 
7. Issues which resonate in the workplace and 
community 
8. Creative, escalating internal pressure tactics 
involving members in the workplace 
Equals 1 if there is at least one organizer for every 100 eligible 
voters in the unit; one woman organizer for units with 25 percent 
or more women; and one organizer of color for units with 25 
percent or more workers of color. 
Equals 1 if the union researched the company before the start of 
the campaign or the company was part of a union targeting plan 
and the union represented other workers at the same employer or 
in the same industry. 
Equals 1 if at least 10 percent of the unit is represented on the 
committee; there is at least one woman on the committee if the 
unit is 10 percent or more women; at least one person of color on 
the committee if the unit is 10 percent or more workers of color; 
and committee members met with workers one-on-one in the 
workplace and engaged in two or more of the following actions 
during the campaign: spoke at house meetings, spoke out at 
captive audience meetings, spoke at community forums, 
conducted assessments, assisted with preparing board charges, or 
helped organize job actions. 
Equals 1 if the union used at least five member volunteers from 
other organized units and they engaged in one or more of the 
following: meetings outside the workplace, one-on-one in the 
workplace, leafleting outside the workplace, speaking at 
community forums, or assessments. 
Equals 1 if the union housecalled the majority of the unit or 
surveyed workers one-on-one about what they wanted in the 
contract and conducted at least ten small group meetings or house 
meetings. 
Equals 1 if the union used written assessments to evaluate 
membership support for the union and waited to file the petition 
until at least 60 percent of the unit signed cards or petitions. 
Equals 1 if the union focused on two or more of the following 
issues during the campaign: dignity, fairness, quality of service, 
power, voice, or collective representation. 
Equals 1 if the union used two or more of the following 
workplace tactics: five or more solidarity days, job actions, 
rallies, march on the boss for recognition, petitions rather than 
cards, and union supporters joined employee involvement 
committees. 
9. Creative, escalating external pressure tactics 
involving members outside the workplace, 
locally, nationally, and/or internationally 
10. Building for the first contract before the 
election" 
Equals 1 if the union involved one or more community groups 
during the campaign and also did at least one more of the 
following: corporate campaign, cross-border solidarity, involving 
other unions, using either paid or free media. 
Equals 1 if the union did one or more of the following before the 
election: chose the bargaining committee, involved workers in 
developing bargaining proposals, or surveyed at least 70 percent 
of the unit one-on-one about what they wanted in the contract. 
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Table III-10 provides definitions for each of the ten elements of our model: 1) 
adequate and appropriate staff and financial resources, 2) strategic targeting, 3) active and 
representative rank-and-file organizing committees, 4) active participation of member 
volunteer organizers, 5) person to person contact inside and outside the workplace, 6) 
benchmarks and assessments to monitor union support and set thresholds for moving 
ahead with the campaign, 7) issues which resonate in the workplace and in the 
community, 8) creative, escalating internal pressure tactics involving members in the 
workplace, 9) creative, escalating external pressure tactics involving members outside the 
workplace, locally, nationally, and/or internationally, 10) building for the first contract 
during the organizing campaign. 
Our research contends that each of the ten tactical clusters, or comprehensive 
organizing tactics, enhances the union's organizing power in a unique way. Unions that 
allocate adequate staff and financial resources, for example, make an institutional 
commitment to be more intensely engaged in the campaign, recruit an organizing staff 
that is demographically representative of the workers they organize, and to run more 
campaigns. Unions that engage in strategic targeting tend to approach organizing as a 
means to build bargaining power within certain sectors and industries, in contrast to the 
non-strategic "hot shop" organizing model. 
Perhaps the single most important component of a comprehensive campaign is an 
active, representative committee that gives bargaining unit members ownership of the 
campaign, allows the workers to start acting like a union inside the workplace, builds 
trust and confidence among the workforce and counteracts the most negative aspects of 
the employer campaign. 
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The use of member volunteers to assist in organizing campaigns reflects a 
combination of greater institutional integration of current and potential new members, 
and an emphasis on a worker-to-worker approach to organizing. Person-to-person 
contacts made inside and outside the workplace enhance the union's organizing power by 
providing the intensive one-on-one contacts necessary to build and sustain worker 
commitment to unionization both at home and in the increasingly hostile election 
environment at work. The combination of benchmarks and assessments allows unions to 
evaluate worker support for the union at different stages of the campaign in order to 
better adjust their strategy to the unit they are trying to organize and to set thresholds to 
determine when, and whether, they are ready to move on to the next stage of the 
campaign. 
A focus on issues that resonate with the workers and the coinmunity, such as 
respect, dignity, fairness, service quality, and union power and voice, is essential both to 
build worker commitment to withstand the employer campaign and to gain community 
support. Internal pressure tactics allow the union to start acting like a union before the 
election takes place, building solidarity and commitment among the workers being 
organized and restraining employer opposition. External pressure tactics, that exert 
leverage on the employer both in the local community and in their national and/or 
international operations, are essential to organizing in the increasingly global corporate 
environment. Finally, building for the first contract before the election helps build 
confidence in the workers being organized, showing them what the union is all about and 
signaling to the employer that the union is there for the long haul. 
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Table IH-11 and Figure IH-38 present summary statistics for the ten 
comprehensive organizing tactics clusters that make up our strategic organizing campaign 
model. Overall, only 14 percent of all the union campaigns devote adequate and 
appropriate resources to the campaign, only 19 percent engage in person-to-person 
contact inside and outside the workplace, and only 17 percent engage in escalating 
pressure tactics outside the workplace. 
Table IH-11: Comprehensive union building tactics and election outcome by industrial sector 
Manufacturing Service sector Other sectors All sectors 
Percent Percent Percent Percent 
Percent of Percent of Percent or Percent of 
of elections Win of elections Win of elections Win of elections Win 
elections won rate* elections won rale* elections won rate* elections won rate* 
Comprehensive Union Building 
Tactics 
Adequate and appropriate resources 
Strategic targeting 
Active representative committee 
Member volunteer organizers 
Person-to-person contact 
Benchmarks and assessments 
Issues which resonate 
Escalating internal pressure tactics 
Escalating external pressure tactics 
Building for the first contract 
Number of tactics used 
Zero tactics 
One to five tactics 








































































































































































Fewer than 30 percent have active representative committees or effectively utilize 
member volunteer organizers, while fewer than 25 percent used benchmarks and 
assessments, or focused on issues that resonate in the workplace and broader community. 
The highest percentages are found for strategic targeting (39 percent), escalating pressure 
tactics inside the workplace (37 percent), and building for the first contract before the 
ejection is held (35 percent). 
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Figure HI-38: Comprehensive organizing tactics, election activity and outcome, by sector 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 
Adequate and appropriate 
resources 
Strategic targeting 
Active representative committee 
Member volunteer organizers 
One-on-one contact 
Benchmarks and assessments 
Issues which resonate 
Escalating internal tactics 
Escalating external tactics 
Building tor first contract 
B Percent of all manufacturing elections • Percent of all manufacturing elections won 
EI Percent of all service sector elections B Percent of all service sector elections won 
H Percent of all elections in other sectors • Percent of all elections in other sectors won 
As described in Table HI-11, for all sectors combined all of the comprehensive 
organizing tactics are more likely to be used in winning campaigns than in losing ones. 
For example, only 9 percent of losing campaigns devote adequate and appropriate 
resources compared to 21 percent of winning campaigns, while 33 percent of winning 
campaigns have active representative committees compared to only 21 percent of losing 
campaigns. 
Once again we find significant differences across sectors. Unions organizing in 
the service sector are much more likely to use comprehensive organizing tactics such as 
adequate and appropriate resources (23 percent service sector, 7 percent manufacturing, 9 
Overcoming the Challenges to Organizing in Manufacturing -page 208 
percent other sectors), strategic targeting (55 percent service sector, 28 percent 
manufacturing, 25 percent other sectors), person-to-person contact inside and outside the 
workplace (27 percent service sector, 17 percent manufacturing, and 12 percent other 
sectors), benchmarks and assessments (30 percent service sector, 17 percent 
manufacturing, and 22 in other sectors), issues which resonate in the workplace and 
community (34 percent service sector, 19 percent manufacturing, 14 percent other 
sectors), escalating external pressure tactics (24 service sector, 13 manufacturing, and 10 
percent other), and building for the first contract (43 percent service sector, 33 percent 
manufacturing, 25 percent other). Service sector campaigns are slightly more likely to 
use internal pressure tactics (40 percent service, 39 percent manufacturing and 24 percent 
other). Manufacturing unions are most likely to effectively use member volunteer 
organizers (33 percent manufacturing, 22 percent service sector, 25 percent other sectors) 
and active representative committees (31 percent manufacturing, 27 percent service 
sector and 18 percent other sectors). 
As described in Figure 111-39, for all elections combined, each of the individual 
elements in the model are associated with win rates that average between 4 to 28 
percentage points higher than in campaigns where they are not utilized. Most dramatic 
are the win rates associated with adequate and appropriate resources (64 percent when 
present, 41 percent when not present), active representative committee (56 percent when 
present, 41 percent when not present), and benchmarks and assessments (66 percent when 
present, 38 percent when not present). 
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The smallest differences are associated with issues that resonate in the workplace 
and community (49 percent when present, 43 percent when not present) and external 
pressure tactics (48 percent when present, 44 percent when not present). This is to be 
expected given that escalating external pressure tactics tend to be only used in campaigns 
with aggressive employer opposition, while the effectiveness of issues is highly 
dependent on the tactics unions use to get their message across. 
When we compare across sectors, we find that manufacturing elections have the 
most dramatic differences in win rates between campaigns where tactics are used versus 
campaigns where they are not used. For example, the win rate in manufacturing 
campaigns where adequate and appropriate resources are used is as high as 70 percent but 
drops to 26 percent in campaigns where the union did not use adequate and appropriate 
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resources. Similarly the win rate is 65 percent when the union uses benchmarks and 
assessments but drops down to 25 for campaigns in which benchmarks and assessments 
are not used. For most other tactics the differences in win rates between when the tactic 
is used and when it is not used range between 6 percentage points (strategic targeting) to 
16 percentage points (active and representative rank-and-file committee). However, for 
several comprehensive tactics, such as focusing on issues that resonate with the 
workforce and community, escalating external pressure tactics, and building for the first 
contract, the win rates associated with the use of the comprehensive tactic are actually 1 
to 4 percentage points lower than in campaigns where they are not used. This suggests 
that in the more adverse organizing climate of the manufacturing sector, these tactics in 
particular are only effective when used as part of a multifaceted campaign, rather than as 
disconnected individual tactics that are not part of any larger strategy. These findings 
also suggest that despite the higher win rates associated with using these tactics, the 
oveiwhelming majority of unions continue to pick and choose individual tactics, in most 
cases without any coherent plan or strategy, rather than pulling them together into a more 
comprehensive, multi-faceted strategy. 
As described in Figure HI-40, the win rate increases dramatically for each 
additional tactic used, at the same time the percent of elections where the tactics are used 
steadily declines for each additional tactic used. Fourteen percent of all campaigns use 
no comprehensive organizing tactics, 54 percent use fewer than three tactics, while only 
10 percent of all campaigns use more than five tactics. 
Overcoming tlie Challenges to Organizing in Manufacturing - page 211 
Figure EGT-40: Percent of elections and election win rate by number of comprehensive tactics used 
Win rates start at 32 percent for no comprehensive organizing tactics, and then 
increase to 44 percent for one to five tactics, 68 percent for more than five tactics, and 
100 percent for the 1 percent of the campaigns where unions use eight tactics.29 
Figure 111-41 describes differences across sectors in the use of comprehensive 
organizing tactics. In the manufacturing sector, 11 percent of all union campaigns use no 
comprehensive organizing tactics, while 83 percent used between one and five tactics and 
only 6 percent used more than five tactics. However, nearly twice as many of elections 
won (13 percent) use more than five comprehensive tactics. In the service sector 16 
29 In order to make sure that all of the elements of our model were a critical component of organizing 
success, we also tested a series of different combinations of six comprehensive organizing tactics from the 
ten elements of our model, making sure to include all of the different elements in an equal number of 
combinations. We found that for almost every different combination of six tactics, win rates increased for 
each additional comprehensive organizing tactic used. The average win rates for all the combinations start 
at 32 percent, increasing to 38 percent for one tactic, 48 percent for two, 55 percent for three, 60 percent for 
four, 78 percent for five, and 93 percent for six tactics. Similarly, win rates range from a minimum 29 
percent and a maximum of 38 percent for elections where no tactics in the combination were used, to a 
minimum of 61 percent and a maximum of 100 percent for six tactics (Bronfenbrenner and Hickey 2002). 
Overcoming the Challenges to Organizing in Manufacturing -page 212 
percent of all elections and 19 percent of elections won use more than five 
comprehensive tactics, and 74 percent use between one and five tactics, while in other 
sectors only 4 percent of all elections and 7 percent of all elections won use more than 
five tactics, while as much as 24 percent of elections in other sectors use none of the 
comprehensive organizing tactics. 
Figure DI-41: Comprehensive organizing tactics and union election activity by sector 
I Manufacturing elections 
I Manufacturing elections won 
I Service sector elections 
I Service sector elections won 
H Other sector elections 
I Other sector elections won 
I All elections 
I All elections won 

































As predicted, across all sectors percent win rates are much higher in elections 
where unions use a comprehensive organizing strategy incorporating more than five 
comprehensive tactics, compared to campaigns where they use five or fewer tactics 
(Figure 111-42). In manufacturing the win rate averages only 20 percent in campaigns 
where unions use no comprehensive organizing tactics, increasing only slightly to 29 
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percent when they use between one and five tactics, but then jumping up to 63 percent in 
the campaigns where they use more than five tactics. Similarly, in other sectors the win 
rate associated with no comprehensive tactics is 29 percent, increasing to 45 percent in 
units in other sectors where the union used one to five tactics and as high as 75 percent in 
units where they use more than five tactics. In the service sector the range is not as 
dramatic. Unions win 44 percent of campaigns where no tactics are used, 57 percent in 
campaigns where one to five tactics are used, and 68 percent in campaigns where more 
than five comprehensive tactics are used. Thus we find that a comprehensive organizing 
strategy improves election outcomes substantially, especially in manufacturing, despite 
capital mobility and the power of giant multinational corporations. 
Figure IH-42: Comprehensive organizing tactics and election outcome by sector 
Manufacturing Service sector Other sectors All sectors 
• Union used no comprehensive 20% 44% 29% 32% 
tactics 
• Union used one to five 29% 57% 45% 44% 
comprehensive tactics 
• Union used more than five 63% 68% 75% 68% 
comprehensive tactics 
Comprehensive organizing strategy, company characteristics, and election outcome 
As described in Figures 111-43 and m-44 the positive impact of comprehensive 
organizing campaigns in the manufacturing sector holds true across a wide range of 
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company and unit characteristics. As difficult as organizing in for-profit manufacturing 
firms has become, unions are much more likely to overcome the negative impact of 
capital mobility and corporate restructuring that so dominates the manufacturing sector, 
when they run a comprehensive strategic campaign using as many comprehensive 
organizing tactics as possible. 
Figure m-43 : Comprehensive organizing campaigns, corporate structure, and election win rates in 
the manufacturing sector 
• Five or fewer tactics • More than five tactics 
While win rates in subsidiaries of large parent companies, publicly-held and 
privately-held for-profit companies, U.S.-based multinationals, and U.S.-based 
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companies with all sites in the U.S., all average between 20 percent and 32 percent in 
campaigns where the union uses five or fewer comprehensive tactics, they increase at 
least 30 percentage points when the union uses more than five of the ten comprehensive 
o n 
organizing tactics in our model. 
The most dramatic increases are in privately held for-profit companies, and U.S.-
based companies with all sites in the U.S. where average win rates increased to 100 
percent from 31 percent (privately-held companies) and 32 percent (U.S.-based with all 
sites in the U.S.). In U.S.-based multinationals win rates increase from 26 percent to 75 
percent and increase at least 30 percentage points to 57 percent in subsidiaries and 50 
percent in publicly-held for profits. 
As discussed earlier in this section (page 141), the lowest manufacturing win rates 
are in subsidiaries of foreign-based multinational companies (24 percent). That rate 
drops to 19 percent in campaigns where the union uses five or fewer comprehensive 
tactics and increases to 33 percent in campaigns where the union runs a comprehensive 
campaign using more than five comprehensive tactics. These findings are not surprising 
because not only are foreign-based multinationals much more likely to run aggressive 
anti-union campaigns, but the very fact that the company is foreign-owned with sites and 
operations in other countries serves as an unspoken threat to workers that their employer 
might readily shift operations out of the U.S. if they try to organize. Foreign-based 
companies are also not as vulnerable to the community-based pressure tactics that have 
been found to be effective for U.S.-based companies. Instead, they may require a much 
more global and extensive campaign that takes the union's cause to the country and 
30
 From this point forward we will use the term "comprehensive organizing campaign" to describe 
campaigns where the union used five or more of the ten comprehensive organizing tactics in our model. 
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community .where the company is headquartered. Yet not one of the campaigns in 
foreign-based multinationals in our sample ran a global campaign and only 10 percent ran 
any kind of external pressure campaign. 
Similarly, in the 31 percent of manufacturing campaigns where the company is in 
excellent financial condition, win rates went from 24 percent in campaigns with five or 
fewer than comprehensive tactics to only 33 percent in campaigns with more than five 
comprehensive tactics. In contrast, in firms outside the manufacturing sector company 
profitability do not appear to be associated with lower win rates (Table UI-3 on page 
143). This is likely because manufacturing firms in excellent financial condition are 
more apt to be large multinationals that have both the resources to aggressively oppose a 
union campaign and the ability to threaten to move work out of the country if workers 
organize. Thus for unions to win against these kinds of employers requires a much more 
comprehensive campaign than in less profitable firms. 
Comprehensive campaigns also are associated with higher win rates in companies 
where the employer made plant-closing threats (66 percent versus 14 percent) or changed 
ownership before the petition was filed (75 percent versus 39 percent), where there are 
other organized units at the same or other locations (50 percent versus 28 percent), and in 
campaigns which took place in AFL-CIO Union Cities (67 percent versus 36 percent). 
The findings relating to Union Cities suggest that they create a climate that serves to 
support and reinforce the effectiveness of most of the tactics in our model - including 
more union resources available to organizing, more training opportunities for organizers, 
and more community and union support and leverage to embolden workers to vote for the 
union and discourage the employer from running an aggressive anti-union campaign. 
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Comprehensive organizing campaigns, unit characteristics, and election outcome 
A similar trend emerges when we compare win rates across bargaining unit 
characteristics for manufacturing sector elections where unions use a more 
comprehensive organizing strategy (Figure HI-44). For production and maintenance 
units, where the overall win rate in manufacturing averages 31 percent, the win rate drops 
to 27 percent in campaigns where the union did not run comprehensive campaign, but 
increases to 63 percent in campaigns where the union did use a comprehensive 
organizing strategy. These data suggest that the relatively low win rates associated with 
production and maintenance bargaining units in manufacturing may be a function of the 
quality of the campaigns that unions are running in those units rather than anything 
directly relating to the attitudes and experiences of the production workers themselves. 
The findings also suggest that the negative impact on win rates in board 
determined units, where the election is delayed by the unit determination process and 
where the union ends up with a different unit than when the petition was originally filed, 
also can be overcome when unions run more comprehensive campaigns. In board-
deteimined units where the union did not use a comprehensive organizing strategy, the 
average win rate is only 19 percent. However, in board-determined units where the union 
ran a comprehensive campaign using more than five tactics the win rate increases to 50 
percent. 
When unions run comprehensive campaigns win rates also increase across all 
wage rates and demographic groups in the manufacturing sector, including units with or 
without a majority of women, workers of color, women workers of color, and/or 
immigrant workers. The increase in win rates ranges from 8 percentage points in units 
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where workers of color are in the minority, to 43 percentage points in units where women 
are in the majority, and 76 percentage points in units where workers average less than $8 
per hour in wages. In units where the majority of workers are women of color, win rates 
average as high as 68 percent in campaigns where the union uses five or fewer tactics but 
then increases to 82 percent in campaigns where the union does use a comprehensive 
organizing strategy. 
Figure EQ-44: Comprehensive organizing campaigns, unit characteristics, and election outcome in 
manufacturing sector campaigns 
• Five or fewer tactics • More than five tactics 
These findings confirm, once again, that women of color are the workers most 
predisposed to unions, and, if manufacturing unions run aggressive and comprehensive 
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campaigns targeting units with a majority of women of color, they could dramatically 
improve organizing success. But most importantly, the data on comprehensive tactics 
and bargaining unit characteristics suggests that the use of a comprehensive union 
strategy can greatly increase win rates across a range of unit types, wage rates, race, 
gender, ethnicity, and immigrant status. 
Comprehensive organizing strategies, employer behavior, and election outcome 
As we described earlier in the report, the overwhelming majority of 
manufacturing employers aggressively oppose union organizing efforts through a 
combination of legal and illegal anti-union tactics designed to dissuade workers from 
voting for the union through threats, intimidation, promises, misinformation, and 
coercion. Yet while almost all of the employer tactics are associated with lower win 
rates, in the manufacturing sector, win rates remain well under 50 percent, even in those 
campaigns where the employer did not aggressively oppose the union. 
Table HI-12 provides some important insight into why manufacturing unions still 
have relatively low win rates, even in the context of weak employer opposition. In all 
sectors combined, win rates for all but one of the individual aggressive employer tactics 
increase between 10 and 40 percentage points when unions use a comprehensive 
organizing strategy. The only exception involves campaigns where the employer 
threatens to bring in INS during the campaign. However, when we look solely at 
elections where there are undocumented workers in the unit, the win rate remains 40 
percent in campaigns where the union uses a comprehensive strategy but drops to 30 
percent in campaigns where the union failed to run a comprehensive campaign. 
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Table HI-12: Employer campaigns, comprehensive organizing tactics, and election outcomes 
All sectors Manufacturing sector 
More than five Five or fewer More than five Five or fewer 
comprehensive comprehensive comprehensive comprehensive 






















Hired management consultant 
Held more than five captive audience meetings 
Mailed more than five letters 
Distributed more than five anti-union leaflets 
Held supervisor one-on-ones at least weekly 
Established employee involvement program 
Made positive personnel changes 
Made promises of improvement 
Granted unscheduled raises 
Made unilateral changes 
Discharged union activists 
Used bribes and special favors 
Used electronic surveillance 
Held company social events 
Assisted anti-union committee 
Used paid or free media 
Used layoffs or contracting out 
Threatened to report workers to the INS 
Involved community leaders/politicians 

































































































































































A similar pattern is found in manufacUiring where, for the majority of individual 
aggressive employer tactics, win rates average 10 to 40 percentage points higher in units 
where the union ran comprehensive campaigns using more than five tactics in our model 
compared to campaigns where they used fewer than five tactics. The only exceptions are 
campaigns where the employer institutes an employee involvement program, makes 
positive personnel changes, or discharges workers for union activity. In those campaigns 
the win rate remains zero even where the union uses more than five comprehensive 
tactics. Similarly, in elections where the employer uses bribes and favors, the win rate 
averages 33 percent where the union uses more than five comprehensive tactics but drops 
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down only one percentage point where they do not use a comprehensive strategy. This is 
consistent with previous research that the use of the tactics is particularly effective at 
undennining worker support for the union (Rundle 1998, Bronfenbrenner 2001). When 
employers use these tactics it requires that the union use a much more comprehensive 
campaign than those run by the unions in our sample, one that uses eight, nine, or even all 
ten elements of the model rather than just five or six. 
In addition to examining win rates associated with comprehensive organizing 
tactics and individual employer tactics it is important to assess the impact of more 
aggressive comprehensive union campaigns relative to the overall intensity of the 
employer campaign. Figure 11-45 compares win rates in campaigns with weak employer 
opposition, moderately-aggressive employer opposition, and aggressive employer 
opposition in elections where the union ran a comprehensive campaign using more than 
five comprehensive organizing tactics versus elections where the union used five or fewer 
comprehensive organizing tactics (no comprehensive campaign). In all sectors, but in 
manufacturing in particular, we find that a union's use of a comprehensive organizing 
strategy is associated with significantly higher win rates in elections where the employer 
ran a moderately aggressive or aggressive campaign. .In elections with moderately 
aggressive employer campaigns, win rates average 93 percent overall and 75 percent in 
manufacturing, 100 percent in the service sector, and 65 percent in other sectors when the 
union runs a comprehensive campaign. However, win rates drop to 35 percent overall, 
29 percent in manufacturing, 42 percent in the service sector, and 38 percent in other 
sectors when the union fails to run a comprehensive campaign. 
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Figure DI-45: Intensity of employer opposition, comprehensive organizing tactics, and election 
outcome 
l Weak employer campaign/comprehensive 
union campaign 
l Weak employer campaign/no comprehensive 
union campaign 
Q Moderately aggressive employer 
campaign/comprehensive union campaign 
I Moderately aggressive employer campaign/no 
comprehensive union campaign 
I Aggressive employer 
campaign/comprehensive union campaign 
H Aggressive employer campaign/no 
comprehensive union campaign 
Even in campaigns with aggressive employer opposition, win rates in 
manufacturing double in elections where the union ran a comprehensive campaign (50 
percent) than in campaigns where the union failed to run a comprehensive campaign (25 
percent). The pattern is similar across industrial sectors increasing from 32 percent to 53 
percent in the service sector, 41 percent to 59 percent in other sectors, and 29 to 52 
percent overall in elections where the union ran a comprehensive campaign. 
The effect of comprehensive union campaigns is much more difficult to measure 
in campaigns with weak employer opposition because it is so rare for unions to run 
comprehensive campaigns when they face only weak employer opposition. As described 
in Figure 111-46, unions in the manufacturing and other sectors failed to run 
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comprehensive campaigns in any of the elections with weak employer opposition and 
only ran a comprehensive campaign in 6 percent of the service sector elections where the 
employer ran a weak campaign. These findings indicate that in the service sector, and to 
a lesser degree in other sectors, unions are still able to have relatively high win rates (78 
percent service sector, 58 percent other sectors) in campaigns with weak employer 
opposition where the union used five or fewer comprehensive organizing tactics. 
However, in the manufacturing sector, even in the context of a weak employer campaign, 
if unions fail to run a comprehensive campaign, win rates average as low as 29 percent, 
much lower than in elections with moderately aggressive or aggressive employer 
opposition where the union does run a comprehensive campaign. 
Once again these data suggest that in the manufacturing sector there are factors 
relating to corporate ownership structure, company characteristics, bargaining unit 
demographics, and organizing environment that make organizing in manufacturing more 
difficult regardless of the intensity of the employer campaign. Thus, while 
comprehensive campaigns are essential to union organizing success across a wide range 
of industries, firms, and bargaining units, comprehensive campaigns are most essential in 
the more challenging organizing environment of the manufacturing sector. Yet, as 
described in Figure HT-46, in all sectors only a small number of unions are regularly are 
using a comprehensive organizing strategy in NLRB election campaigns and unions are 
least likely to run comprehensive campaigns in the manufacturing sector where these 
strategies are most needed. 
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Figure IQ-46: Percent of elections where unions run comprehensive organizing campaigns, by 
intensity of employer opposition 
H Weak employer campaign • Moderately aggressive employer campaign B Aggressive employer campaign 
Overall unions are running comprehensive campaigns in 20 percent of elections 
with aggressive employer opposition, 7 percent of elections with moderately aggressive 
employer opposition, and 5 percent of elections with weak employer opposition. 
However, in the manufacturing sector, unions are running comprehensive campaigns in 
just 9 percent of elections with aggressive employer opposition, 6 percent of elections 
with moderately aggressive employer opposition, and, as mentioned above, none of the 
elections where there is weak employer opposition. 
The pattern is quite similar in other sectors where unions run comprehensive 
campaigns in only 14 percent of elections with aggressive employer opposition, 3 percent 
of the elections with moderately aggressive employer opposition, and none of the 
elections with weak employer opposition. The percentages are slightly better in the 
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service sector where unions run comprehensive campaigns in 35 percent of elections with 
aggressive employer opposition, 12 percent of elections with moderate employer 
opposition, and 8 percent with weak employer opposition. This suggests that it is the 
greater intensity and quality of union campaigns in the service sector, rather than lack of 
employer opposition, that is the primary reason for the significantly higher win rates in 
the service sector. 
Comprehensive organizing strategy and first contracts 
The importance of this model of comprehensive organizing campaigns goes well 
beyond the certification election campaign. As described below, comprehensive 
campaigns where the union used more than five comprehensive organizing tactics are 
associated with higher first contract rates as well. Overall, first contract rates average 74 
percent in elections where the union ran a comprehensive campaign using more than five 
tactics, compared to a 64 percent first contract rate in units where the union failed to run a 
comprehensive organizing campaign. In manufacturing, the first contract rate goes as 
high as 80 percent in units where the union does run a comprehensive campaign but 
averages 74 percent in campaigns where they do not. The percentages are slightly lower 
in the service sector (74 percent comprehensive campaign, 67 percent no campaign), and 
much lower in other sectors (68 percent comprehensive campaign, 50 percent no 
campaign). 
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Figure IQ-47: Comprehensive organizing tactics and first contract outcome 
H Five or fewer comprehensive organizing tactics B More than five comprehensive organizing tactics 
As we mentioned in our discussion of first contract rates in the beginning of Part 
HI, the higher first contract rates in manufacturing relative to the other sectors are a 
function of both the larger size of manufacturing units, and the fact that because unions 
organizing in the manufacturing sector are more likely to have already organized units in 
other branches or operations of the same employer, they have greater bargaining leverage 
during the first contract process. First contracts rates are lower in other sectors because a 
large percentage of elections take place in single site small units, where the union has less 
bargaining power. Also elections in both the service sector and other sectors are much 
more likely to involve unions for which the firm being organized is outside their 
traditional jurisdiction, which once again weakens their bargaining leverage. 
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These findings are also consistent with previous research on first contract rates in 
the public sector, where Bronfenbrenner and Juravich (1998) found that even in the 
context of extremely weak employer opposition, unions organizing in the public sector 
are more likely to win first contracts and to have higher post first contract membership 
rates in open and agency shops, when they run more aggressive comprehensive 
organizing campaigns. At the same time these findings further expand our understanding 
of the relationship between organizing tactics and first contract rates in the private sector. 
Previous research had shown that individual union tactics were not associated with higher 
first contract rates in the private sector (Bronfenbrenner 1993; 1996), because they were 
just one element in the very complex process of private sector first contract campaigns 
where continued aggressive employer opposition after the election and the nature and 
intensity of the union first contract campaign are the primary determinants of first 
contract outcome. In contrast, our findings here suggest that the use of a more 
comprehensive strategy during the organizing campaign is associated with higher win 
rates because it is more likely to lay the ground work of strategic targeting, leadership 
development, community and labor alliances, and internal and external pressure tactics 
upon which a more effective and powerful first contract campaign can be built. 
Unions and comprehensive organizing tactics 
As we have discussed so far, there is no question that some unions, such as the 
UAW in auto-transplants and auto-parts, CWA/IUE in high tech and electronics, USWA 
in metal production and fabrication, UNITE in garment and textile, or the UFCW in food 
processing, face much greater challenges organizing in their primary jurisdictions 
because they are confronted with more mobile, more global, and more powerful and 
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effective employer opposition, and, in some cases, a workforce less predisposed to 
unionization. Yet, as we have seen, even in the most adverse organizing environments, 
union organizing success can dramatically improve when unions utilize a comprehensive 
campaign strategy. Given these differences, what is perhaps most striking about our 
findings is how few unions are actually running comprehensive campaigns, or even 
consistently using any of the ten elements of our comprehensive campaign model. 
Table III-13 summarizes the use of comprehensive organizing tactics by the 
unions most actively organizing in manufacturing, and for comparison purposes, the three 
unions most actively organizing in the service sector (AFSCME, HERE, and SEIU). In 
our examination of the use of comprehensive tactics by all the unions in our sample we 
find that they tend to fall into three main groups. 
The first group, which, among those unions listed in Table III-13, includes HERE, 
SEIU, and UNITE, averages four or more tactics in all of their elections. The second 
group, which includes AFSCME, CWA/IUE, LIUNA, UAW, UBC, UFCW, and 
independent unions, averages three tactics per campaign. The third group, including 
GCIU, IAM, IBEW, IBT, IUOE, PACE, SMW, and USWA, averages two or fewer 
tactics in each campaign. 
For a more in-depth analysis of the data in this section see Bronfenhrenner and Hickey (2002). 
32
 As mentioned above for several of the unions in our sample-most notably CWA, HERE, and some of the 
building-trades unions-NLRB certification elections increasingly represent only a small portion of their 
recent private sector organizing efforts. Our organizer interviews suggest that, for these unions, their 
NLRB campaigns are secondary and thus tend to be more locally based and involve smaller units, with less 
strategic and less comprehensive campaigns, while their non-NLRB are much more likely to follow the 
comprehensive campaign model. Thus, if we were able to include non-NLRB campaigns in our sample, 
unions such as CWA, HERE, and IBEW, would likely display a higher average use of comprehensive 
organizing tactics. 
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Tabic HI-13: Number and percent of comprehensive organizing tactics, by union 
£ 
o P 
All unions in sample 
At least four comprehensive tactics 
Three comprehensive tactics 
Two or fewer comprehensive tactics 






































































































































































































































































As described in Figure ffl-48, only the unions in the first group consistently run 
organizing campaigns that combine at least four strategic tactics. The overall win rate for 
this group is 63 percent, the highest for any group, increasing to 74 percent when they run 
comprehensive campaigns using more than five comprehensive tactics. These unions, 
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SEIU, HERE, and UNITE, have gained national reputations for effective organizing. Yet 
only 30 percent of their campaigns average more than five comprehensive organizing 
tactics. This suggests that these unions may be capable of winning even more elections, 
if they used comprehensive organizing tactics more consistently. 
The second group of unions, on average, uses fewer tactics and is less likely to 
combine them into a comprehensive campaign. Unions in this group average three 
comprehensive tactics per campaign, and have an overall win rate of 44 percent. Only 8 
percent of campaigns run by unions in this group used more than five comprehensive 
organizing tactics. However, the win rate for those campaigns is 55 percent. 
The third group of unions uses comprehensive campaigns even more rarely. 
Unions in this group average two or fewer comprehensive organizing tactics per 
campaign, and, not surprisingly, have the lowest average win rate (38 percent) for all 
three groups. Half of the unions in this group, including unions such as IBEW, IUOE, 
PACE, and GCIU, did not conduct any comprehensive campaigns. Again, the win rate is 
much higher (67 percent), for the 3 percent of elections in this third group in which 
unions used more than five comprehensive organizing tactics. 
These data highlight four important trends. First, higher win rates are associated 
with campaigns that use five or more comprehensive organizing tactics for all three 
groups of unions. Second, higher win rates are associated with unions that consistently 
combine comprehensive organizing tactics in their campaigns. Third, there is a real mix 
of industries, companies, and unit types among the three union groups, yet 
comprehensive organizing tactics are consistently effective across the different union 
groupings. Fourth, those unions most actively organizing in the manufacturing sector are 
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overwhelmingly concentrated in the third group, with the least consistent and widespread 
use of comprehensive tactics, and the lowest win rates. 
Figure DI-48: Unions, comprehensive tactics, and election outcome 
Percent of Percent of Percent run Win rate Win rate for 
elections elections won comprehensive comprehensive 
campaigns campaigns 
The findings summarized in Table III-13 also confirm that the most successful 
unions are those that consistently combine comprehensive organizing tactics. The unions 
in the first group average at least 30 percent for all the tactics in the model and range as 
high as 41 percent (benchmarks), 42 percent (building for the first contract), 46 percent 
(workplace pressure tactics), and, most notably, 71 percent (targeting). The high 
targeting percentage for this group is particularly revealing because it suggests that these 
are the unions that are most committed to a strategic organizing plan, organizing within 
their primary jurisdiction, and fully knowledgeable about the ownership structure, 
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operations, finances, and vulnerabilities of the company of the company they are trying to 
organize. At the same time these data also reveal that, with the exception of targeting, 
even the most successful unions are using these tactics in fewer than half of their 
campaigns. Not only could an increase in frequency (and quality) of the use of all these 
tactics further increase win rates for these unions, but it also might facilitate getting more 
campaigns off the ground and winning them in larger units. 
The results for the second group, are much more uneven, ranging from 17 percent 
for external pressure tactics and 18 percent for resources to 44 percent for workplace 
pressure tactics and targeting. Overall, this group averaged lower than 30 percent for 
most of the tactics in the model. It is particularly striking that this second group rates low 
on resources (17 percent), one-on-one contact (23 percent), representative committee (27 
percent), and benchmarks and assessments (27 percent), since these are fundamental 
elements of a comprehensive campaign. If unions do not devote adequate or appropriate 
resources, fail to build rank-and-file leadership among the workers they are trying to 
organize, and fail to reach the majority of the members through person-to-person contact 
in the workplace and the community, their campaigns may never get off the ground far 
enough to correctly identify issues, build for the first contract, or effectively mobilize 
workers for internal or external pressure tactics. And, if they do not use benchmarks and 
assessments, they have no way of evaluating the effectiveness of their strategy, or when 
and whether to move on to the next phase of the campaign. The findings suggest that 
while these unions have been taking new initiatives and organizing more aggressively 
than in the past, they continue to use tactics in isolation, absent the interconnected, multi-
faceted union-building strategy required in the current organizing environment. 
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The third and largest group of unions, including the majority of the unions 
actively organizing in manufacturing, average lower than 15 percent for half the tactics in 
the model (resources, one-on-one contact, benchmarks, issues, and external pressure 
tactics) and lower than 27 percent for all the remaining tactics. This suggests that nearly 
half of the unions involved in NLRB certification elections, and the majority of unions 
organizing in the manufacturing sector, run campaigns not unlike those in the late 1980s 
when we first started tracking the nature and success of union organizing efforts 
(Bronfenbrenner 1993, 1997a). The findings are not surprising given that, on average, 
unions in this third group had adequate and appropriate resources in only 4 percent of 
their campaigns. Without such resources, it is difficult to pull together many of the other 
elements of the model. 
The trends for each individual tactic provide important insights into the nature of 
current organizing efforts. For example, the frequency of targeting and external pressure 
tactics varies widely among the three groups, while the use of member volunteers shows 
much less variation. This suggests that while more sophisticated tactics, such as targeting 
and external pressure tactics have yet to be embraced by many unions, even the least 
successful are comfortable with more traditional tactics, such as having members assist 
with organizing campaigns. Yet, even the most successful unions still do not make 
consistent use of such key tactics as adequate and appropriate resources, active 
representative committees, person to person contact, benchmarks and assessments, 
member volunteers, and internal and external pressure tactics. 
When we focus in particular on the unions most actively organizing in 
manufacturing we find that as a group they are most likely to use strategic targeting, 
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escalating workplace pressure tactics, and building for the first contract. Yet for many of 
the most critical elements, such as adequate and appropriate resources, one-on-one 
contact inside and outside the workplace, benchmarks and assessments, issues which 
resonate in the workplace and community, and escalating external tactics, at least 70 
percent of unions organizing in manufacturing use these tactics in less than a quarter of 
their campaigns and half use representative and active rank-and-file committees, member 
volunteer organizers in less than a quarter of their campaigns. 
Improving the odds of union organizing success in manufacturing 
In combination, the survey data confirm that the use of a multi-faceted 
comprehensive campaign plays a much greater role in determining election outcome than 
individual union tactics and many other election environment variables such as company 
characteristics, bargaining unit demographics, and even employer opposition. As we 
found in our recent study for the University of California Institute for Labor and 
Employment (ILE), the more comprehensive tactics used during the campaign, the 
greater the odds that the union will win the election, even when we control for industry, 
corporate structure, bargaining unit demographics, and employer opposition 
(Bronfenbrenner and Hickey 2002). According to our findings, while "most of the 
comprehensive tactics that make up our model do not have a statistically significant 
effect when used in isolation of other tactics.. .after controlling for election environment 
and employer opposition, each additional union tactic used by the union increases the 
odds of a union win by 34 percent" (34-35).33 Unions organizing in manufacturing face 
much greater challenges than unions organizing in other sectors. However, 
33
 Binary logistic regression was used for this analysis and our findings for the additive comprehensive 
union tactic variable were statistically significant at .001 or better. 
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manufacturing unions as a group also tend to run extremely weak, inconsistent 
campaigns, failing to take full advantage of the bargaining leverage, union resources, 
membership power and commitment, and labor and community alliances that could 
overcome these challenges. 
The ILE study also confirmed that manufacturing is a particularly challenging 
environment for organizing, and that even when we control for the influence of the 
election environment, bargaining unit demographics, and the union campaign, organizing 
in the manufactxiring sector decreases the odds of winning the election by as much as 48 
percent. Yet, given the fact that the overwhelming majority of unions organizing in 
manufacturing run extremely weak campaigns using on average only two comprehensive 
organizing tactics in each campaign, these findings speak more of opportunity than 
challenge. For as difficult as organizing in manufacturing may be, these findings suggest 
that unions could dramatically increase the odds of winning the election if they ran even 
slightly more aggressive campaigns using three or four more comprehensive organizing 
tactics. 
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PART IV: OVERCOMING THE CHALLENGES 
As we approach the end of 2002, there is no longer any question that the U.S. 
manufacturing sector is in a state of crisis. Not only did overall employment in 
manufacturing industries fall by 1.8 million jobs between January 1997 and December 
2001, but a disproportionate share of those employment losses were concentrated among 
union workers. In just five years, the labor movement lost nearly 10 percent of its 
manufacturing sector membership, and there is no end in sight. Never before have unions 
in manufacturing faced such large, powerful, and globally connected corporations 
opposed to organizing. Not since the 1920s have unions faced such unfettered 
government support for corporate interests and disregard, if not outright antipathy, for the 
rights and interests of workers and unions. 
But this is a crisis that goes beyond any individual industry or union. Instead it is 
one that impacts the entire labor movement. Membership gains by service and public 
sector unions were nullified by membership losses in manufacturing. These losses 
translate into the continuing decline in union density, and the decrease in both political 
power and bargaining power that union density provides, for all unions, not just those in 
the manufacturing sector. 
An increasingly hostile global economic environment has compounded the 
challenges created by both employment and union membership losses. Between 1997 
and 2001, trade balances fell across all commodities and increases in capital mobility 
heightened employment insecurity, as manufacturing workers became unwilling 
participants in a worldwide race to the bottom in wages and working conditions. Yet, 
despite employment losses and declining trade balances, net capital investment continues 
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to increase for most U.S. manufacturing industries, and most of the multinational 
employers that dominate manufacturing employment in the U.S., and around the globe, 
continue to rake in enormous profits, even at a time of layoffs and plant shutdowns. 
The trade and investment data make clear that despite massive job losses, and 
despite the exponential growth of employment in the service sector, manufacturing 
continues to play a key role in both the U.S. and world economies. There is no doubt that 
the U.S. economy will continue to produce manufactured goods. The challenge for the 
labor movement is whether those jobs will be union jobs that raise the standard of living 
for all workers in the surrounding community, or whether manufacturing employment in 
the U.S. will become largely non-union, with devastating repercussions for all workers in 
all sectors, union and non-union, their families, and the communities in which they live. 
Yet, as the NLRB election data in Part II make clear, despite the urgency of the 
crisis, industrial unions have yet to make the organizing gains necessary to stem the 
rising tide of de-unionization in the U.S. manufacturing sector. Across the manufacturing 
sector, the number of elections, the percent of elections won, and the percent of workers 
in organized units, continue to decline. By 2001 there were only 501 NLRB elections for 
the whole year, involving 76,438 workers, of which only 12,813 workers, 17 percent, 
were in units where the election was won. Unlike their counterparts in communications, 
construction, hospitality, laundries, and building services, almost none of the unions 
organizing in manufacturing are gaining new members through card check recognition 
outside of the NLRB process, and so there are only a small number of newly organized 
.workers from non-Board campaigns to add on to those organized under the NLRB. Thus, 
juxtaposed against the 615,000 union jobs lost just since 1997, including the 164,000 jobs 
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lost in 2001 alone, the 13,000 workers who gained union representation last year under a 
first contract made an almost insignificant dent in the bui'geoning union membership 
losses in the manufacturing sector. 
While unions organizing in the service sector have made relatively small gains in 
the context of the massive employment increases in those industries, at least they 
continue to grow, and, in the case of unions organizing in other sectors, are continuing to 
hold their ground. Why is it that unions organizing in manufacturing are having such 
limited success compared to their counterparts in other sectors of the economy? Based 
on the findings from our survey, the answers are clear. Manufacturing unions are losing 
both because they organize in a much more difficult environment than unions organizing 
in other sectors of the economy, and because they run much less strategic, 
comprehensive, and aggressive organizing campaigns. 
The bar is higher for unions organizing in manufacturing for multiple reasons. 
First and foremost, they are organizing among the largest, most mobile, and most 
powerful multinational corporations in the world. These are firms that have the resources 
and the sophistication to stop union campaigns before they even get off the ground, the 
global capacity to shut down, sell off, contract out, or move operations out of the country 
to remain "union free," and the kinds of ownership structures that are least vulnerable to 
public pressure and regulatory restraint. Although more diverse than in the past, the 
majority of manufacturing workers continue to be white, male, and native born, the 
demographic groups least receptive to unions in the more hostile private sector 
organizing environment. And, with new massive layoffs and plant closings being 
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announced each day, these are the workers who are most vulnerable to employer threats 
of discharge, layoff, or plant shutdown. 
Thus, we find that the win rates in manufacturing average as low as 29 percent 
even in those relatively rare instances where there is only minimal employer opposition 
to the union campaign. The very nature, structure, and culture of the majority of private 
sector manufacturing firms today sends an unspoken anti-union message even before the 
employer has a chance to send out supervisors to fight the union head on. 
We also find that, even when faced with these challenges, the majority of 
manufacturing unions continue to have the same staff and officers, run the same type of 
weak, understaffed, and non-strategic campaigns that they did thirty years ago. They are 
not committing adequate and appropriate staff and financial resources, not engaging in 
strategic targeting, not developing and utilizing rank-and-file leadership, not recruiting 
and training member volunteer organizers, not building the union one-on-one or acting 
like a union inside and outside the workplace, not choosing the issues that resonate 
among the workers they are trying to organize and the broader community, not using 
their power in the workplace and the community to build worker commitment to the 
union and restrain employer opposition, and they are not using the benchmarks and doing 
the hard assessments necessary to evaluate when and how to move ahead with the union 
campaign. Yet, as our findings clearly show, when unions in the manufacturing sector do 
use these tactics as part of a comprehensive organizing strategy, win rates increase 
dramatically across a wide range of ownership structures, bargaining unit demographics, 
company characteristics, and employer opposition. 
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This does not mean that the use of comprehensive campaigns guarantee 
organizing success even against the most powerful, multinational, anti-union employers. 
Some employers can and will stop at nothing to stay non-union, and some manufacturing 
plants will shut down and move no matter how strategic and comprehensive the union 
campaign. Instead, what our findings indicate is that despite the seemingly 
insurmountable challenges facing manufacturing unions, U.S. industrial unions have the 
potential to reverse their declining fortunes. There are some inherent strengths in the 
structure of U.S. manufacturing that provide unions the opportunity to change how 
industrial unions organize, and the potential to make the kinds of organizing gains 
necessary to regain their membership strength and the political and economic power that 
goes with it. 
First, manufacturing industries remain the most highly unionized in the private 
sector. Union density often serves as an indicator of union power, potentially increasing 
organizing success and bargaining strength. As such, manufacturing unions enjoy 
density nearly three times greater than the density in the service sector and nearly 30 
percent greater than the density in other sectors. Developing and implementing strategies 
that tap that potential strength will require greater coordination between unions' 
traditional core of activities — collective bargaining, political action, and organizing. 
Such coordination must include expanded use of bargaining leverage to gain card check 
neutrality in other sites, operations, and subsidiaries of the same employer. It also must 
include the integration of union activity throughout production chains to leverage 
customers and suppliers to pressure the employer to back off the anti-union campaign, 
recognize the union, and bargain a first agreement. It will also require taking on entire 
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firms and'industries, in intensive multi-site campaigns comparable to those being run by 
HERE in hotels, CWA in wireless telecommunications, and SEIU in health care. 
Second, the international trade and investment data reveal that an increasing 
number of unions organizing in manufacturing will need to use their bargaining power, 
membership density, and global union connections to run their organizing campaigns at 
an international level. Through Global Union Federations (formerly called International 
Trade Secretariats) and joint actions and discussions among unions working for the same 
large multinationals, industrial unions have scored impressive victories against 
recalcitrant employers, such as Imerys (PACE), and Bridgestone/Firestone (USWA). 
However, these comprehensive campaigns have tended to be defensive, reserved for the 
worst employers when the existence of the union is at stake. Transforming such 
comprehensive campaigns into offensive international organizing efforts could help 
mitigate the worst effects of global trade, international investment, and employer 
opposition. But it cannot be a one-sided relationship — if U.S. unions are going to seek 
the support of unions and non-government organizations around the globe, they are also 
going to have to become more engaged in supporting organizing and bargaining efforts 
by unions in other countries, by contributing resources, using their bargaining leverage, 
and engaging in cross-border actions. 
Third, in order to effectively use their density and bargaining power, industrial 
unions must become more strategic about choosing the bargaining units, firms, industries, 
and sectors where they can best use their bargaining leverage either directly through 
already organized units in the same firm, or indirectly through unionized customers, 
suppliers, and current or future investors. Moving to the service sector or public sector in 
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search of easier election wins does nothing to stop the erosion of density within their 
primary industries or strengthen their bargaining power among already organized units. 
Instead, it expends resources in an environment where they may be able to win elections 
more easily but have neither the density nor experience in the industry to effectively 
bargain for and represent the unit after the election is won, and distracts them from 
focusing on the critical task of increasing union density within their primary industries. 
If industrial unions do not organize in manufacturing, no other unions will, and if no 
unions organize in manufacturing, the entire labor movement will quickly become 
irrelevant. 
Fourth, part of organizing strategically is doing the research and power analysis of 
the employer before the campaign is launched, so that unions can best evaluate which 
targets they should focus on first, which workers in which manufacturing industries and 
firms will be most receptive to organizing, and where unions can best exert leverage to 
restrain the employer and bring them to the table to bargain the first agreement. Many 
industrial unions are far ahead of their counterparts in the service and other sectors when 
it comes to using research to inform strategy during comprehensive contract campaigns. 
Starting with the OCAW at BASF, UMW at Pittston, and the USWA at Ravenswood in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, increasing numbers of industrial unions have honed a 
multi-faceted, escalating, and more often than not, global strategy to take on some of the 
most powerful multinationals and investors in the world. Yet many of these same unions 
balk at launching equally intensive, aggressive, international, and comprehensive 
campaigns when attempting to organize workers in equally large, globally connected, and 
anti-union multinational corporations. 
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Fifth, industrial unions need to commit the appropriate staff and financial 
resources necessary to take on these kinds of employers and win. Because units in 
manufacturing tend to involve greater numbers of eligible voters, and because 
manufacturing employers tend to be larger in scope, organizing campaigns in these firms 
and industries will require more staff, more member volunteers, and more supplies, 
equipment, veliicles, and facilities. At a time when many industrial unions are faced with 
a rapidly declining dues base, finding and committirig these resources becomes more and 
more difficult. But it is essential all the same. And, it bears remembering, putting out the 
resources to launch a large organizing drive still costs the union less than the devastating 
costs of losing units to decertifications, broken strikes, or plant closings. 
Sixth, while changing demographics in the workforce may pose a difficult 
challenge to some unions, these new workers from diverse ethnic, racial, and gender 
backgrounds can also offer an opportunity to jump start a more inspired, committed, and 
effective grass roots movement to organize industrial workers, just as they did in earlier 
union organizing struggles among textile workers in Lawrence Massachusetts in the early 
1900s or during the rise of the industrial union movement in the 1930's. Capitalizing on 
those opportunities will require not only organizing more women, people of color, and 
immigrants into unions, but providing the training and leadership development to fully 
integrate newly organized workers into unions, and recruit new organizers from the 
membership. Ideally this means pulling together a mix of organizers, some experienced 
staff and leaders, some member volunteers or members on release time, and some young 
and passionate organizers who have the energy, enthusiasm, mobility, and training 
required to organize in a more hostile and complex organizing environment. 
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Seventh, manufacturing unions must change how they are mnning campaigns. It 
is too easy to blame the global economy, labor law, and employer opposition for their 
organizing failures. Unfortunately, the majority of industrial unions who continue to run 
weak and ineffectual organizing campaigns have mostly themselves to blame. For, as our 
research has repeatedly shown, when unions run more comprehensive and strategic 
organizing campaigns, they win more elections, even against the most aggressive 
employer opposition in the most challenging organizing environments. 
Industrial unions need to take a hard look at the nature and intensity of the 
campaigns they are losing, and determine what they could do differently to take on the 
same or similar employers and win. Most of all, it will mean doing the hard slow work of 
developing representative rank-and-file leadership and giving them an active role in the 
campaign; recruiting, training, and effectively using member volunteer organizers from 
already organized units; identifying and mobilizing around issues which resonate with 
workers and the broader community; engaging in escalating internal and external 
pressure tactics to build commitment among the workers and constrain the employer anti-
union campaign; and starting to act like a union and begin the process of building for the 
first contract before certification is won. 
Eighth, unions need to establish clear benchmarks to determine what they need to 
accomplish before moving forward with the campaign, and an effective assessment 
system to honestly evaluate worker support and commitment to the union campaign at 
every stage of the process. This requires not moving forward with the campaign unless 
and until a representative committee is in place, not filing the petition for the election or 
demanding recognition until they have a solid majority of the broadest possible unit, and 
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not moving forward to an election, or to demanding recognition, until, through assessing 
a series of escalating tests, such as wearing a union button, attending a union rally, 
speaking out in captive audience meetings in the workplace and in public meetings with 
community and labor allies, they are certain that they have maintained majority support. 
In some cases, this will also require withdrawing from organizing campaigns before the 
election is held in order to avoid a devastating loss that emboldens the employer to 
brutalize the workers in the unit where the election took place and undeirnines union 
organizing efforts, not just for their union, but other unions in the same firm, industry, or 
community. 
Ninth, industrial unions must build alliances with other unions, community 
groups, political leaders, clergy, and other non-government organizations before the 
organizing campaign begins. This is necessary both to create a more supportive 
environment for the workers who are organizing and to shine the light of public 
awareness on the employer campaign. For only by building these alliances and coalitions 
can unions engage other stakeholders in the company and community in bringing the 
leverage necessary to restrain employers from more aggressive opposition and encourage 
them to recognize the union and bargain a strong first agreement. 
Tenth, and last, unions in the service sector and other sectors must make assisting 
industrial unions with organizing in manufacturing as much of a priority as organizing in 
their own primary jurisdictions. It is all too easy for unions in industries less vulnerable 
to the effects of global trade and investment, with bargaining unit demographics more 
receptive to unions, and with more accessible workplaces that are also more vulnerable to 
community, government, and/or customer leverage, to sit back and tell industrial unions 
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to stick to their own jurisdictions. There are perfectly understandable reasons why 
industrial unions are turning towards targets in the service and non-profit sector and why 
service sector and public sector unions have no interest in expanding into the 
manufacturing sector. They all know just how difficult it is to organize in manufacturing 
today. 
Because keeping manufacturing industries unionized is so essential to the future 
of the entire labor movement, if unions outside the manufacturing sector want industrial 
unions to focus on building and expanding their power in their primary industries, then 
they must do everything they can to encourage a more positive climate for organizing in 
manufacturing. This includes providing resources, contributing staff and member 
volunteers, and assisting with community coalitions, organizing actions, and pressuring 
the employer. But most of all it means working with all the unions in communities where 
unorganized manufacturing firms are located to create the kind of "union city" 
atmosphere that effectively counteracts the fear, intimidation, threats, and misinformation 
that are so much a part of nearly every manufacturing employer campaign. Only in this 
kind of environment, with this kind of comprehensive labor support, will the UAW 
succeed in organizing the auto transplants, the USWA organize the mini-mills, the 
CWA/IUE bring back unions in the electronics industry; PACE take on the paper and 
chemical industries, and UNITE be able to build a union movement across the small 
garment shops that are clustered in large urban areas on both the East and West Coasts. 
The challenges facing unions organizing in manufacturing are enormous. But as 
the data we have summarized in this report make clear, the future of the U.S. labor 
movement depends on all unions, industrial and non-industrial alike, to do what is 
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necessary to overcome those challenges and rebuild the industrial labor movement as 
quickly, effectively, and as extensively as possible. It will not be easy. Yet, because of 
the density that manufacturing unions still enjoy in certain firms and industries, and 
because there continue to be some manufacturing industries that are less vulnerable to 
global competition and job losses, and because industrial unions have yet to put in the 
necessary resources, and run more aggressive and more strategic comprehensive 
campaigns, there are great opportunities as well. The biggest challenge for 
manufacturing unions is whether they are willing and able to do what it is necessary to 
take full advantage of those opportunities, and whether they can bring in the rest of the 
labor movement to help them in overcoming the challenges to organizing in 
manufacturing, and help the industrial union movement to rise again. 
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